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Summary 
This thesis is an evaluation of Roman light infantry and non-pitched battle combat in the 
Roman army, from the years 264 BC – AD 235.  This study incorporates a thorough 
etymological assessment of the Latin and Greek vocabulary of light infantry, and how the 
ancient sources use these terms.  Building on this assessment, this thesis then includes a 
discussion on defining Roman light infantry.  From this follows an analysis of the various 
modes of combat of these troops, including skirmishing, ambushing, small-scale 
engagements.  A ‘face of battle’ approach (after John Keegan) assessing the nature and 
experience of the various forms of warfare mentioned above is also included. 
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1  Introduction 
This thesis is a study of the Roman army’s light infantry and the nature of the combat that 
these types of troops were involved in, from the year 264 BC to AD 235.  These dates have 
been have been chosen for several reasons.  The first is that the timeframe required for a 
study of Roman light infantry must inherently be broad, due to the relatively little amount of 
evidence that we have for this portion of the army.  Another reason these dates were chosen is 
that they encompass a period in Roman history during which its military activity was very 
high.  Beginning with the First Punic War in 264 BC, the wars and campaigns that followed 
this date saw Rome’s gradual dominance of the Mediterranean world.  As such, the military 
activity in this period was also increasingly widespread, involving rising numbers of soldiers, 
up until the disbandment of over 30 legions under Augustus.  Thus, this period of intense 
military activity naturally includes the significant use of light infantry.  The final century 
leading up to the establishment of the Roman Empire saw major organizational changes in 
the army, including the disappearance of the dedicated light infantry unit known as the 
velites.  Nevertheless, light infantry still existed in the Roman army and this thesis assesses 
this change through the Principate.  The terminus ad quem for this thesis is the beginning of 
the so-called ‘Crisis of the Third-Century’, due to the chaotic nature of the history of this 
period and the profound changes which the ‘Crisis’ had on all of the Empire’s institutions, 
and the army in particular.  
Within this temporal framework, I have attempted to compile and assess the extant evidence 
for the Roman light infantry and, from this, derive possibilities for the nature of the combat 
scenarios they experienced.  The thesis begins with a review of our sources’ etymological 
uses of the terms describing these troops.  Building on this assessment, I discuss how we 
might define Roman light infantry.  This is followed by an examination of their tactical uses 
on campaigns and the possible reasons for their wide variety of deployments.  Finally, I use 
all of this information to discuss the nature of the various modes of combat light troops were 
often involved in.  This includes skirmishing, both within and outside the widely assessed 
theatre of pitched battle but putting a special emphasis on a non-pitched combat.   
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Light Infantry 
A great majority of works in the literature focus on heavy infantry and pitched battles and 
only a few publications emphasize the importance of the light infantry.1  Even fewer 
publications assess non-pitched battle combat and skirmishing, and the dominant role that 
light infantry played in these situations.2  Indeed, a thorough study of the light infantry in the 
Roman army has not yet been undertaken.3  This is the reason for the present work.  Rome’s 
light infantry – and their modes of combat – has long been ignored, silently classified as 
unimportant, which, like skirmishing, seem to be derived from an apparent prejudice in our 
sources.4  Indeed, Polybius’ assertion that the velites were selected from the ‘youngest and 
poorest’ almost reads as ‘least important’ – at least it seems to have been interpreted in this 
way by modern scholars, given the lack of modern scholarship on the subject.  Despite this 
bias, the existence of the lightly armed troops in all armies throughout the history warfare is 
testament in itself to the integral nature of such troops.  Thus, the present work will attempt to 
elucidate what kind of troops these were and their role in Roman warfare.   
In order to understand the role of light infantry better, it is necessary to attempt to define 
them.  Thus, Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis assess the Greek and Latin vocabulary used to 
describe these troops by our ancient authors. 
Vocabulary of Light Infantry 
The aim of these chapters is to lay the groundwork for the discussion that defines what the 
light infantry was.  This will include clarifying and discussing the various Greek and Latin 
terms, uses, organization and equipment of the light infantry.  For many of the groups 
discussed, there are no distinct definitions or descriptions.  Therefore, I have attempted to 
                                                 
1
 Some examples of historiography emphasizing the importance of light infantry: Foss 1975, 26; Gilliver, 1996a, 
passim; Rawlings 2007, 86; Trundle 2010, passim. 
2
 E.g. Gilliver 2007b, 141-143. 
3
 There are however, a handful of studies on the auxilia of the imperial Roman army, and this division of troops 
has been described as the light infantry by sources such as Tactius; see n. 145, below. 
4
 E.g. Tac. Hist. 2.24; Plut. Comp. Lys. et Sull. 4, where in describing the death of the Spartan general Lysander, 
he says he threw away (paranalw/saj) his life ingloriously, running like a peltasth/j (Lu/sandroj de\ 
peltastou= kai\ prodro/mou di/khn a)klew=j paranalw/saj e(auto/n) (see also chapter 3).  It is thus 
implied that glory was gained in standing your ground when facing death.  However, this could be the bias or 
topos of our sources Cf. Van Wees, 2004, 78, 83.  Similarly, Gilliver 1996a, 55.  For Greek sources overlooking 
light infantry, and the similar importance of light infantry to Greek armies that their Roman counterparts had, 
see Trundle 2010, passim.  That modern historiography does not include an in-depth study of Roman light 
infantry could be a reflection of the ancient tendency to avoid discussing light infantry in detail, see p. 6, below. 
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deduce this information by analysing the descriptions of these units in some instances of their 
usage.  The aim of this analysis will be to focus on how the ancient sources discuss tactical 
manoeuvres, and from this, draw information on the light infantry organization and their 
equipment.  The conclusions drawn will aid us in defining light infantry in a Roman context.  
Part of this analysis will also include a comparison of the Latin and Greek terminology in 
Chapter 4 with a view to establishing any similarities between the various definitions.  All of 
these assessments will be drawn together in Chapter 5 in a discussion on defining the light 
infantry.  With these definitions established, an assessment of the tactical roles and then the 
nature of skirmishing and low-intensity warfare will be included in Chapters 6 and 7. 
It is important to remember that, as with most ancient armies, there were few steadfast 
conventions (if any in some cases) when it comes to the unit size and armament.  In the 
Roman military, there were of course basic standards of armament, if only to create tactical 
cohesiveness within the formal units.5  However, the nature of many light units, especially 
before the establishment of the standing army, probably allowed for variation in the 
armament, most of which is difficult to ascertain from our sources.  Also, in regards to the 
organization, it must be remembered that theoretical number strength almost never matched 
actual unit numbers, which was something that was impossible for any army to maintain at all 
times, especially while on campaign.6  Strategic and tactical circumstances often required 
flexibility of a campaigning army, which in turn, could demand that unit size be altered, and 
the Roman army often did this.7  That said, the assessments in Chapters 2 and 3 will present 
evidence on the organization and equipment of the light units by analysing them in the 
strategic, tactical and philological contexts.   
Historiography 
The study of the Roman army really involves an exercise in Military Intelligence 
… The principal task of Military Intelligence is to discover and assess the 
strength, Order of Battle, organization, equipment and value for war of an 
enemy’s army.8 
                                                 
5
 For more on the variability in equipment within units, see Burns 2003, 67-70; Gilliver 2007a, passim and esp. 
op. cit. nn.11, 12 for further bibliography. 
6
 Cf. Elton 2007, 377 who notes that generalising is necessary to some extent in Roman ‘face of battle’ studies. 
7
 The cohortal system is a prime example of this, cf. Bell 1965. 
8
 Birley 1988, 3. 
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Modern Roman military studies in English owe much to Eric Birley and his observation 
above is particularly significant for this study.  The Military Intelligence Birley speaks of has 
yet to be gathered for the light infantry of the Roman army and their modes of combat.  Thus, 
it is the aim of this thesis to do so.   
Much of the older work on the Roman army (especially that coming out of the ‘Durham 
School’ originated by Birley), has isolated the army from its working context, focusing on the 
organization and the careers of the soldiers.9  As Hanson has observed, many of the standard 
modern texts on classical armies are general surveys; indeed, the wide general interest in the 
Roman army has produced just such works on our subject.10  The more scholarly works on 
the Roman army include contextual approaches that have contributed to a resurgence in the 
significance of Roman military history within the field of ancient history and classical 
studies.11  Phang has recently reviewed these approaches at length, and they include morality 
of war, cultural ideals, Augustan reforms, imperial military discipline, demography, ethnicity, 
religion, gender and sexuality, social status and the face of combat.12  Yet, as James has 
suggested, Roman military scholarship has had a tendency to shy away from the more violent 
aspects of the Roman military studies, which is probably partially due to the distaste of the 
principal theme of bloodshed.13  Alternatively, as Lee has pointed out, there is also an implicit 
psychological dimension inclusive of overtones of subjectivity, which has probably had some 
part in historians’ avoidance of the subject.14  The relatively small number of publications that 
                                                 
9
 Cf. e.g. Watson 1969, Dobson 1978, Maxfield 1981, Mann and Roxan 1988, Davies 1989, Breeze and Dobson 
1993; cf. James 2002, 21. 
10
 Hanson 2007, 8; general works, e.g. Connolly 1998, Goldsworthy 2003, Gilliver et al. 2005.   
11
 Gilliver 2007b, 122, v. esp. n. 2; cf. Speidel 1992c, 18-19.  Also, post-2005 there is a notable increase in the 
number of scholarly bibliographic items for Roman military history of the period studied in this thesis.  E.g. 
Lendon 2005; Domingez Monedero 2005; Kagan 2006; Lendon 2006; Quesada Sanz 2006; Southern 2006; 
Cambridge History…Roman Warfare 2007; A Companion to the Roman Army 2007; Gilliver 2007a; Phang 
2008; Sage 2008; Dobson 2008; Waffen in Aktion…ROMEC 2010; Koon 2010; Mattern 2010; A Companion to 
the Punic Wars 2011.  This resurgence seems to have begun in the mid-1990s; many more bibliographic items 
could be included here if listed post-1995.  Reasons for this resurgence may be tied to the widening gap between 
the modern age and the World Wars, as they had an ostensibly negative effect on military scholarship, see James 
2002, 12-14. 
12
 Phang 2011, passim; some examples: morality of war: Rosenstein 1990, Gilliver 1996b; cultural ideals: 
Lendon 2005, Wallace-Hadrill 2008; Augustan reforms: Alston 2007, Gilliver 2007c; discipline: Lendon 2005, 
Phang 2008; demography: Scheidel 1996, Rosenstein 2004; ethnicity: Speidel 1975, Southern 1989; religion: 
Speidel 1978b, Southern 2006; gender and sexuality: Phang 2001, Williams 2010; social status: Breeze and 
Dobson 1993, Bragg et al. 2008; face of combat: Goldsworthy 1996, Sabin 2000.  For a general overview of 
Roman battle historiography, see Sabin 2007, 401. 
13
 James 2002, 1, 12-14; also the individual’s experience is harder to clarify due to lack of evidence, cf. 
Campbell 1997, 479, and ch. 7, below.  However, this ‘shyness’ of bloodshed is something that is less prevalent 
in scholarship as of late, see n. 9, above. 
14
 Lee 1996, 199. 
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do address the violence involved (often through the ‘face of battle’ approach), commonly 
focus on the pitched battles and their tactics.15  As mentioned above, pitched battles were 
certainly the climax of a campaign, and commonly offered a decisive result in a war.  This is 
probably why our sources focus on them.16  However, the focus on battle by both ancient and 
modern authors is, as Elton has noted, misleading.17  While this focus on pitched battle is a 
direct result of the emphasis placed on them in ancient historiography, these were probably 
not the most common forms of combat.  It might take years of continuous campaigning 
before a set-piece battle.18  Thus, during this time, any combat that may have occurred could 
have taken the form of skirmishes or more static pitched battle-like combat (only on a smaller 
scale and more spontaneous), which I have defined below as non-pitched battle.19  As a result, 
soldiers on campaign may have engaged in these types of combat more often than pitched 
battle.  Furthermore, due to the spontaneity of these engagements, as well as the fluidity of 
skirmishing, light infantry was especially relied upon in these situations.  So, if skirmishing 
and non-pitched battle were some of the more common forms of combat, and if light infantry 
played a significant (if not dominant) role in these situations, we require a thorough study of 
both light infantry, and their combat roles – particularly as regards skirmishing and non-
pitched battle.  In this way, we may form a more complete understanding of the Roman army 
and the way it fought.   
The focus on combat in the latter part of this thesis places this work amongst ‘face of battle’ 
studies.20  Thus, some of the most significant publications in regards to this thesis are works 
on the face of battle.  These include publications by Lee (1996), Goldsworthy (1996), Sabin 
(2000), Zhmodikov (2000), Kagan (2006) and Koon (2011).  A review of this historiography 
will be included in Chapter 7 on the nature and experience of skirmishing and non-pitched 
battle combat. 
What is Non-Pitched Battle? 
…In war nothing is so insignificant as not sometimes to involve serious 
consequences (Livy 25.18) 
                                                 
15
 E.g. Goldsworthy 1996, Sabin 2000, Zhmodikov 2000, Daly 2002; cf. also Phang 2011, 119-20, esp. nn.82-
85. 
16
 Cf. James 2002, 1; also Giddens 1985, 2, 18; Fuller 1954. 
17
 Elton 2007, 380. 
18
 Sabin 2007, 403. 
19
 See ‘What is Non-Pitched Battle’, below. 
20
 Discussed further below, see ‘A Face of Battle Study’, p. 7. 
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This observation from Livy lends great weight to the importance of this thesis.  Ancient 
narratives and modern scholarship has focused on pitched battles, but these usually occurred 
when neither side felt at a disadvantage, and so this dependence on a degree of mutual 
consent meant that it may have taken extended periods of campaigning to engage in such a 
set-piece combat.21  This is particularly true for the imperial period, as James has pointed out, 
Full-scale battle was a relatively rare expedient, most routine objectives being 
achieved by less drastic and expensive methods (although not necessarily less 
drastic or expensive to its opponents or victims).22 
Nevertheless, the focus on pitched battles in our ancient sources and, as a result, in our 
modern ones, is a consequence of the Roman view that the pitched battle gave the greatest 
and most honourable results in warfare.23  Indeed as Goldsworthy plainly put it, ‘battles are 
important because they decide things’.24  Thus, despite the fact that our sources tell us of 
many skirmishes and small-scale engagements that took place during continuous 
campaigning, there is a significant dearth of a detailed narrative on these events.  
Consequently, the lack of the scholarly research on these events is a direct result of the way 
they are presented in the sources.25  This ancient historiographical approach is best 
summarized by a statement from Tacitus: 
…the skirmishers had met in a series of actions, frequent indeed, but not worth 
relating (Tac. Hist. 2.24) 
Yet, such ‘actions’ are surely worth relating because in fact, they were probably the most 
common type of combat a Roman soldier faced on a campaign.  This may be justified as 
follows.  During the period under review, there are significant periods where a relatively low 
level of military activity occurred.  As Rich has pointed out, 167-91BC is one of these 
periods, and as such, it required lower force levels than the preceding period.26  The first and 
second century AD also saw significantly fewer pitched battles that the two preceding 
centuries.  Nevertheless, Roman military forces were consistently maintained throughout the 
500-year period under review.  Furthermore, the Roman soldier was constantly trained for 
                                                 
21
 Sabin 2007, 403.  There are no publications on non-pitched battle, although Gilliver 2007b includes a brief 
discussion of such warfare, see n. 2, above. 
22
 James 2002, 38. 
23
 Gilliver 2007b, 125. 
24
 Goldsworthy 1996, 3. 
25
 Cf. Woolf 1993, 186-188 who points out that little is known about these kinds of incidents, the frequency and 
seriousness of which is under-reported in the literary sources.  During the empire, this may have been motivated 
by imperial pressure or propaganda and the emperor’s desire to save face, ibid. 187. 
26
 Rich 1993, 47-48. 
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combat, which was likely expected to occur at any given time.  This combat may have 
included ambushes, skirmishes, small-scale operations, and street fighting in siege warfare.27  
In this way, the pitched battle was often (but perhaps not always) just the climax of an 
extensive campaign.  The more common types of combat are what we may generally label as 
a non-pitched battle and this is the most common form of combat that most soldiers would 
have seen during our period.28  The nature of this combat often precluded traditional heavy 
infantry tactics and so as mentioned above, light infantry were the dominant type of soldier 
used in these situations.  As a result, because this thesis seeks to understand the nature and 
experience of non-pitched battle combat and skirmishing, it is likewise necessary to clarify 
our understanding of the types of troops commonly used in these situations, i.e. the light 
infantry.  Thus, this study of skirmishing and non-pitched battle in Roman warfare is 
necessarily also a study of Roman light infantry. 
A ‘Face of Battle’ Study  
As mentioned above, this thesis also seeks to add to the small corpus of Roman ‘face of 
battle’ studies with an assessment of the nature of the combat conducted by the light infantry.  
These types of studies apply John Keegan’s ‘Face of Battle’ approach to investigate the 
experience of the ancient combat.29  As a result of this approach, we currently have a much 
clearer picture of what Roman battle could have looked like.  Yet, due to the aforementioned 
concentration on the legionaries or heavy infantry in our sources, the experience of combat 
for the light infantry is much more difficult to ascertain.  As a result, none of the extant ‘face 
of battle’ studies for the Roman army have evaluated this experience for light infantry; this 
thesis seeks to fill that gap. 
As Phang has recently pointed out, reconstructing Roman combat has long been 
controversial.  Much of this controversy has concerned the machine-like discipline and 
ordered movement that seventeenth to nineteenth century warfare anachronistically imposed 
on the Roman combat.30  In addition, since we have no eyewitness accounts of the combat for 
                                                 
27
 Particularly in provinces like Spain where the period 153-133 BC saw continued fighting. 
28
 More precise definitions of non-pitched battle and skirmishing are given in chapter 7, where they are essential 
to the analysis. 
29
 These studies include: Goldsworthy 1996, Sabin 2000, McCall 2002, Daly 2002, Koon 2011; cf. Keegan 
1976.  They are reviewed at length in Chapter 7, under ‘Historiography’, directly preceding my own use of the 
‘face of battle’ approach. 
30
 Phang 2011, 119-120; cf. Goldsworthy 1996, 283; James 2002, 32, 38. 
8 
 
our period apart from Caesar’s commentaries, there is a significant dearth of evidence on the 
matter.  This is a very important point to keep in mind for this thesis; much of the discussion 
regarding the possibilities of the nature and experience of combat for light infantry is open to 
interpretation as a result of our lack of evidence. 
Despite this, research that humanizes the Roman army is an important step away from the 
mechanized view that the Roman army scholarship has taken in the past.31  As James has 
effectively put it,  
the shift of focus from army-as-institution to soldiers-as-people is … fundamental 
for understanding all aspects of the Roman military, [including] our idea of what 
motivated Roman soldiers to behave as they did … on the battlefield or in sacking 
cities.  It is a key part of widening the spectrum of research towards a more truly 
holistic study of the military aspect of Roman civilization.32 
This thesis seeks to be a holistic study of the Roman light infantry.  All milites in the Roman 
army were recruited as combatants.  Their primary purpose was to engage in combat, in 
whatever way best suited the tactical exigency.  Roman light infantry were an integral part of 
this combative force, and to understand them properly, we must understand what kind of 
soldiers they were and how they contributed to the military effort of the army.  
 
                                                 
31
 Works emphasizing a mechanized view: e.g. Liddell Hart 1926, Fuller 1954, Luttwak 1976, Webster 1985, 
Birley 1988, Peddie 1994. 
32
 James 2002, 44. 
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2 Latin Vocabulary of Light Infantry 
In order to understand both the tactical role of light-armed troops and the experience of low-
intensity combat better, it is necessary to discuss the varieties of light infantry units.  A 
philological assessment of the ancient terms for these units, as well as whatever information 
of their organization, equipment and role we might garner from the corresponding evidence, 
should provide the basis from which to analyze their experience during combat.  The 
following chapters will assess both the Latin and Greek terms associated with light infantry.  
The major issue with such an undertaking is the lack of source material.  Many of the terms 
associated with light infantry appear rarely in the literary sources, and even more rarely in 
epigraphic evidence.  Although some terms appear more frequently, the sources often have 
little to offer as far as clarifying any details of the type of contingent mentioned.  This is one 
of the major reasons that a thorough assessment of light infantry has yet to appear in modern 
historiography.   
Despite these issues, below I have attempted the first comprehensive list of terminology for 
light infantry, along with a description of their philological and tactical uses.  This chapter 
includes Latin terms in alphabetical order, while the following chapter will cover Greek 
terms.  In each section, I will also note when the ‘earliest historiographical use’ occurs.  This 
refers to the earliest usage of the term (in the language under discussion) in reference to the 
Roman army, in terms of the time of writing, rather than the date of the historical 
circumstances of the events being written about in the source. 
Accensi33 
These men appear as a formal part of the early manipular army in Livy, with additional 
references in Varro, Vegetius and Festus.  Varro’s reference to accensos in his discussion of 
the office of the magister equitum at 5.14 of De Lingua Latina is the earliest historical usage 
of the term.  Varro does not discuss accensos at this point in his work, and simply says that 
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 Since this term is often used to denote any sort of attendant, and as a verb, denoting something being kindled 
or set alight, the proceeding assessment only includes instances where the term is used as a noun in a military 
context to specifically denote personnel, unless otherwise stated. 
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the magister equitum has power over these and the cavalry.  Significantly, accensi are not 
mentioned in any other sources, and they only appear as part of the army in three places in 
Livy, once in Vegetius, in three chapters in Varro and four times in Festus.34  This scarcity of 
references to these men compared the other units of the manipular army (i.e. hastati, 
principes, triarii, and velites) is significant because I would argue that it is a strong indicator 
of some misinterpretation of their position or role, particularly on Livy’s behalf.  As far as 
their position is concerned, Livy places them at the back of the legion with the rorarii and the 
triarii.  However, they are not mentioned in Polybius’ description of the manipular army.35  
Oakley has satisfactorily dealt with this issue as follows: that Livy mentions them as the fifth 
line of the legion (i.e. being placed in the rear after the principes, hastati, triarii and rorarii), 
is probably the result of ‘a confused attempt to incorporate the five Servian classes into the 
manipular army’.36  This also explains why they are not mentioned by Polybius: they simply 
were not part of the fighting force, which is a notion we shall return to shortly.  That they are 
connected with the rorarii (in Varro as well at Ling. 7.58), causes the perception that they are 
also light-armed troops, however, as Oakley points out, the rorarii have also been misplaced 
and misunderstood by Livy, and may have simply been an earlier form of velites.37  Whether 
the accensi are at all classifiable as light troops then, has come into question, and I will 
attempt to clarify their position here. 
Much of modern scholarship has accepted the accensi as some sort of light infantry unit, or as 
assistants to their heavy infantry comrades.38  A closer investigation of our sources reveals 
that the latter is probably more realistic.  Indeed, following Mommsen, Cary equates them to 
apparitores or public servants who attended Roman magistrates.39 Nevertheless, there are a 
number of possibilities regarding the military function of the accensi that are worth 
discussing.  Yet, as we will see, several of these possibilities are highly unlikely.   
                                                 
34
 Livy 1.43, 8.8, 8.10; Veg. Mil. 2.19; Varro Ling. 5.14, 6.9, 7.3; Festus 13.23 L, 17 L, 216.23 L, 506.26 L. 
35
 I.e. they are not mentioned as a regular part of the legion like the grosfoma/xoi (understood to mean velites).  
This also means that unlike Livy they are not mentioned as having a place behind the triarii.  If they are 
described as something other than accensi, such as yi/loj or eu)zwnoj, it would be impossible to know if 
Polybius is referring to a unit that may be equated to accensi. 
36
 Oakley 1998, 472ff. for similar views from earlier scholarship. 
37
 Oakley 1998, 469-471; for more on this see ‘Rorarii’, below. 
38
 E.g. Smith et al 1891, 502; Mommsen Staatsrecht 3.282; Kromayer & Veith 1928, 268; Ogilvie 1965, 170; 
Samuels 1990, 12-13; Keppie 1998, 216; Roth 1999, 92; Sage 2008, 73; cf. the Lewis & Short definition: ‘a 
kind of reserve troops who followed the army as supernumeraries’. 
39
 Cary et al. 1949, 2, 72, cf. Mommsen Röm. Staatrsr. i
3
.332 ff. 
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As mentioned above, the accensi are some of the least-mentioned Roman light infantry units 
with Varro’s De Lingua Latina having the most references to them.  In the Loeb edition 
(translated by Roland G. Kent), Kent translates the term as ‘assistant’ seven times,40 none of 
which actually refer specifically to a military unit, nor to men engaged in combat.  Rather, 
these references are to men assisting the consul in various military-related actions such as 
calling the citizens in Rome to the consul (who then orders a centuriate assembly – 6.9.88), 
calling soldiers in camp to prepare for battle (6.9.89), or calling the time of day in the camp 
(6.9.89, 95).41  Vegetius describes similar functions for the accensi (Veg. Mil. 2.19), as does 
most modern scholarship.42  As this is the most thorough discussion of the term by any of our 
sources, it is significant to note that they are presented here as assistants rather than 
combatants.   
Varro associates these assistants with heralds (praecones) insofar as they “gave the call [as 
mentioned above] just like a herald [praeco]” (6.9.89).43  It is probably unlikely that accensi 
functioned as heralds, but there are a few arguments that can tentatively be made in favour of 
this argument.  If we accept that accensi performed similar tasks to heralds, and, as the 
sources have suggested, are interchangeable in their function, then a tentative implication 
could be that accensi transmitted top-level battlefield commands – that is, from the 
commander – e.g. Livy 5.21, 9.12 (where heralds perform this task).44  These instances occur 
during sieges (thus, large-scale non-pitched battle), and barring a lack of explicit evidence, it 
could be argued that accensi were used in larger-scale, low-intensity engagements, such as 
pre-pitched-battle skirmishing for the purpose of transmitting strategic commands between 
commanders and skirmishing combatants.45  Also, another interpretation for accensi is 
                                                 
40
 Loeb 1989. 
41
 The latter reference is also translated as ‘aide’ and ‘accensus’ in the same passages.  The cases used in all of 
these passages are nominative singular, dative singular, and accusative singular: accensus, accenso, accensum. 
42
 Op cit.: Ad obsequia tamen iudicium uel tribunorum nec non etiam principalium deputabantur milites, qui 
uocabantur accensi, hoc est postea additi, quam fuisset legio complet.  For modern scholarship, see note 38. 
43
 c.f. Varro Ling. 6.9.95; Frontin. Aq. 100: these passages suggest accensi and praecones have interchangeable 
roles; see also Livy 6.3, 29.27; Caes. BG 5.51 for heralds (praecones) acting as assistants to the commander; for 
heralds calling to soldiers in camp, see Livy 1.28.  Many of the instances of praeco in Livy have a herald 
carrying out orders of the commander-in-chief (e.g. consul, dictator, etc.), thus similar to the tasks assigned to 
accensi described above.   
44
 5.21: deinde multa iam edita caede senescit pugna, et dictator praecones edicere iubet ut ab inermi 
abstineatur; 9.12: quod uocem audiri praeconis passi sunt incolumem abiturum qui arma posuisset. [my 
emphases].  However, for the likelihood of this possibility, see n. 45, below. 
45
 Although this is impossible to argue with any kind of certainty.  Also, even though Livy uses praeco to 
describe the heralds in the examples, it must be remembered that Livy’s method and thus military terminology 
has been criticised by modern scholarship, e.g. see Ogilvie 1965, 5-17; Oakley 1998, 452; Therefore, it could 
also be argued that Livy has used praeco instead of accensi. When considering the argument that accensi may 
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‘supernumeraries’: a term that comes up in Livy’s description of the Servian class system, 
where they were registered in the army as being a part of this group, which also included 
cavalry, engineers and musicians.  These units all have vital functions in the army, and since 
it is known that musicians had a role in transmitting commands, it is perhaps worth noting the 
close association that the accensi have to them in Livy’s description.  Therefore, this 
reference then supports the idea that they may have had some role in the transmission of 
commands.  Furthermore, this suggestion does not ignore the etymology of accensus: it does 
mean ‘to attend to’; Cato uses it in this way,46 and yet being an attendant could possibly 
include helping officers or the commander to transmit commands.47  Light armament would 
obviously best serve someone in that position, as it provided a high degree of 
manoeuvrability, thus allowing them to cover distances quickly.  The issue with this 
possibility lies in their status: if they were just servants, they would not have had to take the 
military oath, and therefore would not be allowed to engage in combat.  As such, they 
probably would not have been relied upon for transmitting important battlefield commands, 
since such messengers would likely be expected to defend themselves and reliably deliver 
commands in the face of battle.48   
Another speculative hypothesis that should be discussed comes up through Festus’ 
commentary.  At 216.23 L he claims that the optio was originally known as an accensus, 
since that was his role, i.e. attending to/assisting the centurion.  One possibility is that these 
optiones could have been the accensi, particularly if we incorporate Livy’s Servian class 
system, in this way, their numbers match perfectly to the number of centuries in a legion, as 
follows.  In Livy’s description of the Servian system, the accensi are noted as part of the fifth 
(and lowest) property class of recruits, and that they totalled one century, or 60 men  and 
there are 60 centuries per legion (Livy 1.43).  If we understand accensi to be an 
interchangeable term with optiones, then there are 60 optiones per legion, or one optio for 
                                                                                                                                                        
be used as heralds transmitting commands, it is important to elucidate exactly what type of commands this may 
have entailed, especially because of the low/rank-less status of the accensi.   
46
 See Varro Ling. 7.3.58. 
47
 Cf. Jos. BJ 6.416 where Titus has one of his freemen decide prisoners’ fates; while this is not the transmission 
of commands, it is a similarly highly responsible task for an attendant. 
48
 This also raises the question of how they could even assist soldiers if they were not meant to fight, but as 
mentioned in note 50, the only feasible time for such assistance would be during lulls in the fighting. 
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each centurion.49  Furthermore, optiones assisted their centurion from the back, and as for the 
question regarding how they did so, we need only to look to the suggestion already made 
regarding the transmission of commands.  However, there is some significant confusion in 
Festus regarding these terms, which likewise casts serious doubts on any connection between 
optiones and accensi.  Festus notes that the accensi are said to have replaced dead soldiers 
(13.23.L; 17 L; cf. 506.26 L).  The terms used in these passages to indicate the role that 
accensi played are adscribebantur, subrogabantur, and substituebantur.  All of these terms 
can be translated as variations on ‘to substitute’, ‘to elect’, ‘to nominate’, ‘to appoint’, but 
their present and imperfect passive forms suggest that they are in fact doing the substitution, 
rather than for example, as optiones, simply directing soldiers to fill the places of dead men.  
Filling in the vital gaps in the line by directing soldiers into said places seems to be a 
reasonable role for the centurion’s assistant (as it was something that the centurion could not 
turn his attention to, fighting at the front).  Yet, if we are to understand these men to be low 
ranking and light-armed as Livy suggests, then these men taking take the place of dead men 
(who were presumably heavily armed) seems highly unlikely.  Furthermore, as there were 
presumably only 60 accensi in a Roman legion, their number seems somewhat small relative 
to the rest of the infantry to replace dead men (17 L:‘in locum mortuorum militum subito 
subrogabantur’; 506.26 L: ‘quique in mortuorum militum loco substituebantur’) with the 
intention of maintaining a solid fighting line.  Due to these inconsistencies, we must conclude 
that there is some sort of misinterpretation of the original manuscript: e.g. it was not the 
accensi doing the replacing (as the passive verbs suggest), but rather they could have been 
assisting in this process of replacing troops by removing dead bodies or helping the wounded 
from the field.  Whether the accensi were the soldiers specifically detailed to this task is 
impossible to ascertain from our sources, and so the suggestion remains speculative.50  
Nevertheless, this role would better coincide with Livy’s description of them as minimae 
fiduciae manum (8.8).  With this interpretation, Festus’ reference to Cato’s description of 
them: qui tela ac potiones militibus proeliantibus ministrabant, also makes more sense 
                                                 
49
 However, in Livy 8.8.8 there are apparently 900 accensi, which would void this argument, however, the 
passage is notorious for its ambiguity and uncertainty, and so it is unlikely that the accensi were a regular part of 
the fighting force with the triarii. cf. Oakely 1998, 471-472.  
50
 If they were indeed charged with removing dead bodies and/or helping the wounded from the field, the only 
time during a battle that this would be feasible would be during lulls in combat.  This subject in itself is poorly 
documented in the sources, which have a tendency towards formulaic battle descriptions that overlook such 
(often) inconsequential details.  For more on lulls, see Sabin 2000; Zhmodikov 2000, 72; Goldsworthy 2000, 
209; Anders, unpublished Cardiff University MA dissertation, 2007. 
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(although he adds that Cato referred to them as ferentarii – 506.26 L).51  Indeed, I would 
suggest that especially considering Cato’s description, the accensi seem to be best classified 
as ‘water-boy’ type assistants.   
In any case, Festus’ descriptions certainly confirm the light-armament of this group, and its 
likely association with ferentarii.52  The few mentions of ferentarii in the sources confirm 
their similarity in armament to the accensi.53  In light of this evidence, Livy’s claims in 8.8 
that they were part of the main force of troops, or that they were mistaken for triarii in 8.10, 
must be dismissed as a mistake attributable to Livy’s own lack of understanding or that of his 
source, which resulted in a seemingly artificial fulfilment of the fifth class of the Servian 
army.54  Even if we accept that there were more than the 60 accensi that Livy suggests at first, 
this would not affect the idea that they were some sort of light-armed servant, as Rawlings 
suggests.55 
We must conclude then that the most appealing interpretation of the accensi is that they were 
lightly armed assistants, not recruited as regular infantry, but rather as ‘combat assistants’, 
armed lightly perhaps to defend themselves if at all necessary, or just simply as a safety 
precaution due to the risk of coming in close proximity of the fighting.56  As servants, they 
would not have combatant status (having not taken the military oath), and thus would not 
engage in the mêlée.57  Further, since the sources clearly identify them as helping the main 
force in some way, and I would suggest that we conceive of them as those who might bring 
water or other critical supplies (e.g. spare weapons, medicinal goods such as bandages) to the 
front during lulls in combat.  Once they took leave from the front, another tentative 
possibility might be that they could assist the wounded off the field, or help remove dead 
bodies.  Since the little information that our sources have to offer have them fit best in the 
role of non-combatative servants, we cannot classify them as traditional light infantry. 
                                                 
51
 For ‘ferentarii’ see the discussion below, p. 48. 
52
 Paul. Fest. 13.23 L, 506.26 L; cf. Oakley 1998, 471. 
53
 See p. 47; cf. Sall. Cat. 60.2; Tac. Ann. 12.35; Varro Ling. 7.3.57; also Smith 1891, 502. 
54
 See Oakley 1998, 472; Sage 2008, 73, also n. 45 above. 
55
 Rawlings 2007, 56, suggests they could have originally been attendants to the hoplites in Rome’s pre-
manipular army, ‘analogous to the servants who carried the equipment of Greek infantrymen on campaign and 
who might have acted as light armed troops during combat.’ 
56
 Sabin 2000 argues for a ‘default state’ of battle where the two fighting lines are engaged in missile combat, 
rather than hand-to-hand mêlée as the regular state of the battle, where the latter is a rarity. Zhmodikov 2000 
argues along similar lines.  Such cases would also necessitate some form of protection even for the servants 
helping the soldiers. Cf. Josephus’ reference to the training of the servants, BJ 3.69, cf. also Speidel 1989, 244. 
57
 For possible military roles of servants, see Speidel 1989, 242-245. 
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Antesignani 
Our earliest historical usage of this term comes from Caesar in his work Bellum Civile, 
although Livy refers to them as being part of the legion in the mid-Republic.58  As with many 
of the contingents under discussion here, the lack of evidence prevents us from being able to 
define these troops categorically.  Furthermore, the only conclusion that has generally been 
agreed upon in scholarship is that the antesignani were troops that fought in advance of, or in 
the front ranks of the legion.59  Parker gives the most extensive scholarly discussion of the 
antesignani to date, but our inability to define antesignani categorically indicates that the 
term must be reviewed.60   
Lewis and Short define antesignani as ‘a chosen band of Roman soldiers who fought before 
the standards, and served for their defence’.  This is certainly a good starting point for this 
contingent of soldiers; however, the definition also presents several issues.  To begin with, 
which standards these men were in front of must be considered.  The second, perhaps less 
obvious issue, is that the definition does not specify period relevance, which as it happens, is 
vital to the discussion of antesignani. 
As with identifying any ill-defined term, a philological assessment of the name of the 
contingent must be undertaken as the primary source for clues.  The aforementioned 
scholarship has repeatedly explained the simple fact that antesignani means ‘before the 
standards’.  However, as alluded to above, this brings into question what standards are being 
referred to, as well as the position of said standards in the army.  Because our references to 
antesignani range in our sources from the mid-Republic to the late empire, we must also take 
into account any changing nature of the signa referred to in the term.  In light of this, it is 
                                                 
58
 His earliest reference to antesignani occurs at 9.39, in the wars against the Etruscans under the consul 
Marcius Rutilus (310 BC), although this could be an anachronistic use of terminology (whereas Caesar is 
referring to troops in his own period).  Furthermore, Livy’s usage of the term does not necessarily refer to the 
same troops as Caesar’s usage of the term does.  Livy’s usage and understanding of the term is discussed below 
(pp. 15ff.), and a discussion of Caesar’s usage follows this. 
59
 E.g. Smith 1891, 502; Le Bohec 1989, 188; Carter 1993, 198; Goldsworthy 1996, 18 esp. n. 25; Oakley 1998, 
510; Gilliver 1999, 111.  
60
 Parker 1928, 36-41. 
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worth remembering the Roman tendency to be conservative with military terms;61 we will 
return to such uses of antesignani, later.   
Due to the changes from manipular organization to cohortal organization in the Roman 
army’s structure, older scholarship tends to take the view that Livy’s and Caesar’s 
antesignani differ significantly from each other.  The general understanding of this 
scholarship is that Livy used the term simply to refer to the hastati.62  Indeed, it is only Livy 
and Caesar who provide us with multiple mentions of the soldiers in battle, and along with a 
few references in Frontinus and Vegetius, it seems we could have more than one definition of 
this group.63 
Kromayer and Veith believed that Livy’s antesignani were actually the hastati, and some 
subsequent research on the subject has followed suit.64  While I would suggest our evidence 
indicates a difference between Livy’s antesignani and later contingents with the same name, I 
intend to re-evaluate the evidence on which the equivalence of hastati and antesignani is 
based and suggest an alternative identification for the antesignani.65  In light of this, we 
should examine the evidence on which this conjecture is based.   
Kromayer and Veith based their understanding that the antesignani were actually the hastati 
on several of Livy’s passages (9.39, 22.5) and Frontinus at 2.3.17.   
Livy 9.39.7 states  
There was no giving of ground anywhere; as the antesignani fell, and so as not to 
lay bare the defence of the standards, those in the second line became the first.66   
For Kromayer and Veith, the debate revolves around what is meant by the ‘second’ and ‘first 
line’ (fit ex secunda prima acies), and the signa in antesignani.  To them, the signa were the 
legionary standards mentioned by Pliny (HN 10.4.16), since they seem to have had a 
                                                 
61
 An example of this is Caesar’s command ‘manipulos laxare’ (BG 2.25): where he refers to the (non-existent) 
maniples in his cohortal army, Gilliver 1993, 31.  See also Caes. BG 6.34, 6.40; Tac. Ann. 1.21, 1.34, 2.55; Agr. 
28; Hist. 1.57, 3.81, 4.77. 
62
 Cf. Smith 1891, 502; Kromayer & Veith 1928, 407-9; Parker 1928, 37.  Lendon 2005, 223 also makes this 
assumption based on the older scholarship. 
63
 Front. Strat. 2.3.17; Veg. Mil. 2.2, 2.7, 2.16. 
64
 See n. 62. 
65
 Any dispute with this specific argument from Kromayer & Veith has not been published thus far. 
66
 Translation is my own, thus: ‘Nihil ab ulla parte movetur fugae, cadunt antesignani et ne nudentur 
propugnatoribus signa, fit ex secunda prima acies.’ 
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‘Palladial-character for the entire army.’67  Because of this, they conclude that these signa 
must have been placed in the gap between the hastati and the principes, where they would 
have been safer than in the front with the tactical signa, that is, the standards of each maniple 
held in the front lines and used for combat manoeuvre.  I would argue that Livy’s description 
above, does not suggest in any way that the antesignani mentioned in the passage were all of 
the hastati, and in fact the hastati are not mentioned at all in the entire chapter.  Rather, as 
Oakely points out, Livy probably uses antesignani to mean the front lines of actual combat 
(i.e. the one or two lateral files of men engaged in hand-to-hand fighting at the front of the 
acies).  He goes on to say that while Livy regularly equates antesignani to prima acies, which 
normally refers to the hastati, the signa referenced by the term antesignani are those 
immediately behind the fighting lines, or in other words, the tactical manipular standards.68  I 
would agree that 9.39 seems to support the image of the front rank of soldiers (i.e. perhaps 
one or two lines deep) falling and being replaced immediately by the line of soldiers behind 
them.  Thus, if in this instance these men were hastati, the passage should be taken to mean 
that those hastati who fell, were replaced by the hastati behind them.69 
I would argue Livy’s reference to antesignani in 22.5 supports this view, again in contrast to 
Kromayer and Veith’s opinion.  It reads:  
And renewed fighting came forth, not the well-ordered kind by means of hastati, 
principes and triarii, nor that with the antesignani in front of the standards, and 
the rest of the fighting lines behind the standards, nor with each soldier in the 
legion in either his cohort or maniple.70 
The discussion here revolves around a careful analysis of the Latin, so I will include it here: 
et noua de integro exorta pugna est, non illa ordinata per principes hastatosque 
ac triarios nec ut pro signis antesignani, post signa alia pugnaret acies nec ut in 
sua legione miles aut cohorte aut manipulo esset 
The key line here for our purposes is arguably ‘nec ut pro signis antesignani, post signa alia 
pugnaret acies’.  Kromayer and Veith understood ‘acies’ to mean the fighting lines in a 
triplex acies, that is, the hastati, principes and triarii mentioned in the passage.  Furthermore, 
as mentioned above, Livy consistently uses prima acies to refer to the hastati, so for 
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 Op. cit: „signa“ ausgesprochenen Palladial-charakter, und zwar für das ganze Heer. 
68
 Oakley 1998, 510. 
69
 This interpretation also means that principes or even triarii fighting in front of their manipular standards were 
considered antesignani, this is discussed further below. 
70
 Translation is my own. 
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Kromayer and Veith, ‘alia...acies’ refers to the principes and triarii.  In that way, the ‘signa’ 
in the passage conform to their view of the normal location of the legionary standards in 
pitched battle.71  However, I would argue that the nec ut...nec ut construction marks a 
balanced pair of thoughts signifying a separate notion from the three units of the triplex acies 
mentioned before this clause.  Thus, the passage gives a sense of two separate but related 
thoughts; the first is that there was no proper formation of the triplex acies.  I would interpret 
the second thought as: (regardless of the fact that there was no triplex acies to speak of), even 
the standards within each tactical unit were not doing their job of organizing unit structure 
and movement, including having the antesignani in front of said standards.  So, since 22.5 
discusses the chaos of the ambush at Trasimene, the image Livy presents is one where 
fighting is going on everywhere and from every side, rather than only in front of the 
manipular standards, as would have been usual.  Accordingly, this interpretation is that the 
antesignani were those men fighting in front of the manipular standards within each unit 
(whether it be the hastati, principes, or triarii), while the rest of the men behind the standards 
do not engage in combat.  In this way, any man who engaged in hand-to-hand combat was 
considered an antesignanus for the period that he was fighting the enemy.  That this is an 
acceptable interpretation of Livy’s definition of antesignani and a suitable invalidation of 
Kromayer and Veith’s view, will be shown below with a further assessment of Livy’s 
passages.   
First, Kromayer and Veith’s use of Frontinus should be addressed.  At 2.3.17, Frontinus 
recounts Sulla’s tactics at Chaeronea: 
[Sulla] arranged a triple line of infantry, leaving intervals through which to send, 
according to need, the light-armed troops and the cavalry, which he placed in the 
rear.  He then commanded the postsignani, who were in the second line (acies), to 
drive firmly into the ground large numbers stakes set close together, and as the 
chariots drew near, he withdrew the line of antesignani within these stakes.72 
Again the ‘acies’ here suggests the same notion for Kromayer and Veith as it did above.  Yet, 
once more, the Kromayer and Veith’s identification seems to be problematic here.  The only 
way that this tactic could function efficiently would be if the acies was quite thin (and thus 
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 Kromayer & Veith 1928, 407.  NB. Livy 22.5 describes the ambush at Lake Trasimene, and so for Kromayer 
and Veith, Livy is emphasizing the placement of the standards in a regular pitched battle with a triplex acies. 
72
 ‘Triplicem deinde peditum aciem ordinavit relictis intervallis, per quae levem armaturam et equitem, quem in 
novissimo conlocaverat, cum res exegisset, emitteret. Tum postsignanis qui in secunda acie erant imperavit, ut 
densos numerososque palos firme in terram defigerent, intraque eos appropinquantibus quadrigis 
antesignanorum aciem recepit.’ 
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long as well).  Therefore, it seems much more realistic to have a thin line of men (i.e. a few 
ranks) standing in front of the standards to retreat just a few feet behind them, moments 
before the chariots reached them, in order to catch their enemy in their trap of stakes.  If Sulla 
had indeed formed his entire acies of hastati quite thinly, then as Kromayer and Veith 
suggest, the hastati are the antesignani.  On the other hand, if he formed the acies more 
deeply, there probably could still only be a few ranks functioning as the antesignani in this 
instance for the tactic to function efficiently.  In this case, the antesignani are still (as in Livy 
above) the men standing in front of the manipular standards, ready to engage the enemy in 
hand-to-hand combat.  This should have been a usual sight to the enemy.  In this way, the 
trickery of the stratagem is clear: the enemy sees a normal formation, with antesignani ready 
to engage them, unaware that just a few feet behind those antesignani lay stakes.  The 
importance of this passage lies in the fact that it emphasizes that any man in front of the 
manipular standards could be considered an antesignanus, regardless of the formation of the 
acies.73 
In summary, I would argue that Kromayer and Veith’s view that the antesignani were simply 
the hastati is a misinterpretation of the ancient sources.  Furthermore, the analysis above 
suggests a possible interpretation of what signa Livy is referring to in his use of the word 
antesignani.  The conclusion that they were tactical signa at the front of the maniples seems 
to me to be a good possibility.  In contrast, Kromayer and Veith’s understanding that these 
signa were the mid-Republican legionary standards described by Pliny is problematic. 
Nevertheless, Kromayer and Veith were not the only scholars to have this understanding of 
antesignani in Livy.  Parker, who, as mentioned above, gives quite a thorough discussion on 
the topic, makes a similar claim, citing Livy at 9.39 as well, but also 8.11 as an example.  The 
passage reads as follows: 
the whole army was butchered, the hastati and principes cut to pieces; slaughter 
occurred both in front of the standards [ante signa] and behind the standards; the 
triarii finally saved the situation74   
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 I.e. Part or all of the hastati, depending on the formation, could be considered antesignani.  If it were all, then 
they are likely not only in front of the manipular standards, but also the legionary standards.  The problem with 
this passage is the fact that acies could vary between battles, and so it is of course impossible to know how 
deeply (or thinly) Sulla formed his lines at Chaeronea.  Furthermore, we cannot be certain if this legion is a 
cohortal or manipular one. 
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 Translation is my own: ‘trucidatum exercitum omnem, caesos hastatos principesque, stragem et ante signa et 
post signa factam; triarios postremo rem restituisse’. 
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The first point that should be made here is that the passage does not include the term 
antesignani, and as such is not necessarily a useful reference in analysing this corps of men.75  
That said, Parker’s comprehension of this passage is that Livy is making a literary 
association: hastati and principes compared to ante signa and post signa.  The understanding 
is that the signa referred to here are the legionary standards mentioned by Pliny (the five 
animal standards), and that the hastati stand before these standards and the principes behind 
these standards; thus making the hastati the antesignani.76  Thus, with both of the units ante 
and post signa destroyed, the triarii remained to save the situation. 
Yet, this interpretation means Livy is being tautological: if hastati are understood to be those 
men ante signa, and the principes are understood to be those men post signa, then saying that 
the hastati and principes were cut to pieces, and then saying that slaughter occurred ante 
signa and post signa is redundant.  As such, we should read the statement regarding the entire 
units of hastati and principes as separate from the statement regarding the standards.77  
Accordingly, a better explanation of the passage is that Livy is simply stressing the 
seriousness of the situation.78  Also, Livy could be pointing out the contrast to a normal battle 
situation (as mentioned above): instead of combat and casualties occurring in front the 
manipular standards, he is stressing the massacre of the battle; slaughter occurred 
everywhere.  Indeed, in reading this short phrase, ‘stragem et ante signa et post signa factam’ 
as separate from the preceding one regarding hastati and principes, Livy does not specify 
what or who is in front or behind the standards.  He does not say that entire units or an entire 
acies of a triplex acies standing in front or behind the standards was destroyed.  Rather he 
simply states that ‘slaughter occurred’, again emphasizing the butchery of the battle.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence in our sources to indicate that the legionary standards (to 
which both Parker and Oakley think Livy is referring to) are placed in between units.  So, I 
would argue that it is incorrect to understand ‘ante signa’ as a reference to both legionary 
standards, and to their position between units.  Consequently, allowing for the interpretation 
that the antesignani were always and only the hastati is precarious. 
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 Cf. e.g. Livy’s use of the two words (ante signa) at 21.55 as well. 
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 It is perhaps worth noting here that Oakley 1998, 509, has also understood Livy’s reference to signa in this 
passage to mean the legionary standards although he does not come to the same conclusion as Parker does 
regarding antesignani despite this understanding.  
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Roberts’ translation. 
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 I owe these insights to K. Gilliver, who pointed it out in pers. comm. 6/08/2009. 
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From the above analyses of Livy, the conclusion is that for him, antesignani refer to the front 
lines of combat.  Oakley also argues that the word signa within antesignani must be a 
reference to the tactical manipular standards and that these standards must have had their 
place directly behind the front lines of combat.79  Indeed, a passing reference to a pullarius 
being placed amongst the prima signa (i.e. the foremost standards) and then falling ante signa 
due to an enemy javelin (10.40.12-14) further emphasizes this point.80  As we have seen 
above, the antesignani could be any number of men, from any of the acies, fighting in front 
of the manipular standards.  The term is not pre-designated to any man or men in particular, 
nor is it a title that a soldier may hold, as they did in later periods.81  Put simply, any man who 
ended up at the front, whether by choice or by force, was part of the antesignani.82  This 
argument also means that even when triarii reached the front, those men in front of the 
standards from the triarii could also be considered antesignani.  So for Livy, any men who 
were actually engaged in hand-to-hand combat during a ‘controlled’ pitched battle83 and thus 
stood before their manipular standards, were considered the antesignani.84  As such, the 
Livian definition does not qualify as a description of a distinct corps of men, and as will be 
shown, this denotes a significant difference in usage with Caesar, despite their being roughly 
contemporary.  We will return to this contrast and compare it in further detail below. 
The question remains for the present assessment whether antesignani might be classed as 
light infantry.  It is clear from the above conclusion that since any infantryman, whether from 
the hastati, principes, or triarii, could at some point in a pitched battle fight as an 
antesignanus, Livy’s antesignani cannot be classified as light infantry.   
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 Parker 1928, 38 (see esp. for why tactical standards must be near the front of the fighting maniple); Oakley 
1998, 510 (includes further Livy references). 
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 A pullarius is the keeper of the sacred chickens in the army; he is placed in the front lines as punishment in 
this incident. 
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 As seen on tombstones, see p. 27, below.  Antesignanus being a pre-designated term or title is also discussed 
below. 
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 Although ending up there by choice is more probable. 
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 That is, tactically ‘controlled’, as opposed to pitched-battles that turned into uncontrolled massacres where the 
tactical standards were no longer functioning due to the mass engagement on all or most sides of a unit (e.g. 
Livy 8.11). 
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 Cf. Livy 30.33 at Zama where the antesignani had to leave lanes for the elephants to run through, the velites 
were placed in between these positions (at the head of the lanes): ‘vias patentes inter manipulos antesignanorum 
velitibus...complevit’, again emphasizing the forward positions of the antesignani. 
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Moving on to the next period in which the term is encountered, Caesar’s antesignani are 
perhaps the most promising candidates for light troops at first glance.  With additional 
evidence from Cicero and Varro, this period provides the most substantial data on this group. 
Perhaps one of the first issues to make note of is the etymological understanding of the term 
for this period, and how it differs from the Livian use of the term.  Unlike the suggestions 
from the older scholars above, modern historians understand the term to mean before the 
tactical standards, and thus have no reason to equate the corps with an entire unit such as a 
cohort (in the way that older scholarship equated the Livian use of the term with all the 
hastati for example).  So, like the conclusion reached above, the antesignani here are also 
men standing at the front of the fighting lines, only at this time, the men behind them are 
organized into cohorts, rather than maniples.   
Parker argues that under Caesar, the antesignani were no longer simply any first line of 
troops engaged in combat, but a specialised unit that occasionally operated at the front lines.85  
His reasoning for this is based on Caesar’s references to them as fortissimos viros who were 
assigned a mission with centurions (Caes. BC 1.57), as light units, i.e. expediti (BC 3.75) and 
as expeditos assigned to fight with cavalry (BC 3.84).  In contrast, both Carter and Gilliver 
have an alternative and more reasonable opinion to Parker’s.  Their understanding is that the 
antesignani were men who regularly operated at the front lines, and who were occasionally 
used for special duties.86  Although I would argue against Carter’s understanding of ‘front 
lines’ as the first four cohorts in a triplex acies (thereby accepting the view of Kromayer and 
Veith, above), the emphasis on the antesignani not being a special unit is important.87  Thus 
in contrast to Parker, the antesignani are simply men known for fighting at the front.  Carter 
adds that Caesar would have chosen these men in particular for special operations because of 
their skill: 
A legion’s standard was its symbolic, and often tactical heart, and it is plausible 
that the men who were deployed in front of it were the best fighters.88 
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 Carter 1991, 191; Gilliver 1999, 111. 
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 Carter 1993, 198.  As indicated above (p. 15 ff.), the first acies (i.e. all the hastati in the manipular legion and 
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It is worth emphasizing the similarity between Livy and Caesar’s antesignani at this point in 
the analysis.  For both, the antesignani were men fighting in front of the army.  We might 
speculate that because Livy was roughly contemporary with Caesar, this may have had 
something to do with his similar understanding of this military corps, i.e. perhaps Livy is 
retrojecting his (limited) knowledge of his contemporary antesignani onto those in his 
histories.  However, there is a significant difference in the usage of the term by Livy and by 
Caesar.  This difference is that Caesar notes their usage in special duties.89  This suggests that 
the antesignani were a recognized corps of men, chosen for special duties because of known 
skill and/or reliability in combat.  Thus, unlike Livy’s antesignani, not everyone who 
engaged in hand-to-hand combat (which likely would have been most of the legion at one 
point or another) was considered an antesignanus.  This then raises the question of how one 
became an antesignanus and whether they were perhaps appointed to that post, as centurions 
were for their skill and bravery.  The only evidence that suggests an answer is from Cicero, 
where he negatively recalls Antony’s choice to fight as an antesignanus: 
In that [civil] war, not only on account of your timidity but also on account of 
wantonness, you had enjoyed the blood of citizens or rather you drank it; you had 
been an antesignanus in the battle line at Pharsalus; you had murdered Lucius 
Domitius, an illustrious and noble man, and slaughtered many others who had 
fled the battle...pursuing them most unmercifully.90 
This passage suggests several features of being an antesignanus.  The most unsurprising is 
perhaps the fact that someone fighting in the front lines, as Antony had at Pharsalus, would 
have seen a significant amount of combat.  What is important to draw from this is that it also 
solidifies the fact that the antesignani in the Late Republic were the front line of men 
engaged in combat, as they are in Livy.  The other important feature of being an antesignanus 
is the apparent choice to do so.  That Antony chose to fight as an antesignanus, suggests that 
Roman soldiers could chose to fight at the front.91  Indeed, there is no evidence indicating 
where men were placed in their century once on the battlefield, and so there is no reason to 
assume that this could not have been arranged purely on a volunteer basis.92  If this was the 
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 Caes. BC 1.43, 1.57, 3.75, 3.84. 
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 Cic. Phil 2.71; My translation, ‘cui bello cum propter timiditatem tuam tum propter libidines defuisti. 
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 Though Antony may have had more choice than a miles because he was a senator/aristocrat, but this is 
impossible to prove. 
92
 Cf. Asclep. 3.5 where the strongest are placed in the front of the phalanx. 
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case, then this probably occurred consistently, (barring death or serious injury for the 
individual) if only as a result of the pursuit of gloria through displays of virtus.  In this way, a 
soldier would either become known amongst the ranks as an antesignanus, or simply be able 
to claim the title.93  With this status, they could easily fit into the role of ‘go-to’ men for 
Caesar; brave and eager soldiers would be best suited for special tasks of challenging tactical 
degree.  This is the case at BC 1.57 where Caesar needed men to act as combatants on the 
ships in the naval battle of Massilia.  He specifically states that ‘electos ex omnibus 
legionibus fortissimos viros...’.  This passage also suggests that Caesar’s antesignani are not 
formally a unit.  They are simply ‘the bravest men from all the legions’; soldiers known for 
regularly volunteering to be the first to face danger, and so are called upon for other special 
combat circumstances.  BC 3.84 also suggests that anyone could volunteer to be an 
antesignanus.  Caesar elected ‘adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis’; to me this 
implies that anyone of any age or physical prowess could have volunteered to be an 
antesignanus, as bravery does not necessitate youth and agility, and so in this instance the 
distinction of this situation is emphasized as Caesar chooses to elect ‘the youngest and 
quickest’ of them.94 
It is important to note that the antesignani have been shown above to haven been drawn from 
regularly enlisted legionaries under Caesar, rather than a distinctive unit.  So, for the present 
discussion, they can be identified initially as being heavy infantry. 
One of the reasons why we see them being used for special deployments under Caesar and 
not in the mid-Republic, may have to do with the prolonged service of the army in Caesar’s 
time versus the citizen militia that Livy’s history covers.  With the permanent cohortal legion, 
it might have been easier to identify someone who consistently volunteered to fight in front 
of the standards.  In contrast, the mid-Republican yearly enrolment probably made it difficult 
for a soldier to find himself in the same position within the army every year.  So, even if he 
regularly volunteered to stay fighting in front of the standards while his unit was in the front 
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 This might be an explanation for the mention of the title on military tombstones; this is discussed on p. 27, 
below.   
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 It is important not to understand expeditos to mean ‘light armed’ in this passage, since doing so would mean 
that some antesignani were more lightly armed than others; this would be tactically imprudent, and work against 
the success of the corps.  The Lewis & Short definition of expeditus is (among other things) ‘unfettered, 
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also give a sense of increased agility, and not only being light-armed.  Also, as Carter points out, there was no 
category of troops known as ‘antesignani expediti’, see Carter 1993, 198. 
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acies, the following campaign or season could possibly see him surrounded by completely 
different men.  In contrast, the permanence of service of the officers and soldiers in the 
cohortal legion, would give the milites a better opportunity to be recognized amongst their 
peers as those who consistently fought as antesignani.  Because of this, they could now be 
recognized as an antesignanus, and they could therefore be easier to single out for special 
deployment.  This in turn meant that they could now claim the title of antesignanus, thus 
changing the understanding of who the antesignani were between the manipular legion and 
the cohortal legion.95  In the manipular legion, a soldier could fight as an antesignanus, but in 
the cohortal legion, they could claim to be an antesignanus.  In both, they were probably self-
selecting: they chose to fight in that position, but only the permanence of the cohortal legions 
allowed for the recognition of someone who consistently fought in that position amongst 
established peers.  This, in turn, allowed for the use of a specific designation.  Whether the 
antesignani fit the definition of ‘light’ infantry because of their special deployment under 
Caesar will now be assessed. 
Caesar mentions the antesignani acting as light infantry when they are sent to secure high 
ground.96  In another instance, also similar to the earlier use of velites, Caesar sends the 
antesignani intermixed with horse to fend off Pompeian cavalry (BC 3.75).  Carter claims 
that since on this occasion they are described as ‘expeditos antesignanos’, they are lightly 
armed, which he further points out was done only under special circumstances.97  However, I 
would argue that as above expeditos should more likely refer to the most agile or most eager 
men.98  Caesar has not only already used expeditos in this sense regarding the antesignani, but 
also we do not have any other explicit evidence from the late Republic describing the 
antesignani as being lightly armed.  Furthermore, I would take expeditos as referring to the 
most agile men because of the circumstances in which they are supposedly lightly armed 
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 For the title of antesignanus, see tombstones, p. 27, below. 
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 BC 1.43; also, this reflects the tactics of the velites: e.g. Polyb. 10.15.10. 
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 Carter 1993, 198; also Gilliver 1999, 111; if they ever were lightly armed, then Carter and Gilliver are 
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regular heavy infantry as argued above. 
98
 See esp. n. 168, below where McGushin 1977, 286 suggests that Sallust’s use of expediti at the battle of 
Pistoria (Cat. 60) was probably in reference to ‘those who ad pugnandum alacres videbantur’.  Cf. also Veg. 
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referring to levis armatura and ferentarii in this passage, it is relevant because of the probability that 
antesignani took over many of the tactical roles of light troops, as discussed below.  Furthermore, regarding 
these light troops Vegetius notes that ‘nec erant admodum multi’; since we know that the light troops made up at 
least 30% of the fighting force (see ‘Tactical Roles’), the antesignani are a much more likely group to be 
described as ‘not being many in number’ (and thus, at 1.20, Vegetius may have been thinking of the Caesarian 
antesignani). 
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here.  If the antesignani are simply regular legionaries, then they are normally dressed in 
‘heavy’ equipment.99  So in an instance where they were to get to the rear of the column as 
quickly as possible to fend off a Pompeian cavalry attack, having time to change their 
equipment on the march to a ‘light kit’ before heading off, seems unlikely.100   
There is only one other passage in the Caesarian corpus that suggests a link between light-
armed troops and the antesignani, and that is at BAfr. 78.  It is mentioned here that Caesar 
normally kept 300 men from each legion in light order (expeditos); at BC 3.84, he mentions 
300 antesignani.  The numbers might suggest that these legionaries in light order could be 
antesignani.  However, the troops in the African War are not described as such and so we 
cannot imply that they were.101  Furthermore, at BC 3.75 there are 400 antesignani, and so the 
number of antesignani ostensibly out-number the quantity of men kept in light-order.  Thus, 
without explicit evidence, it is probably safest to conclude that the antesignani were not 
normally lightly armed. 
What is clearer from both of the passages just mentioned is the subtle correlation to velites.  
Caesar uses his antesignani in much the same way that velites were used: fighting ahead of 
the legion, being sent to secure high ground, and fighting alongside cavalry.102  Parker has 
suggested that the antesignani replaced velites.  He bases this conclusion on the idea that the 
position of the antesignani alone must have meant that they skirmished in front of the 
standards and thus took the place of the velites.  Bell has subsequently treated this subject, 
and does not suggest that this was the case.103  Furthermore, Parker’s suggestion ignores the 
vital point that antesignani appear in Livy, as do velites.  Although they never appear in the 
same passages together, our conclusion above means that they probably co-existed, and so 
they did not ‘replace’ them in the traditional sense.  Furthermore, we know that the 
antesignani fought with the legion, and were capable of pitched-battle formation, something 
that the velites were not.  Yet, perhaps Parker is not entirely wrong in his idea.  I would 
suggest that a better approach would be to say that the antesignani took over some of the 
duties of the velites.  Bell, for example, suggests that a heavy infantryman would be better 
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able to fill the role of the velites as well as their own, and Goldsworthy has also suggested 
that legionaries could operate in a ‘light’ role.104  Furthermore, certain tactics used by the 
velites were probably too effective to discard after their disappearance.  For example, the 
usefulness of the combined cavalry-infantry tactics is noted elsewhere (see Chapter 6 on 
‘Tactical Roles’, below), and it would certainly seem unreasonable to abolish such an 
apparently powerful tactic with the disappearance of the particular type of light infantry 
associated with it.105  Thus, from this we might suggest that Caesar used this corps of men as 
a replacement for the light infantry wing of the mid-Republican armies, yet it is impossible to 
ascertain if this was truly his intent.  Still, this correlation is also noticeable in a fragment 
from Varro (Sat. Men. 21), which seemingly associates the antesignani with the velites.  
Unfortunately, the fragment is too short and ambiguous to provide us with any specific 
information on either the antesignani or their relationship to the velites, but perhaps it 
deserves a formal placement within scholarship on antesignani.  The text is as follows: 
quem secuntur cum rotundis velites leves parmis, antesignani quadratis 
multisignibus tecti  
A literal translation might be: 
those whom the light armed velites with round shields followed, the antesignani having been 
covered/shielded by/with the many standards for the square 
Since tecti and antesignani are the same case, they are either genitive singular with tectus as a 
noun – ‘of the covering/shield of the antesignani’; or nominative plural – ‘the antesignani 
cover’; or with tectus as a perfect passive participle – ‘the antesignani (having been) 
covered’.  With tecti as a participle the main verb is missing, as well as an object, since 
‘quadratis multisignibus’ can only be dative or ablative.  Since quem is an abrupt beginning, 
we are also unable to identify with whom or with what unit the following action of the velites 
refers to, and as such it would be risky to associate this action with the antesignani.106  Thus, 
in the absence of context the interpretation of this fragment is very difficult.   
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What we can deduce from this fragment for our purposes then is that the antesignani are a 
distinguishable group within the legion, and that perhaps they performed some unique role of 
protection (e.g. protecting the standards would seem the most sensible correlation).  Yet, this 
definition is the same as that reached above: as described by Livy, they are anyone fighting in 
front of the standards.  And so unfortunately, Varro does not offer us much in regards to 
clarifying the term.  Thus, beyond their mentions of undertaking roles attributable to light 
infantry in Caesar, we have no clear reason to classify the antesignani under Caesar as light 
troops. 
For the late Republic then, our definition of antesignani is similar to the one that Livy 
provides us with.  This corps of men seem to be the front-line combatants, who possibly 
volunteer for that position.  Consistently doing so in the permanent legion allows them to 
earn the unofficial title.  Recognized as antesignani, they could then easily be rounded up for 
special combat duty, like being dispatched with the cavalry for example.  It must be 
remembered however, that no other civil war generals are mentioned to be using antesignani, 
and so the possibility exists that Caesar’s use of them may have been unique.107  In any case, 
evidence for the existence of such a title continues into the imperial period, and this evidence 
will be examined next. 
The only evidence we have for the imperial period is epigraphic, and it is very fragmentary.  
Because of this, it is especially difficult to reach any precise conclusions regarding the 
antesignani in this period.  Nevertheless, a review of the possibilities they present will be 
undertaken here. 
We have two tombstone inscriptions referring to antesignani; the first comes from 
Strasbourg, and dates to AD 70: 
L(ucius) Valerius Co|metius, uetera|nus leg(ionis) VIII Aug(ustae), | militauit 
armis | antesignanis | her(edes) ex test(amento)108 
It is difficult to draw anything from the tombstone itself, but it certainly indicates the 
existence of the title of antesiganus during the Principate.  Whether the title was an official 
one or not is impossible to say. 
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The second inscription comes from Syria and it is dated to AD 172/173.  It reads as follows: 
)/Etou|j dpu` | Ga/ioj | 'Iou/lioj || a)ntisign|ano/j109  
Again, the inscription gives us almost nothing in terms of defining the group, but as above, 
we may say that the term antesignanus existed throughout the imperial period.  
One of the more contentious and most often discussed inscriptions mentioning antesignani is 
one found at the base of Legio III Augusta in Lambaesis.  It reads as follows: 
ARMA ANTESIGNANA XXX 
ARMA POSTSIGNANA XIV110 
There have been several interpretations of this inscription, primarily amongst the older 
German scholarship, which includes speculative ratios of troops who may have been 
equipped as antesignani or as postsignani.  Yet, as Parker points out, any inference of 
armament ratios from the inscription is groundless.111  Kromayer and Veith have also argued 
for the possibility that the inscription above supports the idea that the antesignani were a 
distinct unit.  This conclusion is made on the basis that different armament must indicate an 
exclusive unit.  They further argue that the actions of the antesignani as described by Caesar 
necessitate them being a distinct unit.  For example, the speed with which they need to 
execute orders such as those described by Caesar (e.g. at Caes. BC 3.75), necessitates that 
they be from the same part of the legion; that 
...it would have been almost senseless militarily to entrust this task to a division 
which would have to be collected from all parts of the Legion and form up for this 
purpose only.112   
However, this argument ignores the possibility that the composition of the men needed for 
specific tasks could have simply depended on the task.  If we take the Pompeian cavalry 
attack on Caesar’s column as an example (BC 3.75), it would make more sense to have the 
antesignani collected (as the front-line volunteer combatants defined above) from the units 
closest to the rear of the column (where the attack occurred).  So, what would rather make 
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almost no sense militarily would be to entrust the task to a pre-designated unit that was, for 
example, marching at the front of the column.  Similarly, if a general sent a whole century for 
such a task, he would risk breaking up the cohesion of the cohort.  If the general only 
assigned a few men from each century, he would not be taking such a risk. 
Yet, we must return to the question of specific armament for antesignani, which is apparently 
presented by the above inscription.  Kromayer and Veith accept that the antesignani were 
armed differently and suggest that the flat shields mentioned in a testudo by Dio at 49.30 
could have been the ones belonging to the antesignani.113  We might take Kromayer and 
Veith’s suggestion a little further with some more recent scholarship on Roman military 
equipment.  Bishop and Coulston argue that flat shields would have belonged to the auxilia, 
and that as such they were capable of engaging in a variety of combat scenarios, i.e. they 
could fight in a traditional, solid formation for pitched-battle-type tactics, or in more open 
order, skirmish-type action.114  Now this seems like something that the antesignani were 
capable of: they were a part of the legion, but could also engage in light-infantry-type tactics, 
as we have seen in Caesar.  Thus, we might conclude that at Lambaesis, the third legion 
stored different armour for the antesignani (we might speculate that amongst this could be 
flat-shields) and this was for any instances of their special deployment.  It must be 
remembered however, that there is no evidence for an empire-wide trend of providing 
distinguishable equipment for a corps of antesignani.  This could have simply been for a 
specific campaign and/or a method of armament used only at Lambaesis.   
Although our evidence from the Principate gives us almost no information about the 
antesignani, one thing we can say is that the designation seems to have existed across the 
empire.  Our inscriptions come from Gaul, Africa and Syria, and so we might postulate that 
the corps was a regular element of the imperial Roman military. 
Beyond these inscriptions, we can only speculate why we do not have more evidence for 
antesignani during the imperial period.  Yet one of the primary reasons for our lack of 
evidence is certainly that our descriptions of pitched battles in imperial literature are quite 
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poor.  They are simply not as detailed as our Republican sources, and so tell us much less 
about the soldiers involved.  A speculative possibility for the lack of evidence for antesignani 
during the imperial period may be because such brave fighters were often promoted to staff 
positions, such as optiones, signiferi, and centurions.  Thus, by the time they appear on 
tombstones, they have the more common officer ranks.115  Another reason may be that 
because they were never an official or administrative unit, the term was rarely written down.  
Alternatively, since we can say that antesignani is a legionary term based on our evidence, 
perhaps they do not appear in the imperial literature because the auxiliaries of the period 
could be given the tasks they the antesignani had been given formerly.   
Vegetius provides us with the latest evidence that we might consider relevant to the present 
analysis of antesignani.  The late Roman author mentions antesignani three times in his 
Epitoma rei militaris, correlating the antesignani to officers or drillmasters in his discussion 
of the ancient legion.116  His understanding is consistent when he describes their armament, as 
he relates it to the equipment of other officers, claiming that,  
all antesignani and standard-bearers, though infantry, received small cuirasses, 
and (leather) helmets covered with bearskins to frighten the enemy.117 
It is perhaps worth mentioning that Apuleius makes a similar correlation, using vexilliarus 
and antesignanus interchangeably; perhaps they were indeed outfitted in a similar fashion.118  
As Hijmans et al. point out, Apuleius uses these terms in ranking robbers who have organized 
themselves on army lines, and while robbers could have had deserters in their ranks, the 
terms obviously cannot be applied literally (although the correlation between vexillarius and 
antesignanus should still be well noted).119  Also, it is interesting to note that Apuleius was 
from North Africa (Madauras) and Legio III Augusta was the only legion stationed in all of 
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North Africa (excluding Egypt).  Although Apuleius travelled extensively during his studies, 
he eventually settled in North Africa.  It may be that Apuleius’ familiarity with the term 
antesignani had to do with the existence of the group in Legio III Augusta, as seen in the 
inscription above.120  Ultimately, however, this is only conjecture. 
As we have seen, none of the other evidence we have on antesignani supports the idea that it 
was a distinct unit, nor does any literature suggest that they were officers.  While it may be 
true that antesignani were officers in Vegetius’ time, he does not give very much information 
on the duties and roles of the antesignani in battle, so we cannot establish if the corps that 
Vegetius refers to is related to examples from our earlier evidence.121  The only clear 
connection he makes to the earlier legion is his mention of them amongst the heavy 
infantry.122  While he lists the antesignani as an individual unit alongside the principes, 
hastati and triarii, it has been shown above that this is probably not the case, so it is difficult 
to accept Vegetius’ understanding of the Republican antesignani.  Since for him the name is 
interchangeable with campidoctores, perhaps Vegetius’ use of the term is an example of the 
Roman trend to be conservative with military phrases and words, even when new 
terminology had replaced old words.123 
Thus, the definition for antesignani in the late empire is probably quite different from our 
earlier definitions, insofar as by Vegetius’ time, they seem to be campidoctores or officers.  
Yet, if it were a regular officer’s post there probably would have been a greater wealth of 
archaeological evidence, as there is for the other officers, especially because there were 
probably fewer signiferii, optii and centurii in a legion than antesignani (based on the above 
analysis of who they were).124  Thus, it may be that there is little evidence for them as officers 
because the antesignani were regularly enlisted legionaries.  That they were not technically 
separable from other soldiers is the common motif we have seen in both Livy and Caesar, and 
so the possibility that antesiganus was an unofficial title or that this group was not an 
administrative unit, remains a plausible reason for our lack of evidence.   
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In conclusion, we find that our evidence for antesignani is extremely fragmentary, and often 
tremendously unclear, but brought together, there are several assertions we might make.  First 
that each period, mid-Republic, late-Republic, Principate and late empire, has different 
definitions for the group termed antesignani.  While this is true, there seems to be a common 
link between the mid-Republic and the late Republic, insofar as the antesignani were the men 
engaged in combat in front of the battle line.  We also know that they were probably self-
selecting, and that the longevity of Caesar’s legions (and those that followed in the empire) 
brought about the change in their designation: they could claim the title of antesignanus.  
Also, under Caesar they took over some of the tactical roles of the velites, such as attacking 
with cavalry.  Although we have almost no evidence for the group during the Principate, the 
term seems to have been used across the empire.  The lack of evidence for this unit during the 
imperial period may also be a result of their duties being transferred to the auxilia of that 
period,125 a feasible probability, as shall be discussed in Chapter 6, in the section on the 
auxilia’s tactical roles.  Finally, from the analysis above it seems that the antesignani cannot 
be considered traditional light infantry in any period in which they are mentioned.  The only 
possible exception is under Caesar, where they function as light troops despite heavy 
equipment.126 
Auxilia 
This term is most familiarly used to refer to the professional auxiliary wing of the army 
during the imperial period, but earlier writers such as Livy and Caesar refer to the foreign 
troops provided as aid to the legions from allied and friendly states.  As such, several other 
light units that are individually discussed in this chapter can fall under the title of auxilia (e.g. 
caetrati, funditores and sagitarii), but are dealt with individually, having been specifically 
designated by the sources as units functioning in a ‘light’ capacity.127  Thus, this section will 
consider references to any unit(s) designated as auxilia, but not designated by any other term 
that might be directly associated with light infantry (such as the ones mentioned above, for 
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example).128  Also, because the definition of auxilia varies significantly between Republic and 
Empire, these periods will be assessed separately. 
During the Republic, as with their successors, the auxilia were commonly used in the tactical 
role of light infantry.  However, just as with the professional auxilia of the principate, the 
Republican auxilia were also used in a ‘heavy’ tactical role in pitched battle.129  In many of 
the passages that mention auxilia, it is not always clear how they were armed and thus 
whether they were ‘lightly’ equipped or not.  Nevertheless, there are several examples that 
are explicit as to their light armament, discussed below.   
As will be shown below, there are various types of auxiliaries: light-infantry, auxiliaries 
acting as light-infantry (despite their armament being traditionally ‘heavy’), and heavy 
infantry auxiliaries.  The term auxilia is often applied to allies or mercenaries who fought as 
heavy infantry in pitched battle, and so these do not fall under the present analysis.  In some 
cases, the function of these allies and mercenaries is not clearly mentioned.  Those that we 
know functioned as light-infantry, such as Numidian troops, will be discussed below, while 
the Balaeric slingers and Cretan archers will be discussed under funditores and sagitarii. 
Many instances of auxilia refer to these troops as heavy infantry (peditum) and, therefore, 
they will not be discussed here.130  When the auxilia are explicitly stated to be light-infantry 
(e.g. levis armum, expeditus) or engage in light tactics with other light infantry, our sources 
do not mention armament, although they do occasionally mention the ethnicity of the 
auxiliaries.131  Some of these areas providing auxilia to Rome during the Republic include 
Gaul, Spain, Greece (and Asia), Egypt, Numidia and Germany.132  Although some inferences 
of these peoples’ armament might be made through other sources of information that we have 
on this topic, we cannot come to any definitive conclusions, nor can we generalize in such a 
way.  Rather, in Chapter 5, “Defining Light Infantry,” I will discuss instances of auxilia that 
are seen to function as light infantry.  Although some of these units may also occasionally 
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function as heavy infantry (e.g. Roman imperial auxilia), these instances will be further 
analyzed in the aforementioned chapter. 
During the Second Punic war, we have examples of auxiliaries being used in a ‘light’ 
capacity to check the raiding and plundering of the enemy (Livy 22.3, 22.21), and used in 
conjunction with the velites (Livy 22.45, 42.65).  Unfortunately, our sources give very little 
detail about these auxiliaries, but they are probably allied (socii) troops, since there is no 
specification of ethnicity.133  We likewise do not have much specific detail regarding the 
equipment of allied troops, but it seems that they were similarly equipped to the legions.134  
Not only would this would have been necessary to ensure tactical cohesion, but in Livy 22.45 
and 42.65 we have a specific example of the light-armed contingents of the auxilia 
functioning alongside velites.  This may mean they were similarly armed, especially since 
heavy mail armour would make swift movement alongside velites more difficult.  
Furthermore, like the velites, the ‘auxiliis levium armorum’ under Flaminius are sent with 
cavalry to check the plundering enemy, a well-known tactic for Roman light-infantry (Livy 
22.3).135  We also know that these light-armed auxiliaries had a similar record of discipline to 
their Roman allies, and Livy (22.21) claims that this was the reason for their easy victory in a 
skirmish with the Ibergetes tribe.  So for the allied auxiliaries of the Second Punic war, it 
seems there may have been some contingents armed similarly to Roman velites. 
The cavalry–light infantry combination is also seen with some Numidian auxiliaries.136  From 
Livy we can infer that when it comes to Numidian auxilia, they were armed in such a way 
that they must have fought in a similar fashion to velites.  Livy notes that during action 
against Perseus in 170 BC, the velites were used to strengthen (‘ad firmanda’) the ‘Numidae 
pedites’ who are then referred to as ‘levium armorum auxilia’ (42.65).137  Livy also notes that 
the Africans were ‘aequantium equos velocitate’ – a common reason for tactically combining 
light infantry and cavalry, which is something we have also seen with Roman velites.138  
Caesar also mentions Numidian cavalry and infantry working together (Caes. BC 2.25), as 
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well as placing Numidian light infantry amongst other cavalry and light infantry (BG 2.7, 
2.10, 2.24).  As Daly has pointed out, during the Punic wars, the Numidians were generally 
known for light armament, and their cavalry may be described as ‘mounted peltasts’.139  
Although our evidence is extremely sparse, the few cases of Numidian infantry that we have 
present them as light infantry auxiliaries. 
Germans auxiliaries appear twice in Caesar in a light infantry role (BG 6.29, 8.10).  Since 
these are the only examples of Germans being employed as auxilia during the Republic 
(perhaps unsurprisingly given their relative lack of contact with Rome), we cannot come to 
any conclusions on their role as light infantry.  However, archaeological evidence seems to 
support this function.  As Todd has summarized:  
During the last two centuries BC, Germanic weaponry continued to be dominated 
by the arms of the infantry-man, the spear and dagger, with throwing weapons 
steadily increasing in significance.140   
Thus, unlike the prominent role that the sword played with the Celts, the Germans more 
commonly relied on spears, which was probably a result of the scarcity of iron in their area.  
Combining this archaeological evidence with German ideologies gives us a clearer picture of 
what their combat style could have been like.  Owen states that a love of independence, a 
spirit of individualism and a love of booty motivated the Germans.  Yet, at their core, their 
driving ambition was the attainment of honour, fame, and recognition, and indeed their social 
structure was based on these values.141  Furthermore, their imperial successors were well-
known for their displays of individual bravery.142  These ideologies and fighting style 
certainly resembles a more fluid style of combat.  This in turn, may have looked like 
skirmishing or reflected a light infantry approach to combat: the velites for example 
supposedly also approached combat with recognition in mind, wearing animal-skins on their 
helmet for the purpose of recognition.143   
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Thus, while we know that some troops classified as auxilia by our Republican sources 
functioned as light infantry, our evidence is scarce, and there are only a few cases where this 
is evident.  By contrast, there are more references to them as ‘heavy’ or ‘line’ infantry, and 
reasons for this are difficult to ascertain.  One suggestion might be that a sufficient amount of 
other types of light infantry existed (e.g. velites – who made up approximately one-third of 
the Roman infantry, peltasts, funditores, sagitarii, etc.).   
Having reviewed the Republican sources on auxilia here now follows an assessment of the 
imperial sources.  The professional auxilia – the significant ‘light’ infantry division of the 
imperial Roman army, are perhaps somewhat underrepresented in modern scholarship, 
relative to the amount of studies that are published on their legionary counter-parts.  This of 
course is a reflection of the attention devoted to these respective divisions in the extant 
literary evidence.  As Gilliver has pointed out, this division of the army has often been 
unjustifiably seen as ‘cannon-fodder’.  Instead, as suggested by Gilliver and as indicated in 
Chapter 6 (p. 169, below), the auxilia were a ‘specialized-corps’ of combatants; experts in 
hand-to-hand combat, who were tactically flexible, and strategically indispensible.144   
In the realm of Roman light infantry, this is the unit for which we have the most evidence, 
particularly in the archaeological record.  Also, the term ‘cohortes’ in the literary evidence 
for the imperial period (particularly in Tacitus), likewise refers to the Roman imperial 
auxilia, but this term will be philologically discussed separately.  Despite being very dated 
now, Cheesman still provides the most useful dedicated discussion of the imperial auxilia, 
and has philologically discussed various other terms associated with them, as well as their 
strength and organization.145  
The term auxilia is most often translated as ‘aid’, ‘help’ or ‘assistance’ in all our sources 
(when not referring to the military unit), and it is significant that the ‘light’ wing of the army 
was labelled as such: it seems to me to be a clear and deliberate segregation between the 
traditional ‘might’ of Rome – the legions, and their philologically ‘lesser’ brothers-in-arms, 
the ‘help’.146   
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That the auxilia functioned in both a light infantry capacity, as well as in pitched battle, we 
know from the tactical analysis below, so then what is left to discuss is the armament of the 
professional auxilia.  As with the number of men in the army, this topic has its theoretical 
‘facts’ and an unascertainable reality.  Bishop and Coulston have discussed the armour of the 
professional auxilia at length, and how it compared to (or contrasted with) legionary armour.  
As they have pointed out, nothing is unequivocally provable, but the differences in equipment 
depicted on Trajan’s column seem to be the most likely theoretical reality.  That is, that the 
auxilia were not normally equipped with segmented armour, and were equipped with the flat 
oval shield and long thrusting spears (as opposed to the short-range armour piercing pilum 
that legionaries used as ‘shock weapons’ prior to engaging in hand-to-hand combat during 
pitched battle).  A spatha or gladius and mail or scale armour completed this theoretical 
‘uniform’.  As Bishop and Coulston have pointed out, this armament possibly allowed for 
tactical versatility,147 a point that coincides with the argument for tactical flexibility made in 
the section on tactical roles, below.  It must be remembered that it was highly unlikely that all 
auxiliary infantry were similarly armed; variation in equipment fluctuated throughout the 
army and within units, and similarity in equipment probably existed to enough of an extent to 
maintain tactical cohesion, but beyond this we cannot be certain how each soldier would have 
been outfitted.148 
As mentioned above, we have a significantly larger amount of evidence regarding the 
professional auxilia than any other ‘light’ infantry unit.  As a result, an in-depth assessment 
of their role is possible, which I have included in Chapter 6, “Tactical Roles”.149   
Caetrati 
Very little is known about this group of light-armed Spaniards, since only Livy and Caesar 
mention them; our earliest reference being from Caesar at BC 1.39.  They are depicted in 
iconography found at Osuna, in which they are identifiable by their armament, among which 
is the caetrata, or ox-hide target for which they were named.150  Apart from their tunic and 
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caps, the depiction shows us very little, and unfortunately archaeological evidence for them 
does not go much further than that.151  
Livy consistently refers to Macedonian peltasts as caetrati, and though these are clearly not 
the same as Spanish caetrati, the reference is worth noting as it denotes some sort of 
similarity in Livy’s understanding.152  According to Williams, Philopoemen’s peltasts (which 
Livy refers to as caetrati) were not light infantry, the basis of her argument being the fact that 
Livy does not use the word velites to describe this unit.153  However, the use of the term 
velites could have confused Roman readers, as the corps was exclusively Roman, and 
moreover, Livy does not use the term to describe any other group.  Caetrati on the other 
hand, seems to denote any foreign version of the same or similar corps.  Furthermore, Livy 
distinguishes Philip V’s caetrati from his “Cretan auxiliaries”, as the latter were velocissimi 
pedites (31.36).154  So it may be that Livy is using caetrati to denote light infantry in foreign 
armies that are a part of the native portion of the force, like the Macedonian peltasts were to 
Philip’s army.155 
Daly argues that the caetrati were javelin-men, and as such were armed similarly to Roman 
velites, i.e. with not only a throwing spear, but also a sword as a sidearm; in this case, the 
falcata-type.156  Indeed, Livy articulates this specifically at 33.8, and along with one of 
Caesar’s references to the unit, this suggestion seems to be a good possibility.157  It must be 
remembered however, that Livy’s understanding might have been influenced by the time 
period in which he was writing, which was roughly contemporary with Caesar.  Thus, our 
chronology for this group is particularly difficult to ascertain.  It is difficult to tell whether 
Livy’s description of caetrati is applicable to those in the mid-Republic, the late-
Republic/early Empire, or both.  So, aside from the wide chronological spread and thinness of 
our evidence, what the ancient authors tell us is that they do seem to bear a resemblance in 
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armament to the Roman velites, and it would seem that their tactical use was similar – 
perhaps a natural result of this resemblance.  As with velites, we see caetrati being used in 
conjunction with cavalry at Caes. BC 1.75.  It is also worth nothing here that these Spaniards 
are part of Afranius’ personal guard (praetorius cohors).  Although we never see velites as 
the commander’s praetorian guard, there are examples of them being sent on reconnaissance 
with the commanding officer (e.g. Polyb. 10.32.2). 
Caesar also mentions that like the Lusitanian light infantry, the caetrati were good swimmers, 
presumably on account of their water skins (utres), which were inflatable for floatation (BC 
1.48).  As discussed below, it was tactical versatility that made light units useful, and part of 
this skill was the ability to manage various kinds of terrain (e.g. Caes. BC 1.70); being able to 
manoeuvre around or through water could prove to be a vital part of this versatility (e.g. Livy 
44.35).  This benefit is also seen with the Batavians during the imperial period (e.g. Tac. Hist. 
2.17).  Indeed, perhaps the reason why we see little of the caetrati in our evidence is because 
the Romans often had similar troops from other regions (e.g. velites, peltasts, Batavians, etc.), 
which voided the necessity of recruiting these kinds of light units from Spain.  Another 
reason, perhaps a more likely one, could simply be that our sources do not distinguish so 
carefully between the specific vocabulary for auxiliary troops, as we have seen with auxilia 
above. 
Cohors 
One of the first things to note about the usage of this word in our sources is that it often 
comes with an adjective, that is, a term describing exactly what kind of cohorts are being 
referred to.  Among these, the most common are auxilia; ala; expeditus; extraordinarius; 
leves; socius; subsidiarius, and many of these terms appear below.  Other common adjectives 
include the ethnicity of the auxiliary unit, such as the Batavian or Tungrian cohorts.  When 
the terms ‘auxilia’ and ‘ala’ are used with cohortes, in Tacitus they often refer to the Roman 
imperial auxiliaries, but we do find the terms occasionally used in Caesar and Livy.158   
The term cohort is most commonly a reference to a distinctive unit (one of 10 in a legion), 
but it may also be a general reference to the particular size of a group of men; without a 
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 See Livy 10.40, 10.41, 10.43, 21.60; Caes. BC 1.63, 1.73.  For the possible time of establishment of the 
cohort, See Bell 1965, 405; Rawson 1991, 42, 53; Keppie 1998, 63; Dobson 2008, 58-60. 
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descriptive adjective, it is usually several hundred men.159  Varro tells us that the term is 
derived from agriculture language meaning joined or coupled together.  This, in turn, is a 
reference to the maniples that are joined together to form the cohort (Varro Ling. 5.88).  The 
possible existence of cohorts in the mid-Republic, and the corresponding prospect of a 
combined light infantry – heavy infantry mix in these cohorts, is discussed in Chapter 5.160 
Some of our references to cohorts have them being used in ‘light’ tactics, and these cases will 
be addressed in Chapter 6.  For the cohorts that are expressly stated to be ‘light’, e.g. ‘leves’, 
‘expediti’, see the sections on those terms below.161 
Expedites 
Our sources use this term in two ways: either as a noun on its own, describing light infantry, 
or as adjective in conjunction with various units to emphasize the lightness of their 
equipment, whether an ad hoc tactic, or a permanent feature of the corps.  Units that are 
equipped in this way are thus often used in ‘light’ tactics.  This applies without much 
variation to both the Republic and the imperial period.  Our earliest author to use this term is 
Caesar, and it appears in his Gallic War at 1.27. 
For our purposes, it would be beneficial to determine what this usage of ‘light-armed’ refers 
to in our sources as far as equipment is concerned, however, as we shall see, our sources are 
not explicit in this respect. 
To begin with the Republic, Livy uses expeditus as an adjective describing the iuventi, 
exercitus, agmen, milites, iaculatores, auxilia, legio, cohortes, pedites, and funditores.162  He 
also uses it as a stand-alone noun, which is most commonly translated simply as ‘light-
infantry’.  The above corps include troop divisions that are traditionally considered light, 
(iuventi, iaculatores, funditores), and those that are often considered heavy (exercitus, agmen, 
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 The paper-strength unit size being 480 men in the cohortal legion.  Livy uses the term to refer to similar 
numbers of men, e.g. 4.38-39: 300 dismounted cavalrymen form a ‘cohort’, 7.7: 400 men in each Hernician 
‘cohort’, 10.40: 400 in each Samnite ‘cohort’, 23.17: 460 in the Perusian ‘cohort’, 43.18: 500 in the Illyrian 
‘cohort’.  
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 See p. 134 ff. 
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 The earliest reference to what may be ‘light’ cohorts in the period under review appears in Caesar at BC 1.39. 
162
 iuventi: Livy 2.11, 37.16; exercitus: 6.3; agmen: 10.12, 28.7; milites: 21.36, 25.21 (Carthaginian troops); 
iaculatores: 21.46; auxilia: 22.21; legio: 24.41; cohors: 27.40, 28.23; pedites: 28.14, 34.26; funditores: 37.41 
(Greek troops). As noted in brackets, some of these refer to enemy corps, and so will not be included in the 
assessment that follows. 
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legio, cohortes, pedites).163  The iaculatores are probably velites and we know that they were 
regularly lightly equipped.164  If we consider Polybius’ description of velites as the youngest 
and the poorest (6.22), then it is also likely that the ‘expediti iuventi’ are probably also velites.  
Funditores are slingers, and are discussed in their own section below.  What is more difficult 
to determine is the nature of the ‘heavy’ infantry described as expediti.  The terms used seem 
to refer to the regular heavy infantry of the legion, yet our sources do not tell us what a light-
armed legionary’s armament would have been.  There are several cases where the term is 
understood to mean ‘without baggage’ or in ‘light marching order’, and this almost always 
the translation in the context of the march (i.e. with agmen).165  For all the other instances of 
legionaries described as expediti, we can only speculate what this might mean as far as 
equipment is concerned.166 
When the term is used on its own, Livy seems to be referring to the regular light infantry of 
the manipular legion, i.e. the velites, since we see them employed in ‘light’ tactics that have 
been assigned to the velites elsewhere, such as skirmishing, quickly occupying high ground, 
or reconnaissance.167  The tactics in which light-armed legionaries (i.e. expeditus cohors) are 
mentioned include attacking enemies conducting a siege (24.41), an ambush (27.40), and a 
joint siege operation with the navy against Gades (28.23).  It is not clear why the legionaries 
were expediti in these cases, except perhaps the exigency of these situations.  From this we 
might conclude that due to the haste required in these cases, these expediti may have been 
legionaries in light marching order, i.e. without their baggage, so that they could arrive at 
their tactical positions with some advantage (e.g. at the place of ambush before the enemy 
arrived). 
With the emergence of the cohortal legion, we see the transference of typical ‘light’ tactics 
from the velites to the regular infantry.  Sallust uses expeditus most often with cohortes, 
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 Although Livy’s use of expeditus pedites seems to be referring to velites since they attack with cavalry.   
164
 Cf. Lewis & Short 1879, ‘iaculator’, and Iaculatores, below. 
165
 Livy 7.34, 10.12,  24.41, 28.7, cf. the Lewis & Short definition: ‘unfettered, unimpeded, unencumbered, 
without a burden, soldier lightly burdened, a swiftly marching soldier’ 
166
 Livy’s reference to expeditiis auxiliis led by a tribune at 22.21 notes that their Ilergetes counterparts were a 
hastily-organized militia (tumultuariam manum), which in turn provides a subtle contrast to the nature of the 
expediti auxilii (i.e. that they were neither hastily-organized nor a militia).  While this does not add much to our 
understanding of this corps, it underscores their professionalism and their ability to be led by a Roman 
commander. 
167
 E.g. Livy 21.32, 21.36, 21.46, 21.47, 22.16, 28.34, 32.6, 33.6, 34.28, 36.15.  For more on ‘light’ tactics see 
ch. 6, ‘Tactical Roles’, below. 
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where we find these cohorts engaging in tactical manoeuvres such as advancing ahead of the 
marching column (Iug. 46, 100), securing high ground (Iug. 50), and rushing ahead of the 
army to garrison a town with their provisions (Iug. 90).  Unfortunately, as with Livy, Sallust 
is not explicit as to the armament of these legionaries and so we cannot determine the 
specifics of their ‘light’ equipment.  Sallust uses expeditus twice more, to describe pedites 
mingling with cavalry (Iug. 59) and to describe light-armed soldiers in the front line at the 
battle of Pistoria (Cat. 60).  It is interesting to note that these would probably be velites in an 
earlier period, but regrettably, we do not know what kind of soldiers Sallust is describing or 
how they were equipped.168 
Caesar uses expeditus to refer to Roman troops five times: twice regarding antesignani, and 
three times regarding the entire legion.169  The uses with antesignani are discussed in that 
section above.  He also uses it once regarding evocati (BC 1.27), but this instance, as with 
antesignani, seems to refer to the most agile of these men, rather than light troops.  When he 
mentions the whole legion, he is referring to their being equipped without their baggage, for 
purposes of swiftness.  It should be noted here that Livy, as well as Cicero (Att. 5.18, 8.9a, 
Fam. 15.4) use the term in the same way; this consistency suggests that expeditus might 
simply mean ‘without baggage’ when referring to the entire legion. 
From our imperial sources, Frontinus uses the term twice to refer to Roman troops, once 
regarding the velites at Zama (Strat. 2.3.16b), and once under Fulvius during the Cimbrian 
wars (Strat. 2.5.8).  In the latter instance, Frontinus claims that Fulvius with 
part of his force observing the customary practice, he himself, with the light-
armed troops took a hidden position behind the camp of the enemy, and as they 
poured forth according to their custom, he suddenly attacked and overthrew the 
deserted rampart and captured their camp.170 
The phrase Itaque per partem exercitus custodita consuetudine ipse cum expeditis, implies 
that it was customary (consuetudine) for Fulvius to keep part of his army equipped somehow 
more lightly than the rest of the army, perhaps for these ambush-type stratagems.  Yet, 
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 McGushin 1977, 286 suggests that Sallust’s use of expediti at the battle of Pistoria was probably in reference 
to ‘those who ad pugnandum alacres videbantur’.  If this is true, we can correlate them to the antesignani, cf. 
antesignani under Caesar, p.21, above.  This would also emphasize the point made above that expediti 
antesignani are not necessarily light, but rather the most agile/eager, See p. 24. 
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 Antesignani: see section above; entire legion: BC 3.77, BG 5.2, 5.7. 
170
 Translation is my own: Itaque per partem exercitus custodita consuetudine ipse cum expeditis post castra 
hostium consedit occultus effusisque eis ex more repente adortus et desertum proruit vallum et castra cepit. 
43 
 
Frontinus’ anecdote is generally confusing, since we do not know which Fulvius he is 
referring to, and so we cannot place this stratagem chronologically.  Livy 40.30-32 refers to 
Q. Fulvius Flaccus using this stratagem with the Celtiberians in 181 BC; however, there is no 
account of Fulvius's warring with the Cimbrians.  If this is the same Fulvius as in Livy, then 
the expediti here might be velites.  Otherwise, there is not much more we can say regarding 
the nature of Fulvius’ light-armed troops. 
Like the Republican sources, Tacitus’ usage of the term mostly refers to a light marching 
order, used in order to have groups of legionaries move quickly to a strategically important 
position.171  There are three instances that vary from this usage however, the first occurs at 
Ann. 4.25, where Tacitus describes the abrupt assassination mission against Tacfarinas in AD 
24.  Here, expeditae cohortes and cavalry are sent out before dawn to surprise and annihilate 
the rebels, asleep in their camp.172  The second instance sees a Vespasianic commander 
named Varus, cum expedita manu, defeat a small Vitellian force of 400 cavalry towards the 
end of the civil war.173  The third instance involves eques cum expeditis cohortibus at the 
siege of Jerusalem, where they are sent to skirmish with Jewish forces under the walls of the 
city (Hist. 5.11).  Although we cannot say how these light-armed troops would have been 
equipped, we might reason that they would have either have to have been very fit or very 
lightly armed in order to keep up with cavalry. 
Thus, both our Republican and Imperial sources do not specify what they actually meant by 
expeditus when referring to troops.  It is possible that Livy meant the velites when he used the 
term on its own.  We can also say that it very often refers to a group of legionaries or an 
entire legion in light-marching order, and this simply means that they were unencumbered by 
their baggage (impedimenta), but aside from this, the ‘light infantry’ that otherwise are 
associated with expeditus must remain a mystery. 
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 Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.50, 1.56, 1.60, 2.7, 3.74. 13.41, Hist. 2.45, 3.50, 4.34. 
172
 It is unclear whether these are legionaries or auxiliaries. 
173
 Hist. 3.61. The term cum expedita manu is often translated ‘flying column’ by Church and Brodribb 
(Macmillan, 1877), and is the same Latin term used to describe groups of legionaries sent to occupy strategic 
positions quickly, as mentioned above. 
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Exploratores 
This group has been discussed at length by Austin and Rankov, although there is little in our 
sources beyond their employment as spies and scouts.174  Though our earliest 
historiographical reference is at Caes. BG 1.12, there is only one reference in our sources 
relating exploratores to combat, and that is in Tacitus where he dismisses the importance of 
their skirmishing.175  Since our sources overwhelmingly discuss their reconnaissance role, it is 
probable that they were not meant to engage in combat.  This can also be seen in their easy 
capture by a group of eager Batavians during the civil war of AD 69 (Tac. Hist. 2.17).  
However, that is not to suggest that they were not armed or that they were incapable of any 
kind of combat, but rather that successful reconnaissance was their primary objective.  
Engaging in combat and risking their lives was probably something they tried to avoid since 
it could jeopardize the success of their reconnaissance.  Beyond this there is nothing we can 
determine about their armament.  Lewis and Short’s translation as skirmishers in the plural 
comes from Tacitus Hist. 2.17, cited above.   
We have several inscriptions from the late third century that hint at their organization.  One 
indicates that those stationed in Dacia (recruited from Germania inferior) were commanded 
by a legionary centurion, acting as their praepositus.176  In light of this, Speidel has suggested 
that their number will not have exceeded the strength of a regular cohort, which is a 
reasonable assumption.177  Alternatively, two inscriptions suggest that exploratores units were 
commanded by prefects, and it seem that the cohors IX Batavorum equitata miliaria 
exploratorum was theoretically 1000 men strong.178  Thus, it seems that the size of an 
explorator unit was not necessarily set in stone – a reasonable reality given that their tactics 
would have varied depending on the exigency of their deployment.  Furthermore, regarding 
exploratores (from Germania superior specifically), Speidel guesses that most if not all of 
these soldiers would be mounted (as the unit name of cohors IX Batavorum equitata above 
suggests), however, I find that gravestones like that of the explorator Tamonius may suggest 
                                                 
174
 Austin & Rankov 1995, 42-54, et passim. 
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 Tac. Hist. 2.24: ‘etiam per concursum exploratorum, crebra magis quam digna memoratu proelia’; this 
occurs after the first Battle of Bedriacum in AD 69, near Placentia. 
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 CIL III 12574. 
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 Speidel 1992, 92. 
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 CIL XIII 6814; CIG III 6771 = IG XIV2422 = IGR I 10 = ILS 8852; cf. Speidel 1992a, 93, 99-100. 
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otherwise; specifically because he is not depicted as a cavalryman.179  Also, the gravestone 
belonging to Lecterus depicts him as either a light infantryman or dismounted cavalryman 
(specifically because of his small shield), and the inscription does not directly suggest he was 
an explorator.180  Speidel has suggested that his unit, the numeri Divitesium was one of 
exploratores, sent from Lower Germany on an exploratory expedition.181  In any case, it is 
difficult to determine the exact nature of these units, how many men would be mounted in 
them, and how the foot soldiers might be equipped.   
With the information that we have, we know the exploratores could have been mounted or 
part-mounted.  Yet, because it is impossible to determine how many men within these units 
would have functioned as infantry (if any), we cannot define the exploratores as a corps of 
light infantry.  Rather, we can only suggest that some of the soldiers in these units may have 
functioned as such upon demand. 
Extraordinarii 
The clearest definition for this group comes from Polybius, who says  
The allies muster along with the citizens, and are distributed and managed by the 
officers appointed by the Consuls, who have the title of praefecti sociis and are 
twelve in number.  These officers select for the Consuls from the whole infantry 
and cavalry of the allies such as are most fitted for actual service, and these are 
called extraordinarii [e)ktraordinari/ouj], (which in Greek is e)pi/lektoi).182 
Polybius’ Greek translation, i.e. e)pi/lektoi, emphasizes that these are indeed the select few, 
or ‘chosen’ as Liddell and Scott define it.183  This does not give us any specific details as far 
as their equipment is concerned, and the only thing it suggests is that they were similarly 
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 CIL VIII 9060 = ILS 2627, Speidel 1992, 99.  He also suggests that in the late third century infantry 
gravestones had become so popular that it was used for horsemen as well, citing CIL V 944 as a single example.   
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 CIL III 728 = 7387 
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 Speidel 1992, 92 
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 Translation: Shuckburgh. Macmillan. 1889.  ἁθροισθέντων δὲ καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὁμοῦ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, τὴν 
μὲν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν χειρισμὸν ποιοῦνται τούτων αὐτῶν οἱ καθεσταμένοι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπάτων ἄρχοντες, 
προσαγορευόμενοι δὲ πραίφεκτοι, δώδεκα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες. οἳ πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ὑπάτοις τοὺς 
ἐπιτηδειοτάτους πρὸς τὴν ἀληθινὴν χρείαν ἐκ πάντων τῶν παραγεγονότων συμμάχων ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς 
ἐκλέγουσι, τοὺς καλουμένους ἐκτραορδιναρίους, ὃ μεθερμηνευόμενον ἐπιλέκτους δηλοῖ.  Though Polybius 
transliterates the Latin, this is our earliest historiographical reference to the group.  It may also be worth noting 
that Josephus associates lo/gxh with the epi/lektoi.  This is discussed under logxoforo/i, in Chapter 3.  It 
should also be noted that cavalry appear as extraordinarii at Livy 40.31, and 42.58.  The discussion here, as 
everywhere, focuses only on the infantry. 
183
 Cf. the Lewis & Short definition: ‘select, out of the common order, extraordinary’. 
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equipped to the rest of the allied contingents, as they were selected from all the allies.  As to 
why they were selected from the allies, we cannot say.  Rawlings suggests that in selecting 
these men from the allies, the Romans may have been copying a Hernician custom.184  Hoyos 
suggests that extraordinarii were a part of the commander’s bodyguard, and as such, their 
recruitment may have been a symbol of comradeship and trust among the allies.185  Either 
suggestion is possible, but unascertainable. 
It is also impossible to determine what Polybius actually meant by ‘most fitted for actual 
service’ (tou\j e)pithdeiota/touj pro\j th\n a)lhqinh\n xrei/an), and whether this has 
any correlation to the way they were equipped, or whether it was simply a judgement of their 
fighting skill.  At 6.30 Polybius notes that they could be placed at the head or at the rear of 
the marching column, which is a tactic that was often given to ‘light’ troops, but this still 
does not allow us to make any firm assertions regarding their equipment.186  However, there 
are two other questions that arise regarding extraordinarii in Livy, and that is their 
organization and their link (if any) to antesignani. 
Regarding their organization, Livy mentions 23 centurions from the allied contingents dying 
at the Battle of Mutina (193 BC).  Although it is impossible to determine the specific 
organizational structure of the allies, this passage suggests that they too had centurions in 
their ranks.187  Whether Livy is simply using centurion as a general term denoting a unit 
commander is unclear.  We do know however that the total number of allied infantry was 
equal to the number of infantry in the legion (i.e. theoretically 8,400 in a consular army), and 
that the allied contingents are commonly referred to as being grouped in cohorts.188  
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 Rawlings 2007, 53.  That Romans probably copied other armies' conventions is attested elsewhere, cf. esp. 
Ineditum Vaticanum: Von Arnim 1892, Hermes 27: 118: ‘But when we found ourselves at war with the Samites we 
armed ourselves with their oblong shields and javelins ... and by copying foreign arms we became masters of 
those who thought so highly of themselves’, trans. Cornell 1995, 170. 
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 Hoyos 2007, 67.  As to whether they were the commander’s bodyguard, this is true if we read the dative ‘τοῖς 
ὑπάτοις’ (i.e. the Consuls) at 6.26.6, as a possessive dative.  Thus, ‘the officers select for the Consuls’ (‘οἳ 
πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ὑπάτοις’), would mean that the extraordinarii were selected for the Consuls to have as their 
own, or in other words, as their bodyguard.  However, Polybius does not use the word for bodyguard in the 
passage.  
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 See p. 159 ff., below. 
187
 Some Italian allies, and the Samnites specifically, may well have provided Rome with the manipular 
organization and large scuta, cf. Ineditum Vaticanum: Von Arnim 1892, Hermes 27: 118; trans. Cornell 1995, 170; 
Burns 2003, 65. 
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 E.g. Livy 29.19, 30.41, 41.2; Sall. Iug. 105; Tac. Ann. 1.49, 2.16, 13.38, 14.26, Hist. 5.18, however, these 
uses of cohort could be a result of the authors homogenizing allied military structure to that of the legions due to 
their unfamiliarity with the former. 
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Furthermore, the extraordinarii had their own place in camp and in the order of march.189  So 
it is likely that their organization must have somehow reflected Roman organization, if only 
to ensure tactical cohesion in the battle line: they were traditionally placed on the flanks, and 
the extraordinarii were usually in the front lines.190  While the evidence from Livy is vague, 
the latter point suggests a tentative link with the antesignani. 
As mentioned above, the extraordinarii were known as the select or chosen few, picked for 
their suitability (e)pithdeiota/touj) for combat.  It is this and their fighting in the front line 
(prima acie, Livy 35.5), that suggests a correlation to antesignani.  The etymology of 
extraordinarii supports this suggestion as those who were ‘beyond’ (extra) ‘the regulars’ 
(ordinarii): soldiers who in both skill and position fought beyond the regular troops.  
Polybius suggests that some of these men might be chosen for special tasks in direct service 
to the consul (6.31).  This may be correlated to the emergency summons Caesar gives to his 
antesignani (e.g. BC 3.75).  The link between the two falters however, when we consider the 
time period in which the respective groups exist.  As seen above, the antesignani seem to 
have existed throughout the period under review, whereas we only have evidence for the 
existence the extraordinarii in the mid-Republic.  They are mentioned eight times by Livy 
(and no other Latin authors), with the last reference occurring in 181 BC (40.27).  Because 
antesignani is the more enduring term, it might be suggested that as with rorarii and velites, 
the early term of extraordinarii may have been eventually replaced with antesignani, yet this 
is only speculative.  So, with the given evidence, we cannot suggest any positive connection 
of any kind.   
Hence, the sources provide us with little information on the extraordinarii, however, we can 
ascertain that they are associated with heavy infantry.  They are placed in the battle line 
alongside the legions and have a similar if not the same organizational structure.  While a 
connection to the antesignani is extremely speculative, it only adds to the already observable 
implication that the extraordinarii should not be considered as specialist light infantry.191 
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 Place in camp: Polyb. 6.31; Order of march: Polyb. 6.40.  cf. Walbank 1957, 709. 
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 E.g. Livy 27.12, 34.47, 35.5. 
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 Specialist insofar as they were not dedicated light infantry like the velites; they may have been able to 
function as light infantry if they were taking on light tactics as the antesignani did. 
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Ferentarii 
This term appears very rarely in our sources, and it is only Vegetius and Varro who mention 
this group several times (Varro being the earliest historiographical reference at 7.57).  
Vegetius describes them as part of the ancient Roman armies, or the armies of the mid-
Republic, and while he describes them at length, none of our sources for the mid-Republic 
mention ferentarii.192  However, from the late-Republic, Sallust makes one mention of them 
in his description of the Battle of Pistoria (Cat. 60), describing the opposing armies coming 
close enough for the ferentarii to engage.  While the reference makes it impossible to say 
anything about their equipment, their position is correlated to skirmishers or velites.193  
Vegetius makes similar suggestions, describing them alongside levis armaturae and 
funditores.194  Indeed, throughout his work Vegetius emphasizes that ferentarii are some form 
of light-armed troop, and his description of their equipment can be likened to the armament 
of the velites.195  Also, like Livy’s description of the accensi, Vegetius places the ferentarii in 
the third line of the Republican legions: a parallel we have already seen above.196  If we are to 
consider this association to be valid, then the possibility exists that the ferentarii may have 
performed a similar function to the accensi.  However, while our other evidence supports the 
idea that the ferentarii were some sort of skirmishers, it also renders the suggestion that they 
were non-combative assistants like the accensi quite doubtful.  For example, Varro describes 
them as ‘cavalrymen who only had weapons which were to be thrown, such as a javelin’ 
(Varro Ling. 7.3.57).  Also, Tacitus describes them skirmishing with the Britons before the 
heavy infantry engaged at the battle against Caractacus (Tac. Ann. 12.35): a similar role to the 
one described by Sallust.   
With such sparse evidence, any conclusions on the ferentarii remain speculative.  Yet, our 
sources seem to agree that ferentarii were some sort of light infantry.  Their loose correlation 
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 Vegetius: see n. 195, below.  The term does however, appear in Plaut. Trin. 2,4, with the sense of ‘a friend in 
need’, cf. Lewis & Short ‘ferentarius’, and also n. 14 in the Riley edition, 1912: “The "ferentarii" were the light-
armed troops, who, being unencumbered with heavy armour, were ready to come immediately and opportunely 
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193
 Festus also makes this correlation: Paul. ex Fest. p. 85, 7; 93, 14; and 369, 5. 
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195
 Veg. 1.20, 2.2, 2.15, 2.17, 3.20, 3.26, esp. 2.15: ‘ferentarii et levis armatura, quos nunc exculcatores et 
armaturas dicimus, scutati qui plumbatis gladiis et missibilibus accincti’, also at 3.20 he has them attacking 
with cavalry : a tactic also used by the velites.  This tactical versatility is typical amongst Roman light infantry, 
cf. ch. 6, below. 
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 Veg. 3.14, Cato likens ferentarii to accensi and this is mentioned in Festus 506.26L, see Accensi above. 
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to velites or skirmishers appears several times, and Vegetius is consistent in his multiple 
descriptions of them as lightly armed troops.  Thus, although we know almost nothing about 
this group, I would suggest it can be said that they were probably light infantry. 
Funditores  
This is the Latin term for ‘slingers’.197  The ambiguity of our sources makes it difficult to 
identify any differences in this corps between the Republic and Imperial period.  They are 
more commonly mentioned in the literary sources for the Republican period, but it also seems 
that slinging may have been part of the general training for auxiliaries and legionaries during 
the Imperial period.198  Our earliest reference that is relevant to this study appears at Caes. BG 
2.7. 
We know very little about the armament of these units, although Griffiths has provided a 
good assessment of the archaeological evidence.199  In addition to his assessment, there is 
some sculptural evidence for the armament of slingers, but, it is problematic as it comes from 
Trajan’s column.200  In scenes 70 and 72 on Trajan’s column, a slinger is depicted wearing a 
tunic and carrying his sling-bullets in a small pouch slung over his shoulder.  There is a 
slinger in scene 66 as well who is similarly armed, only he is also carrying a shield in his left 
hand and wearing a short blade on his belt.  Whether or not the shield and sword were a 
regular part of the slinger’s armament is difficult to ascertain, but his lack of body armour is 
consistent in the depictions on Trajan’s column. 
There are several other factors that support the lightness of their equipment.  Perhaps most 
importantly, our sources do not discuss them engaging in hand-to-hand combat; while there 
are some descriptions of them skirmishing in loose order with other light infantry and 
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cavalry, they themselves are not normally depicted with the appropriate equipment for close 
combat, such as a shield or sword.201   
The archaeological record has many examples of sling bullets,202 and while this is useful in 
determining the nature of combat when these weapons were involved, apart from this, it is, 
not surprisingly, very difficult to identify the equipment of slingers in the archaeological 
record.203   
It should also be noted that slingers were often foreign recruits, and the Balearic Isles were 
well known for their men who had trained in slinging since childhood.204  This also makes it 
more difficult to ascertain any standards of equipment (or lack thereof) and organization 
since our sources are less concerned about these aspects of foreign recruits, relative to regular 
units of the Roman army.205  Domingez Monedero has suggested that for slingers from the 
Balearic isles, Strabo’s description is probably fairly accurate (Geo. 3.5.2).  He notes that  
in addition to the sling, the arms of the Balearic Islands had a goatskin shield and 
a spear hardened in fire and sometimes had an iron tip.206 
Although none of the iconography from the Roman period portrays the spear, a slinger’s 
shield is depicted on Trajan’s column.  Regarding this and other additional weaponry like the 
sword for example, Domingez Monedero asserts that Balearic slingers would need such 
equipment to defend themselves once their main function as slingers concluded in a battle.207  
Indeed, such equipment could have been necessary for the skirmishing which we know they 
engaged in.  Domingez Monedero also adds that slingers may have modified their equipment 
to conform to Roman requirements: 
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With the integration of the Balearic Islands in the Roman world it is quite likely 
that, in fact, the natives were changing their ancestral sling to conform to a 
standard that Rome had to represent.208 
While this is impossible to prove, it is also impossible to say when and where this may have 
happened.  As such, we cannot track any sort of changes in slinging equipment, but if some 
sort of development over time occurred, it naturally makes it impossible to determine any 
‘standard’ equipment amongst slingers. 
As far as size of units of slingers is concerned, it seems it varied depending on the levy.  At 
BC 3.4 Caesar says 1200 slingers were levied (although he does not say where from), but the 
portion that this number constitutes for his total force of slingers is unascertainable.  Thus, as 
with most foreign corps, size and organization is an insolvable question. 
We can conclude that these missile units could certainly be considered light, especially due to 
their regular skirmishing with other light infantry, and to the iconography that depicts them 
with no armour.  Yet, beyond their various tactical uses, there is little we can ascertain 
regarding their organization and equipment. 
Iaculatores  
While this term appears relatively few times in our sources, the etymology of the word itself 
suggests that these men threw things at the enemy.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, both Livy and 
Vegetius’ reports of these men describe lightly armed javelin throwers.209  Thus, possibly the 
most obvious parallel we have in the Roman army is the velites.  This is not only because 
these men are seemingly light-armed javelin throwers, but also because of the tactics in 
which they are used.  Livy has them functioning with cavalry several times (21.46, 21.52, 
27.12), which is similar to the velites.  Also, in other instances they are deployed at the front 
of the battle line, ahead of the heavy infantry (Livy 21.46, 22.45, 42.59).  So, I would suggest 
the possibility that when referencing Roman troops, iaculatores is simply another term for 
velites, but ultimately this is only speculation.  It is impossible to determine why the sources 
would use a different term for the same troops.  If they are indeed the same troops, then 
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 Domingez Monedero 2005, 179, my translation: ‘Con la integracion de las baleares en el mundo romano es 
harto probable que, en efecto, los nativos fuesen modificando su ancestral honda para adaptarla a la norma 
que Roma trataba representar.’  He cites Strab. 3.5.2 as a possible indication that specialization of equipment 
occurred. 
209
 Cf. the Lewis & Short definition: ‘a thrower, caster, hurler’. Also, Livy’s reference at 21.21 is our earliest 
historiographic citation.   
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etymologically, velites emphasizes that they were veiled (velare), i.e. by an animal skin, as 
per Polybius’ description of them (see Velites, below).  The term iaculatores on the other 
hand, emphasizes that they threw javelins (iaculari), highlighting their function as 
skirmishers and javelin throwers.210  Perhaps the authors intentionally chose to emphasize one 
aspect or the other about these light armed troops, but again, this is only conjecture.  The only 
suggestion we may make with certainty is that they are some sort of light armed missile 
troop: appearing alongside slingers, archers and levis armaturae.211   
Lanciarii 
We have very little evidence in the period under review for this term.  We have evidence for 
soldiers using the title on their tombstones from the early third century AD.  However, the 
title appears more frequently on tombstones from the period between the reigns of Diocletian 
and Constantine.212  From our period, the only direct evidence we have for this type of soldier 
comes from the tombstones of the soldiers from Legio II Parthica, stationed in Apamea, 
Syria.  There are three tombstones depicting lanciarii, although only two use the title in the 
inscription.213  All three monuments date from between AD 215-218, and as such are some of 
our earliest evidence for lanciarii.  However, Speidel has argued for an earlier appearance of 
a lanciarius, based on a gravestone from the early first century AD.214  The tombstone of 
Flavoleius Cordus from Mainz (fig. 1) shows the soldier holding what Speidel suggests is a 
lancea.  Though most of the weapon is broken away, a thong fastened to the shaft and looped 
around the soldier’s index finger can still be seen.  Speidel points out that Isidore of Seville 
tells us that this feature is the mark of a lancea.215  Yet, the inscription does not mention 
lanciarius.216  Furthermore, Isidore’s assertion that a thong attached to a spear made it a 
lancea is insubstantial evidence on which to base such an argument, especially considering 
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that Isidore was not a military writer, but a theologian who was writing in the sixth century.  
As such, I would not associate this tombstone with the lanciarii.  
Returning to the evidence from the Syrian tombstones, 
the iconography on the monuments depicts each man 
holding a handful of spears in his right hand, with a 
round shield in his left.  On the tombstone of Aurelius 
Mucianus (AE 1993, 1575) we can also make out a 
cloak, cingulum, and sword belt, worn over the right 
shoulder.  The other two images are poorer quality, but a 
cingulum on both soldiers is also just visible.  The 
number of javelins each man carried (between four and 
five) suggests that these were missile weapons, rather 
than stabbing spears.217  Balty and Rengen have 
suggested that the lancea was probably used by the 
antesignani.218  There is no evidence to support this 
conjecture, and furthermore, since I have determined 
above that the antesignani seem to be regular 
legionaries, we know they normally only carried two 
pila, rather than four or five lighter javelins.219   
Mucianus’ tombstone inscription also notes that he was a 
lanciarius in training or an ‘instructor’ (discens).  This 
suggests that the position of lanciarius was a specialized 
one which required additional training.  However, the 
funerary altar of Aurelius Zolius depicts him as a lanciarius yet the inscription describes him 
as simply miles.220  Why Zolius is not styled lanciarius is impossible to say, but it certainly 
makes it less clear as to how or when the title was used. 
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Figure 1: Tombstone of Flavius Cordus, 
from Mainz. 
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Based on the depictions of these lanciarii holding several javelins in one hand, Speidel has 
also argued that the depiction of a soldier from the base of a column, from the legionary 
fortress at Mainz (fig. 2) could be further evidence for first-century lanciarii.221  Yet, I would 
argue that the link between the three javelins depicted on this relief and lanciarii is much too 
tenuous to come to such a conclusion. 
Due to the scant evidence for 
lanciarii in our period, there is little 
we can determine about them other 
than the fact that they were probably 
some sort of missile troops. 
Leves 
This term is often paired with 
armaturae in Republican sources or 
cohortes in the imperial sources.  It 
seems to have a different connotation 
for mid Republic, late Republic and 
Empire due namely to the differences 
in Roman military structure in those 
times.222  For this reason, the usage of 
this term by our sources from each 
period will be assessed separately.223   
Beginning with Livy, aside from the 
infamously confusing passage at 8.8, we might assume that his use of the term with respect to 
Roman soldiers of the mid Republic refers to velites, and indeed at 30.33 he states this 
explicitly: ‘velitibus – ea tunc levis armaturae erat’.  Also, in his description of the battle at 
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Figure 2: Base of column from Mainz depicting a soldier. 
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Mount Olympus, Livy uses velites and levi armatura interchangeably.224  His mention of leves 
as the javelin and spear-armed contingents attached to the maniples of hastati at 8.8 is 
confusing because of the light-armed accensi and rorarii that he places at the back of the 
legion as well.  Since the latter contingents and Livy’s references to them are dealt with in 
their own sections within this chapter, it may suffice to say here that the aforementioned leves 
at 8.8 also resemble velites in Polybius’ description of them, in that they are attached to a 
maniple of heavy infantry.225  While the remaining uses of this term in his work are also 
unspecific as far as what kind of soldiers these were (aside from the obvious fact that they 
were ‘lightly armed’), his references are almost always to the tactical uses of the leves 
armaturae.226  If we compare these tactics those known to have been employed by the velites, 
we might further establish the link between the two terms.  Perhaps one tactic that was not 
only known to have been used with velites but conceivably also required that the infantry 
used in its execution be lightly armed (for purposes of speed), was the combination of cavalry 
and light infantry.  Livy cites leves armaturae engaging in this tactic fourteen times, a 
significant portion of his references to Roman leves armaturae.227  As with other tactics 
typically assigned to velites, they are seen skirmishing (22.28, 28.13, 40.48, 44.4),228 used 
against elephants (28.15, 30.33), and perhaps most importantly, are posted at the front of the 
legion – the usual position for the velites (21.55, 30.33, 38.21).229 
All of the above evidence certainly makes a strong case for Livy’s use of the term to be 
considered as simply a synonym for velites, especially because he indirectly states that he is 
using it in this way at 30.33.  Finally, given the period Livy is writing about, it is further 
probable that the Roman leves armaturae he refers to are velites (or at the very least, they 
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were units armed in a similar way to the velites), because they were the main light infantry 
arm of the Republican Roman army. 
Since the velites were no longer a part of the Roman army for our late-Republican sources, 
the leves armaturae were obviously something else for writers such as Caesar and Cicero.230  
Although they are not always clear about the armament of these troops, we do have a few 
descriptions of these soldiers in this time, and that they were often foreign troops.  Out of the 
few uses of this term, there are references to German auxiliaries (BG 7.65, BC 1.83), 
Numidian light-infantry (BG 2.10, 2.24)231 and Spaniards (Front. Strat. 2.5.31).  There are 
also three references to leves being tactically deployed with cavalry (BG 7.65, BC 2.34.2, 
2.34.3).  While this might reaffirm the lightness of their armament, it does not tell us much 
more than this.  Furthermore, since we know antesignani were sometimes chosen by Caesar 
to be deployed with cavalry, the possibility exists that they acted as the light-infantry in some 
of these references.  Thus, with this evidence, it may be that leves armaturae was simply a 
term used to describe particular units functioning in a light role, rather than the actual 
lightness of their equipment.232 
Although we have almost no information regarding leves armaturae for the late Republic, the 
period may be seen as a transitional stage for Roman light infantry.  With the velites gone, the 
roles of light infantry were split amongst legionaries (e.g. antesignani) and foreign auxiliaries 
serving in a light role.  From this, a seemingly natural development would be the 
professionalization of the foreign light infantry at the beginning of the Principate: the regular 
auxilia.  This in turn would eliminate the need for leves armaturae amongst the legionaries.  
For the Imperial period, Tacitus uses the term several times, but as with our other sources, 
there is little we can ascertain.  The tactical contexts in which the light infantry are used are 
typical for contingents equipped as such, that is, situations in which they require agility and 
speed, such as being deployed with cavalry (Ann. 2.8, 3.39, 4.73), or skirmishing (Ann. 
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13.41).233  Bishop and Coulston have suggested that the regular Roman auxilia, that is, the 
official auxiliary wing of the Imperial Roman army, would have likely been well-suited for 
such tactics and open-order fighting, due to their armament.234  Similarly, at Ann. 4.73, 
Tacitus alludes to the fact that these light infantry are the aforementioned auxilia of the 
Roman army, and Furneaux believes this is the case, as he does for the more ambiguous ‘levis 
armatura’ mentioned at Ann. 2.16.235  In contrast, at Ann. 14.34 the light-armed auxiliaries are 
seemingly locally recruited men, but Tacitus is imprecise once again. 
Overall, our sources are not specific regarding leves armaturae, but for each period we can 
apply some speculative possibilities.  In Livy, they are probably the velites; in Caesar, they 
could either be foreign auxiliaries, light-armed legionaries, or any corps designated with 
‘light’ tasks.  With Tacitus, he may occasionally be referring to the professional Roman 
auxilia.  What is interesting to note is the development of ‘light’ infantry from velites to the 
much more heavily armed auxilia.236  We might conjecture that this could have been a result 
of the changing nature of warfare; insofar as by the time of the Principate, Rome was no 
longer encountering large organized armies like those of the Greeks and Carthaginians.  
Thus, it the speculative possibility exists that heavily armed infantry were more suitable for 
tactical roles as leves armaturae due to the type of armies Rome typically faced in this 
period. 
Rorarii 
The evidence for this group of infantry is so sparse that there is very little that can be said 
about them at all.  Most significantly, they make an appearance in Livy’s description of the 
organization of the legion.  However, it must be emphasized that Livy is the only writer on 
military matters who mentions them, and only twice at that.  He describes them as younger 
and less distinguished (‘mius roboris aetate factis que’) than the triarii, being placed behind 
them (8.8), and briefly mentions their rushing forward to strengthen the ranks of hastati and 
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principes during the battle of Mount Vesuvius in 340 BC (8.9).  Aside from this there is a 
brief description of the etymology of the word in Varro and Nonius, which we will return to 
momentarily.  Livy’s description tells us almost nothing, and it is important to highlight his 
lack of references to these men anywhere else.  Oakley notes that the entire passage is 
confused, and that Livy or his sources may have been trying to create a false parallel with the 
five Servian classes and thus create five lines of infantry in the army.237   
Varro’s description tells us they ‘were those who started the battle, named from the ros ‘dew-
drops’, because it ‘sprinkles’ (‘rorat’) before it really rains.238  Nonius Marcellus tells us 
something very similar, saying 
Those soldiers are called rorarii who, before the battle lines had met, began the 
battle with some javelins.  This is derived from the fact that light rains precede 
heavy ones ... Lucilius in the fifth book of his Satires gives the following lines: 
“Five javelins, the golden belted light-armed skirmisher.” ...  Again Lucilius in 
Book X: “In the rear the light-armed skirmisher was standing.”239 
The obvious correlation we can make from this is with the velites who had exactly the same 
role.240  Unfortunately, this relationship is unclear, not only because of the little information 
we have on the rorarii but also because of the confusion regarding when the velites were 
formally established.  Although the question of the velites’ establishment will be discussed 
more fully in the section on velites below, there is pertinent evidence on the relationship 
between the two units from Lucilius.  Two fragments show that the term rorarius was still 
used in the second century BC; one mentioning ‘rorarius veles’ possibly in reference to 
military rewards, and the other saying ‘pone paludatos stabat rorarius velox’.241  As Oakley 
has pointed out we can only guess as to what this means for the relationship between rorarius 
and veles; on the one hand it may be that they refer to the same troops and that veles simply 
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came to replace rorarius.242  Alternatively, we might speculate that there may have been light-
armed troops at the back of the legion called rorarii and those at the front called velites, with 
the former perhaps being more experienced, as per Livy’s suggestion that they were less 
distinguished than the triarii (rather than the hastati or principes for example, like the velites 
would have been).  Eventually these rorarii may have faded out or joined the velites, since 
they were both light-armed units.243   
Thus, determining specifics about the rorarii is not possible with the little evidence we have, 
although we do know that they can be classified as light-infantry, and that they used javelins 
as skirmishers. 
Sagitarii  
While our literary sources divulge very little detail on archers fighting for the Roman army, 
we do know that Cretan archers were ubiquitous in serving as foreign troops in the Roman 
army and in those of her neighbours, particularly during the Hellenistic period.  Also, we 
have sculptural evidence from the Imperial period that shows that archers had become regular 
auxiliary soldiers.  This evidence will be discussed chronologically according to historical 
context, rather than historiographical time of writing.244   
Using accounts of Cretan archers in Hellenistic campaigns and battles, we can better interpret 
the surviving iconographic evidence, discussed below.  As we shall see, the archer’s 
armament may have reflected that of other light troops, such as the velites. 
In a skirmish between the Romans and Philip V’s army, Livy describes the Cretan archers in 
Philip’s army as  
trained to skirmish in loose order and unprotected by armour, [they] were at the 
mercy of the velites who with their swords and shields were equally prepared for 
defence and attack.  Incapable of sustaining the conflict [with the Romans] and 
trusting solely to their mobility they fled back to their camp.245 
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Yet, this example contradicts Livy’s description of the Cretan’s capabilities the very next 
day.  Philip used his Cretans and cavalry to attack foraging Romans who fled to their camp.  
When the Romans came out of their camp to defend their fleeing comrades, the Cretans were 
ready and in close order, making sudden onsets and easily wounding the disordered Romans 
who were not holding any formation (31.37).  This last example hints at panoply that 
consisted of more than just a bow.  A closer examination of Cretan mercenaries further 
suggests that they were capable of hand-to-hand combat. 
Polybius describes the Cretans engaging in close combat at the siege of Psophis: 
the Cretans, attacking the mercenaries who had sallied from the upper gate, 
forced them to fly in disorder, throwing away their shields.  Pressing close on 
their heels and cutting them down, they entered the gate together with them, and 
thus the city was taken from every side at once.246 
Thus, with the ability to engage in such combat, it may be likely that they were armed with 
some sort of shield and sword, along with their bow.  Indeed, at 10.29, while describing the 
campaign in Hyrcania, Polybius notes that Antiochus III had shield-bearing Cretans under the 
command of Polyxenidas of Rhodes, who marched parallel to the infantry, slowly, and in 
good order.  So it would seem that here the Cretans are capable of functioning in a phalanx-
type formation, bearing shields.  In Plutarch’s Life of Amelilius Paulus, Cretan and Thracian 
light shields (peltai, ge/rra) and quivers are part of the display of captured arms in Paulus’ 
triumph, taken from Perseus’ forces (32). 
Although archers may be traditionally considered missile troops rather than light infantry, it 
must be remembered that the line between the two is very thin, if at all extant.  That missile 
troops were armed with more than just their missile weapons, and further that they were 
armed with a shield and sword along with their missiles is something that is evident in other 
light troops as well, particularly the velites, and the example of the slinger in scene 66 of 
Trajan’s column, mentioned above. 
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A fragment from a weapons relief from Perinthus dating to the first century BC shows a small 
hoplite’s shield, behind which lies a bow, a quiver, a short spear, and another rectangular 
object that seems to have two spears projecting from it (fig. 3).  Beneath that is a curved 
dagger with a simple scabbard.  The panoply is similar to that of Chaironides (see fig. 5), and 
may have belonged to a Cretan.247 
A funerary stele from 
Demetrias belonged to 
Thersagoras, a Cretan 
from Polyrrhenia, and 
it dates to the end of 
the third century or 
beginning of the 
second century BC 
(fig. 4).  It is poorly 
preserved but the 
archer can be seen 
with his bow and 
quiver, wearing what 
may have been a 
white tunic, and 
carrying what may 
likely be a shield slung over his back.  According to the descriptions made when the stele was 
discovered over 100 years ago, Thersagoras was also wearing a helmet of some sort, a feature 
that is presently indistinguishable.248   
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 Post 2009,. 26, 28. 
Figure 3: Fragmentary weapons relief from Perinthus, 1
st
 century BC. 
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Another stele from the ancient city of Demetrias dating to the end of the third century BC, 
belonging to a Chaironides, depicts the Cretan wearing a white short-sleeved tunic, a very 
dark cloak, a bronze helmet, and a bow (fig. 5).  His servant standing behind him carried a 
small oval shield and several javelins.249  Thus, his armament is consistent with Thersagoras’ 
equipment. 
Although Chaironides and Thersagoras were Cretans who may have served as mercenaries a 
few decades before Livy’s descriptions of Cretans in Philip V’s army, I would suggest that it 
may be possible that Cretan archers were usually armed with more than just a quiver and 
bow.  The iconographic evidence from the Hellenistic period suggests that they likely had a 
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 Post 2009, 24, 27.  The paint on the stele has faded but the descriptions were made soon after its discovery in 
1907. 
Figure 5: Stele from Demetrias, depicting Thersagoras, a Cretan 
from Polyrrhenia, beginning of 2
nd
 century BC. 
Figure 4: Stele from Demetrias, depicting 
Chaironides of Crete, end of 3
rd
 century 
BC. 
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shield and perhaps some sort of blade or javelin as well, and were thus similarly equipped to 
other light infantry of the period such as velites or funditores. 
During the Imperial period archers became regular auxiliary soldiers, as evidenced by units 
such as Cohors I Sagittariorum.250  In such units, armament would have reflected Roman 
military standards, as seen on the tombstone of Hyperanor, a Cretan of the aforementioned 
cohort.  Armed with a gladius and pugio strapped to a belt with a cingulum, he wears a tunic 
and holds his bow in his left hand. 
The archers depicted on Trajan’s column are probably Syrian, probably from Palmyra 
according to Frere and Lepper, and so are armed differently than the Cretan examples we 
have seen above.251  In scene 66, they can be seen with cone-shaped helmets and scale-mail 
armour.  Similarly, in scene 115, they are equipped in the same way, only a gladius can also 
be seen slung around their shoulders and worn on the right hip.  In scene 70, they are also 
equipped with cone-shaped helmets, and what may be ring mail armour.  All of this Imperial 
evidence, and especially the ring mail armour, suggests to me that they were prepared for 
hand-to-hand fighting, whether they actually engaged in such combat or not. 
As far as size of archer units is concerned, it is impossible to come to any conclusions.  At 
BC 1.51 Caesar mentions 200 archers lost in an engagement; at 3.4, 3000 archers are levied.  
As with slingers above, it is impossible to tell what proportion of archers these numbers made 
up in Caesar’s armies.   
As we can see, an archer’s panoply and their organization varied depending on the time 
period and area from which they came.  They seemed to function, perhaps not surprisingly, in 
light infantry or missile-unit roles quite regularly throughout our time period, even though 
they may have also been armed with heavier equipment at times.  Thus, I would suggest that 
sagitarii can be considered light infantry. 
Velites 
The velites are probably the best-known example of light infantry in the Roman army, 
although they only appear in the mid-Republic.  Thanks to the accounts of Livy and Polybius, 
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we have a fairly clear picture of this light-infantry unit, relative to any other light infantry 
mentioned above.252  Thus, it might be beneficial to start this section with Polybius’ 
description of these men, since it gives the most specific information on this unit.  Beginning 
with a description of the yearly levy, he says, 
When they [the military tribunes] arrive on the appointed day, they first select the 
youngest and poorest to form the grosfoma/xoi (velites) ... The youngest 
soldiers or velites are ordered to carry a sword, spears, and target (parmh/n). The 
target is strongly made, and large enough to protect the man; being round, with a 
diameter of three feet.  Each man also wears a headpiece without a crest; which 
he sometimes covers with a piece of wolf-skin or something of that kind, for the 
sake both of protection and identification; that the officers of his company may be 
able to observe whether he shows courage or the reverse on confronting dangers.  
The spear of the velites has a wooden haft of about two cubits, and about a 
finger's breadth in thickness; its head is a span long, hammered fine, and 
sharpened to such an extent that it becomes bent the first time it strikes, and 
cannot be used by the enemy to hurl back; otherwise the weapon would be 
available for both sides alike.253 
According to Festus (332.35L), the velites were also known as both procuritores and 
procubitores.  These words respectively refer to those standing in front of those given 
frequent attention or cherished and those standing in front of those lying down.  As Festus 
points out, this is a direct reference to the velites’ duty of standing guard along the vallum of 
the marching camp: a task mentioned by Polybius and also presumably in Cato’s military 
treatise.254  Although Festus suggests that Cato describes the velites using these terms, Festus 
is the only author in our extant corpus of ancient literature in which the words procuritores 
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 Aside from the regular auxilia of the Roman Imperial army perhaps.  Polybius is arguably our earliest 
relevant reference to the velites, but because he does not use the Latin term, the other earliest historiographic 
citation comes from a fragment in Varro, discussed above under ‘antesignani’. 
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 Polyb. 6.21-22, translation: Shuckburgh, Macmillan. 1889: paragenome/nwn d` ei)j th\n taxqei=san 
h)me/ran diale/gousi tw=n a)ndrw=n tou\j newta/touj kai\ penixrota/touj ei)j tou)j grosfoma/xouj ... 
Kai\ toi=j me\n newta/toij parh/ggeilan ma/xairan forei=n kai\ gro/sfouj kai\ pa/rmhn.  h( de\ 
pa/rmh kai\ du/namin e)/xei th= kataskeuh= kai\ me/geqon a)rkou=n pro\j a)sfa/leian: periferh\j ga\r 
ou)=sat w= sxh/mati tri/pedon e)/xei th\n dia/metron.  prosepikosmei=tai de\ kai\ litw= 
perikefalai/w: pote\ de\ lukei/an h)/ ti tw=n toiou/twn e)piti/qetai, ske/phj a)/ma kai\ shmei/ou 
xa/rin, i)/na toi=j kata\ me/roj h(gemo/si prokinduneu/ontej e)rrwme/nwj kai\ mh\ dia/dhloi gi/nwntai.  
to\ de\ tw=n gro/sfwn be/loj e)/xei t%== me\n mh/kei to\ cu/lon w(j e)pi/pan di/phxu, t%== de\ pa/xei 
daktuliai=on, to\ de\ ke/ntron spiqamiai=on, kata\ tosou=ton e)pi\ lepto\n e)celhlasme/non kai\ 
sunwcusme/non w)/ste kat` a)na/gkhn eu)qe/wj a)po\ th=j prw/thj e)mbolh=j ka/mptesqai kai\ mh\ 
dunasqai tou\j polemi/ouj a)ntiba/llein%=: ei) de\ mh/, koino\n gi/netai to\ be/loj.  Cf. also the Lewis & 
Short definition: ‘kind of light-armed soldier, who attacked the enemy out of the line of battle, a skirmisher.’  
For possibilities as to why the youngest were selected/best suited for this duty, see Rawlings 2000, 239, 242-45.   
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and procubitores appear.  Nevertheless, his usage of the terms reinforces our understanding of 
the various tactical roles assigned to the velites. 
Regarding their organization, from Polybius we also know that they were not divided into 
maniples, and from this that they were not assigned any centurions or optiones either (6.24).  
Rather, he tells us that the velites were ‘divided equally amongst all the companies (me/rh)’,255 
although this must have been only for administrative purposes since we know that they started 
the battle, ahead of all the maniples.256  Thus, their officers (that Polybius mentions above) 
were probably those of the company that they were attached to, and although we have no 
evidence indicating any specific role for commanding the velites in battle, the transmission of 
commands would probably have had to come from the heavy infantry or cavalry units.257  We 
also know that there were probably about 1,200 velites in a paper-strength manipular legion, 
which also agrees with Polybius’ description of the overall size of the legion (6.21).258 
One of the most significant questions regarding the velites is when they were established.259  
This is difficult to determine due to the confusion in our sources, and there is some 
disagreement amongst scholars because of this.  Brunt dates the reform to 214 based on the 
reduction in the minimum property qualification for military service that occurred between 
214 and 212.  He is followed by Gabba who has argued for the introduction of the velites in 
211.  Walbank does not find the argument convincing, and Rich refutes the notion of a 
reduction in the property qualification for military service.  Daly convincingly contests 
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Gabba’s view and emphasizes the fact that we have no reason to believe that the proportions 
of light troops changed at the end of the third century.260   
Regarding the origins of the velites, perhaps the most significant passage on the subject is in 
Livy, found at 26.4.  Describing the battle of Capua (211 BC), he mentions a ‘new’ tactic 
where light-armed troops rode to battle with cavalry, and then dismounted to engage the 
enemy.  This tactic apparently caused ‘the Romans [to have] the superiority in their 
cavalry.’261  Then follows the statement understood to mean ‘The velites were subsequently 
incorporated in the legions.’262  Besides the obvious point that there was not enough cavalry 
(300 paper-strength) to carry all the velites (1,200) into battle,263 an analysis of the Latin 
indicates that this paragraph should not be interpreted to mean that this new tactic resulted in 
the establishment of the velites. 
In describing the armament of the velites at Capua (26.4.4), the Latin reads ‘...praefixa ferro 
quale hastis velitaribus inest,’ or iron heads like (quale) the ones of the velites.  This implies 
to me that Livy here is claiming that the velites already existed, as inest is in the present tense.  
I suggest that if Livy meant to say that these were the first velites, he simply would have used 
a word other than velitaribus (e.g. levibus, roraiibus, etc.).264  Furthermore, as Oakley has 
pointed out, Livy is recording a tactic that is seemingly being carried out by existing velites, 
and that the tactic was designed for a specific occasion.265  In addition, in the key sentence 
(26.4.9), ‘Inde equitatu quoque superior Romana res fuit; institutum ut velites in legionibus 
essent, certainly has a sense that the velites already existed.  As institutum is a perfect passive 
participle, and essent is in the imperfect subjunctive (which traditionally denotes a nonfactual 
claim, e.g. ‘may be’ or ‘could’), the sentence should read: ‘Thereafter the Roman side was 
superior in cavalry; it having been established that the velites could also be in the legions.’  
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The sentence is evidently unclear in its meaning, and indicates to me that Livy was actually 
not sure when the velites were established.  Indeed, he is obviously confused since in the very 
same paragraph he suggests they existed before 211 (at 26.4.4);266 not to mention his 
references to the velites before 211 at 21.55, 23.29, and 24.34. 
So, I suggest that this passage should in no way be considered as a factual statement 
regarding the founding of the velites.  Still, when exactly they were established is extremely 
difficult to determine, especially because of the confusion in Livy’s account of the Roman 
army.  For instance, amongst Livy’s many contradictions and confusing statements on the 
velites, we cannot determine whether the velites could have existed as rorarii or under some 
other name (e.g. simply ‘leves armaturae’) for an indeterminate amount of time.  Yet the 
velites as described by Polybius above (grosfoma/xoi), probably existed by 255 BC, the 
date for the Battle of Tunis.  Polybius’ reference to grosfoma/xoi in his description of the 
battle at 1.33 is his first use of the term.  Consequently, because he establishes his definition 
for grosfoma/xoi in book 6, it follows that the grosfoma/xoi at 1.33 are the same that are 
described in detail at 6.21-22 since he uses the same term.  It cannot be that the 
grosfoma/xoi at the battle of Tunis were a different type of light-armed infantry to the ones 
he describes in book 6 (i.e. the velites) precisely because he uses the same term.  There are 
other Greek terms for light infantry, several of which Polybius uses, (as discussed in the 
chapter on Greek vocabulary, below), but the troops at 1.33 must be the same as the ones at 
6.21-22.  Despite this, it is still impossible to determine the exact date of the velites’ 
establishment, particularly because of the confusion between the Polybian and Livian 
accounts of the Roman army.  However, as Oakley has put it ‘decisive proof in favour of 
Polybius is wanting, but, given Livy’s unreliability elsewhere, he is clearly to be preferred’.267  
Perhaps the best conclusion then, would be that light-armed javelin-fighters existed in the 
Roman army from at least the date of the manipular reform, irrespective of their actual 
name.268 
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One important note we might take from Livy’s description at 26.4 is the description of the 
javelins used by the velites.269  As mentioned in Chapter 6 on tactical roles below, seven 
javelins per person would have meant a tremendous amount of ‘firepower’ for the velites as a 
whole and this certainly highlights the significance of skirmishing.270  Indeed, although their 
name is derived from velo or cloak (thus making the ‘cloak-wearers’), there is a notable 
correlation to the Greek word be/loj or missile/dart (pronounced as [′velos] in both the 
Roman-period and modern Greek), again emphasizing their role as missile troops. 
Overall, the picture we get of velites is one important to our understanding of light-infantry in 
general, especially in cases like Livy’s use of leves armaturae, discussed above.   
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3 Greek Vocabulary of Light Infantry 
The following chapter will assess the uses of terminology referring to light infantry by the 
Greek authors of the Roman period.  As with the preceding Latin chapter, this chapter will 
aim to determine the etymological aspects of light infantry terminology, as well as any 
equipment and organization that we can associate with each term.  The following chapter, 
Vocabulary Comparisons, will evaluate the technical aspects of the terminology, and draw 
overall conclusions for the two chapters on the vocabulary of light infantry.  
For ease of reference, I have categorized the Greek vocabulary of light infantry into the 
following groups, appearing in order: 
General Light Infantry 
Javelineers271 
Slingers 
All the terms under each of these headings appear in alphabetical order.  Also, each author’s 
usage of the term will be assessed below in order of their historical time of writing. 
General Light Infantry 
Gumnh/j 
As gumnh/j is derived from the Greek word gumno/j, meaning naked or un-armoured, it is 
the latter meaning that appears most often in our sources.  Thus, in reference to troops, we 
find soldiers or fighters that are simply ‘naked’ or ‘un-armoured’.  Many of these are enemy 
soldiers fighting Rome, rather than fighting with the legions.  Furthermore, while they are not 
always entirely unarmed or naked, they are often significantly less armed than their Roman 
counterparts; thus, ‘lightly armoured’ might be an acceptable definition as well.272   
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Most of the references to these troops occur in reference to the Republican army, and the 
earliest use of the term occurs in Plutarch’s Life of Titus Flamininus at 4.9.  Here, we have a 
possible reference to velites as gumnhtiko\n, when Plutarch describes these forces harassing 
Philip’s marching column in skirmishes (Flam. 4.9).  While it is impossible to determine 
exactly what kind of troops these are, the fact that they were skirmishing suggests they were 
probably best equipped to do so, and so given the time period, these would probably be 
velites rather than regular legionaries. 
There is an odd mention in Appian of un-armoured Roman troops engaged in foraging, where 
Fabius Maximus Aemilianus has legionaries protect these troops (App. Hisp. 11.65).  
Although gumnoi=j in the passage has been translated by Horace White in the Loeb as 
unarmed, it is probably unlikely that these soldiers, who may be legionaries or socii, are 
completely unarmed.  Naturally, their shields would be cumbersome during foraging, but it 
seems to me that foraging without armour or even just a sword is also rather dangerous, even 
with a guard (although this does not preclude the possibility that such folly occurred from 
time to time).  On the other hand, that foragers were simply slightly more lightly armed than 
their guard is probably more likely, and perhaps this is how we should interpret this passage. 
Of the troops that are described more specifically, we find these are often foreign contingents 
fighting for, and against Rome, and when their weaponry is mentioned, they are armed with 
missile weapons such as stones, arrows, and javelins.273  We also have several references to 
these ‘light-armed troops’ as Balearic slingers at the battle of Zama,274 and skirmishing troops  
in Perseus’ army before the battle of Pydna (mentioned alongside yiloi\; perhaps resembling 
peltasts) (Plut. Aem. 16).  Appian also describes gumnhtw=n (again, alongside yiloi as well 
as archers) in Antony’s army during his preparations for war against Brutus (BC 3.3).  
They are mentioned alongside logxofo/roi twice in Arrian’s Ektaxis (14, 29), where they 
appear as non-Roman light-armed troops who are meant to run with cavalry during the attack.  
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While logxofo/roi are some sort of javelin-troop,275 it is not clear whether they were 
actually lightly armed.  However, that they and the gumnh=tej here must run with cavalry, 
suggests that they may not have been wearing heavy mail. 
Thus, it seems that while gumnh/j may denote light-armed troops, it is certainly not a specific 
troop type.  Further, while the etymology of the term seems to emphasize a lack of armament, 
the particulars of such descriptions are also often lacking in our sources.  Because such a 
wide variety of troops are labelled with this term, it is possible that gumnh/j is simply used to 
describe the ‘light’ function of particular troops, and indeed, their light function is the only 
common link between them.276 
Overall, this term is most popular with Appian.277  As to why it is not a popular term amongst 
most authors, it may be suggested that this is because the etymology of the word suggested 
nakedness or being un-armoured, and other writers may have seen it as an inappropriate term 
to describe infantry, even if lightly armed, due to this association with a complete lack of 
armament.  Alternatively, it may be that this term was not in regular use until the second 
century AD. 
eu)/zwnoj 
Perhaps the first thing that should be noted here is the definition of this term.  Liddell and 
Scott define the term in Homer as ‘well-girdled, as an epithet of women’.  The physical sense 
of being well-girdled seems to have persisted in some way, since Liddell and Scott also 
define the term as well-equipped.  Precisely how eu)/zwnoi were ‘well-equipped’ will be 
determined below.  In many authors, the term is best and most commonly understood to mean 
light-infantry.  This in turn, may be derived from the definition ‘active’, which Liddell and 
Scott also attribute to the term.  The reasoning behind this is simply that troops acting in a 
‘light’ capacity may appear to be the most active.  There are three ancient authors in which 
this term appears as a reference to Roman light infantry, and they are Polybius, Dionysus of 
Halicarnassus and Appian.  Their uses of the term will be assessed in that order, coinciding 
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 On the grounds that they are armed with the logxh/, for more on this, see logxofo/roi, below. 
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 For more on this view, see Chapter 5. 
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 Appian’s uses of the term constitute ten out of the fourteeen relevant references in our sources, see the table 
on p. 114, below. 
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chronologically with their historical time of writing.  In this way, any changes in use over 
time may be made clearer. 
Polybius uses the term to refer to light-armed troops in general, regardless of whether he is 
referring to Greek, Carthaginian or Roman forces.  Though he uses other terms to describe 
light-armed troops, he uses this term most often.  In reference to Roman troops he uses the 
term thirty times, and it is his favoured term for Roman light-armed troops.  However, as will 
be shown, though Polybius uses this term interchangeably with other terms for light infantry, 
eu)/zwnoi has the sense of troops who are ‘well-equipped for the given task’.  These men first 
appear in Roman forces at the Battle of Panormus (251 BC), and are regularly referred to 
until Cynoscephalae (197 BC).  It is worth noting the similarity of this time period to the one 
that covers Polybius’ use of grosfoma/xoi (255 – 202 BC).  As is noted in the section on 
a)krobo/loj, it is very likely that Polybius uses various terms to refer to the same type of 
troops.  So, given that the time period of his use of grosfoma/xoi is so close to that of his 
use of eu)zw/noi, it may also be likely that he uses the latter term to refer to velites as well.  
Since Polybius’ histories cover the period during which the velites were known to exist, it 
follows that the velites should make regular appearances in descriptions of military action.  
This is especially true when one considers that his histories also cover one of the most intense 
and active periods in Roman military history; so, due to the high frequency of combat, it is no 
wonder that this significant portion of the Roman army is mentioned so often.  This 
ostensibly indiscriminate use of vocabulary for light troops on Polybius’ behalf will be 
assessed in further detail below.   
Polybius describes eu)zw/noi engaging in many ‘standard’ light tactics discussed in Chapter 
6, ‘Tactical Roles’.  This includes attacking elephants (1.40), beginning battles ahead of the 
heavy infantry (3.73, 3.105, 3.113, 3.115, 10.39), skirmishing (3.101, 3.104, 11.21, 11.22), 
attacking foragers (3.102), attacking with cavalry (3.102, 3.110, 11.21, 11.22), and 
reconnaissance (18.19, 18.21). 
All the tactics listed above point to light armament, and they also fall under most of the uses 
of light infantry in the manipular legion, as discussed in the aforementioned chapter.  Thus, it 
may be argued that these troops are velites or some similar light-armed corps.  Furthermore, 
in his description of the light-armed action before the Battle of Ilipa (11.22), he describes the 
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eu)zw/nouj as both a)krobolizome/nouj and grosfoma/xoouj (11.22.5-10).  We know 
these are velites in all instances here for several reasons.  Firstly, grosfoma/xoouj is the 
only specific term he uses to describe the light infantry at Ilipa.  He does not use any other 
term that might suggest there were slingers or archers mixed in with these light infantry.  And 
as will be shown in the section on grosfoma/xoouj below, this is the term Polybius uses to 
describe the velites specifically.  Thus, Polybius identifies the light infantry (to which he had 
been referring in general terms) as velites by using the more specific designation.  Secondly, 
we know these can only be Roman light-armed troops.  This is because the only socii and 
auxilia that are mentioned in the passages leading up to this one are the Spaniards forming 
part of the heavy infantry.  Furthermore, the tactical manoeuvring of these light infantry 
directly reflects that which is specifically attributed to the velites: they retire between the 
lines of heavy infantry.  Finally, Livy uses Polybius’ account for his description of this battle, 
and there he makes it clear that he understands these troops to be velites.278  Like Polybius, he 
uses three terms interchangeably to refer to the light-armed troops at Ilipa (28.14).  Moreover, 
he also uses two general terms and one specific term: leves armatura, expeditis peditum and 
velites.  The crucial wording comes at 28.14.20, where Livy may be equating the leves 
armatura in the passage to the velites: cornua ancipiti proelio urgebantur: eques levisque 
armatura, velites, circumductis alis in latera incurrebant.  Because the text at 28.14.20 does 
not use language that explicitly equates the leves armatura to the velites (e.g. levisque 
armatura, id est velites), most modern editions of the Latin of this passage read levisque 
armatura, ac velites.279  However, as indicated for the aforementioned reasons in Polybius, 
the leves armatura and velites in this passage should be equated, and so the original reading 
without the ac should be considered correct.  A translation of Livy 28.14.20 with this 
understanding could read:  
The wings were hard pressed by a twofold attack; the cavalry and the light-armed, 
(the velites), wheeling round, charged their flanks... 
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 That Livy uses Polybius for his accounts of this time period, see Smith 1993, 4. 
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 This trend seemingly started with Gronovius in the 17
th
 century, cf. Drakenborch 1818, 452.  This perhaps 
should not come as a surprise since the passage appears to be less confused with the ac added.   
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This should make it obvious that Livy is equating the two terms, thus highlighting his 
understanding that Polybius is using three terms interchangeably whilst consistently referring 
to the velites.280 
Further passages in Polybius also indicate his use of varied terms for light infantry, amongst 
which we may include eu)zw/noj.  At 11.23, the eu)zw/nwn appear first as grosfoma/xoouj 
(these are the same grosfoma/xoouj mentioned on p. 73 above, at Polyb. 11.22).  The 
terms are then used interchangeably, with each term being used twice in the section.  Clearly, 
there is a direct correlation for Polybius, and as suggested above, it is probable that he is 
simply using synonyms for the velites.   
That there were several synonyms for light infantry should not come as a surprise; there are 
after all, several synonyms for heavy infantry as well.281  However, Polybius not only uses  as 
a synonym for light infantry, but also as an adjective to describe an entire army, i.e. one in 
light marching order (14.8, 14.10).  This goes back to the definition of eu)/zwnoj meaning 
well-equipped, or more directly ‘well-equipped for the task at hand’.  Accordingly, when 
used in contexts where speed was required of the army, being well equipped meant being 
lightly armed.  What this actually means in terms of their equipment is probably just that they 
were marching without their baggage, rather than actually wearing less armour.282   
This meaning of being the ‘most appropriately equipped’ is also probably what Polybius tried 
to convey at 10.39.3.  Here he says that Scipio sent his eu)/zwnoj forward to assist the front 
line of men.  The latter were the advance group of both grosfoma/xoi and e)pile/ktoi that 
Scipio had initially sent out to harass Carthaginian pickets (10.39.1-16).  When the eu)/zwnoi 
were then sent out to assist this group of grosfoma/xoi and e)pile/ktoi, the group is 
referred to as toi=j prokinduneu/ousi.  This provides particular clues as to how we should 
interpret Polybius’ usage of eu)/zwnoi in this passage.  Prokinduneu/ousi comes from the 
verb meaning ‘to run risk before’.  As such, it may be translated here as ‘those who are 
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 This perhaps raises the question of why Polybius is seemingly technical in his use of terminology in Book 6 
(v. Rawson 1991, 35-48), but less so in other places.  The reasons for this are unascertainable.  We may 
speculate, however, that Polybius desired to present his formal description of the Roman army in technical terms 
in Book 6, and then felt free to use various terms elsewhere (as he does at 11.22-23), perhaps for literary effect. 
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 E.g. pedites, milites, pezoi\.  This is discussed in further detail in the following chapter, see p.120, below. 
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 Polybius also occasionally uses the term in this sense when referring to other armies, such as Hannibal’s 
army on the march at 3.35 or that of Philip at 5.5. 
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risking the first danger’ or possibly ‘those who are bearing the brunt of the battle’.283  Thus, 
this term could possibly be associated with the antesignani of the Republican army, or the 
first line of infantry.  This point could be especially valid at 10.39.1 where part of the 
prokinduneu/ousi are referred to e)pile/ktoi (i.e. picked troops).  E)pile/ktoi certainly has 
strong connotations with the antesignani as some of the most reliable troops.284  Yet, because 
Polybius differentiates between the grosfoma/xoi and the e)pile/ktoi within this particular 
group of prokinduneu/ousi, the result is that prokinduneu/ousi refers to both velites and 
antesignani.285  It may certainly seem odd that this reference discusses such eager heavy 
infantry troops being paired with the lightly equipped velites.  And indeed, it raises the 
question of how such troops may have fought together.  Yet, the actual dynamics of their 
tactical deployment are impossible to determine from Polybius’ description, and we so we 
can only speculate on how these two varying troop types may have functioned together.286  
Furthermore, regardless how the grosfoma/xoi and e)pile/ktoi functioned together or what 
kind of combat they were engaged in (e.g. skirmishing or hand-to-hand fighting), the most 
important aspect of this scenario is that they were probably the most appropriate tactical 
group to execute their orders.  This is especially true considering their apparent success, 
mentioned by Polybius at 10.39.6.  As a result, the eu)/zwnoi that come to their aid were 
probably also ‘the most appropriately equipped’ for the task of assisting the 
prokinduneu/ousi, rather than a specific light infantry unit.   
It is interesting to note that aside from Polybius’ references to an army in light marching 
order, all of his uses of eu)/zwnoi refer to men who engage in non-pitched battle combat.  
Because those being employed in such combat can be considered to be engaging in ‘light’ 
tactics, (simply because they contrast the tactics of static heavy infantry) this term has a 
strong association with light infantry in Polybius. 
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 As Liddell & Scott suggest, see ‘prokinduneu/w’ op cit.  They cite IGIX(2).531.5 for both ‘those who are 
risking the first danger’ and ‘those who are bearing the brunt of the battle’. 
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 See antesignani, above, as well as the discussion on delecti / e)pi/lektoi in the following chapter. 
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 That is to say, prokinduneu/ousi is not an equivalent term for antesignani, nor should velites be considered 
antesignani.   
286
 For example, perhaps the line-infantry engaged other similarly equipped infantry while the velites skirmished 
with other skirmishers or simply out-flanked the enemy line-infantry.  In any case, this is certainly an instance 
of non-pitched battle combat. 
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In his Loeb translation of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cary regularly interprets the term as 
‘light infantry’ or ‘lightly equipped’.  However, many of these references concern Roman 
infantry well before the timeperiod covered in this study (e.g. many references occur during 
6
th
 century BC).  Nevertheless, these references will be included here for philological 
comparison. 
For the most part, Dionysus’ use of the term seems to refer to an intentional and situational 
outfitting of troops, out of haste.  When the Fidenates revolted from Roman rule and engaged 
in raiding their territory, Ancus Marcius led out an army of light troops (eu)zw/n% strati#= 
e)la/saj) before the Fidenates could make necessary provisions for war (3.39).  Similarly, 
when the Latins raided Roman territory, Tarquinius Priscus ‘marched out against them with 
his eu)/zwno/v who were ready for action’.287  Occasionally, they are also described as young; 
against the Latins, Tarquinius  
took with him such of the Roman youth as were eu)zwnota/thn, and led them 
with all possible speed against those of the enemy who were dispersed in 
foraging.288 
Also, the light armed youth (eu)/zwnon neo/thna) of the Veientes are found plundering 
Roman fields as soon as the army had been discharged (9.14).  In another example, an ill-
fated soldier by the name of Siccus was sent on a spurious reconnaissance mission (during 
which he was to be assassinated) and he was accompanied by ‘a company of picked youths 
fitted out with light equipment’.289 
Thus, the type of group that Dionysius portrays with his various uses of the term is not a 
specific light unit, but instead the group appears as lightly equipped infantry who need to get 
somewhere quickly.  This is emphasized again at 4.51, when he has Tarquinius putting his 
army into light marching order (eu)/zwnon).  Marching against the Sabines, Tarquinius’ 
mobile force is effectively able to outmanoeuvre them.  This is because they split into two 
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.50 ‘e)ch=lqe me\n e)p” au)tou\j th\n eu)/zwno/v te kai\ e)n e(toi/m% du/namin 
e)pago/menoj’ 
288 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.63: ‘a)nalabw\n th\n eu)zwnoata/hn R(wmai/wn neo/thta w(j ei)=xe ta/xouj 
e)ch=gen e)pi\ tou\j diesparme/nouj e)pi\ ta\j pronoma/j’ 
289 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 11.26: ‘e)pile/ktwn ne/wn eu)zw/n% e(stalme/nwn o(pli/sei’; NB. the equipment 
here is described with the noun associated with hoplite armour; eu)zw/n% is used as the adjective to describe this 
equipment as light. 
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groups, and surrounded the Sabines.  This highly mobile manoeuvre is what brought the 
Romans victory, since as Dionysus describes, the pitched battle leading up to the Sabines’ 
encirclement was doubtful for the Romans.  Again, it is simply the lack of baggage that aids 
the Roman victory, and not an actual light unit.290   
Because these instances of eu)zw/noi in Dionysius refer to troops that are lightly equipped for 
a specific reason, and are not an actual light-armed unit, we may conjecture that they were 
some sort of predecessor to select ‘light’ units in later periods (such as the antesignani) who 
were called out in similar tactical circumstances.291  Indeed, many if not all of the above 
instances could probably be reasonably translated as ‘most appropriately equipped’, rather 
than ‘lightly equipped’.  It may also be that Dionysius uses eu)/zwnoj in its sense of being 
‘active’, where the most active or (or in other words the most vigorous) troops are chosen for 
these special assignments.  However, that the best troops were chosen or picked for unique 
tactical scenarios is probably a convention that dates as far back as soldiering itself.  What 
may be rather more significant are the references to the youth in conjunction with eu)zw/noi.  
As seen in the section on tactical roles below, the velites, (described to be the youngest and 
the poorest by Polybius), were commonly used for a range of tactical scenarios, especially 
those that required celerity.  Indeed, youth and vigour or ‘activeness’ (as per one of the 
dictionary definitions of eu)/zwnoj, above) often coincide.  Thus, while speculative, it may be 
that the young eu)zw/noi in Dionysius’ references were predecessors to the velites of the 
Republic.292  We should not, however, consider Dionysius to be using this term to describe 
velites.  Dionysius does not mention troops that were obviously velites and he is writing about 
a period that may have preceded their existence as an identifiable unit. 
Of course, none of the references in Dionysius aid in creating a specific definition for the 
eu)zw/noi, especially for the period under review.  It is clear however that they were probably 
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 This may raise the issue of what a light unit actually was, and whether the historical sources in general see a 
difference between a unit lightly equipped and a unit operating without baggage.  This issued is discussed in the 
following chapter, ‘Comparison of Vocabulary’. 
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 It should be noted however, that Dionysius does not use a term like e)pile/ktoj to describe such men, which 
could have been a more appropriate term if he were describing picked soldiers. 
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 However, it should also be noted that young soldiers probably made up a portion of the hastati as well.  
Furthermore, Caesar also chooses the youngest of his antesignani for purposes of celerity, and these are regular 
legionaries (Caes. BC 3.84 – see p. 23, above).  Thus, the ostensible association with youth should not be seen 
as conclusive evidence for equating Dionysius’ eu)zw/noi and the velites. 
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either more lightly armed than other infantrymen or simply equipped in such a way that best 
suited the given tactical scenario.  Based on a fragment from Dionysius, we might speculate 
that they could have simply been sine impedimentia, as it were.  The fragment reads: 
‘eu)zw/nw? kai\ ou)de\n e)/cw tw=n o)/plwn ferou/sh stratia=?’ (14.2).293  Naturally 
however, because this is a fragment, we cannot use it as a concrete evidence for the 
equipment of the eu)zw/noi.   
Dionysius’ references to eu)zw/noi should not be taken as a reflection of how these troops 
may have been referred to in the 6
th
 century BC.  Rather, it is likely that his vocabulary is 
indicative of how such quickly deployed or most appropriately equipped troops may have 
been referred to in the Augustan period.  However, this is not to say that Dionysius is 
exaggerating the role of particular troops by using this particular vocabulary.  Instead, I 
would argue that Dionysius is using eu)zw/noi in a way that makes the most sense to his 
Augustan audience, i.e. he uses the word to describe what he understands to be troops that are 
most appropriately equipped for the given tactic.  Thus, while he is describing the Roman 
army from several hundred years before the current period under assessment, we may say that 
for said period, eu)zw/noi was one of the most suitable terms for troops functioning in such 
light tactics. 
Appian uses eu)/zwnoj four times in reference to Roman troops.294  Two instances involve 
tactics that are commonly assigned to light-infantry, namely, deployment with cavalry (BC 
4.7), and pursuing a routed army.295  At Iber. 17, Appian describes how Gnaeus Scipio took 
some eu)zw/nwn on a mission to save some of his foragers from a Carthaginian ambush.  
Whether this force was actually light-armed (for purposes of speed, in order to reach the 
threatened foragers quickly), or simply well-equipped for the attack is difficult to determine.  
However, it may be suggested that because they could not withstand the first charge from the 
Carthaginian forces, they could be categorized as lightly armed.  The fourth reference 
mentions a group of soldiers taken by Sextus Pompey for a nighttime ambush on Marcus 
Titius’ fleet (BC 5.14).  As above, it is not clear what kind of troops these are but ‘well-
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 My translation: ‘with an army of light troops carrying nothing but their arms.’ 
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 App. Iber. 17, Mith. 6.45, BC 4.7, 5.14. 
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 Mith. 6.45; this is also often assigned to cavalry to ensure that the pursuers catch the fleeing soldiers, and so 
it may be suggested that the Roman pursuers here were deployed alongside cavalry (as with the former 
example), or otherwise, were simply lightly armed for purposes of speed. 
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equipped’ seems to be the most suitable translation; in this way, the sense of ‘being well-
equipped for the tactic/task at hand’, comes across quite clearly.  However, it may also be 
suggested that these troops were lightly armed, since they did not intend on engaging in 
combat, but rather aimed only to burn the fleet, and probably wanted to do so quickly and 
quietly. 
It is interesting to note, albeit speculatively, that it would seem that eu)/zwnoi could 
sometimes refer to elite troops like the antesignani.  As indicated above, Appian’s use of the 
term certainly seems to suggest that he meant that these troops were the ‘best’ for the job.  
The various translations used for the references at Mith. 6.45 and BC 5.14 in particular, 
ostensibly support this conjecture.  In the former, the Horace White translation (MacMillan 
Co., 1899) interprets eu)zw/noij as ‘best troops’; similarly John Carter (Penguin, 1996) 
interpreted eu)zw/nwn as ‘crack troops’ at the latter point in Appian’s work.  In this way, we 
might also associate them with Caesar’s elite and ‘light’ troops, the antesignani.  As 
discussed above, like eu)/zwnoi, the antesignani have been seen to be deployed with cavalry, 
and were required for tactical situations that required celerity.  Indeed, aside from the 
reference to Gnaeus Scipio, Appian’s remaining three uses of the term can be correlated to 
such troops (i.e. troops used for such manoeuvres), and our modern interpretations from 
White and Carter seem to support this.296  Nevertheless, the point remains speculative, but it is 
worth noting the link in understanding for modern scholars, that troops used for such special 
tactical deployments are to be considered some of the best troops. 
Regarding the actual equipment of Roman eu)zw/noi, it is impossible to be specific.  
However, from all three authors above, there seems to be two main military definitions for 
this term.  In some instances, and especially in Polybius, the tactics that they are involved in 
(e.g. attacking with cavalry, skirmishing, reconnaissance),297 suggest that they are probably 
often armed in a similar way to velites.  In other words, eu)zw/noi seems to mean lightly-
armed or refer to troops engaged in light-infantry-type tactics.  In other instances and 
particularly in Dionysius and Appian, the term seems to refer to the troops that are ‘most 
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 Similarly, in a French translation of Diodorus Siculus (1865), Ferdinand Hoefer interprets μάλιστ’ εu)ζώνους 
(at 2.26) to mean elite light troops (l'élite des troupes légères). 
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 Attacking with cavalry: App. BC 4.7; Polyb. 3.102, 3.110, 11.21, 11.22, 18.19, 18.21. Skirmishing: Polyb. 
3.101, 3.104, 3.115, 11.21, 11.22.  Reconnaissance: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 11.26; Polyb. 18.19. 
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appropriately equipped’ for the given task.  This variation may reflect each author’s personal 
preference of vocabulary.  Alternatively, the term’s dichotomy in meaning may be a 
reflection of the contemporary understanding of military terms for each of the individual 
authors.298  That is, while eu)zw/noi generally denotes fast-moving troops, it seems that for 
each of the three authors, the specific troops type that this referred to varied, based on the 
military realities of the time period in which they were writing.   
kou=foi 
Like many of the terms here, this word is used in a general sense for lightly armed troops.  It 
is often used as an adjective in the ancient sources, rather than a noun, and so it is most often 
used to describe anything that is light.299  As such, it does not usually denote a formal unit of 
soldiers, but most often refers to men who are somehow lightly equipped.  Kou=foi is one of 
the least frequently used words amongst all the terms under assessment here, at six uses in 
our sources.  There is no evidence to help us determine why this is the case. 
There are no specific details regarding their equipment, except for one reference in Appian 
(discussed below) and in Dionysius of Halicarnassus.  The first historical use of this term in 
reference to the Roman army appears in Dionysius’ description of the Servian legion.  His 
use of the term is somewhat convoluted.  Because he uses it alongside yiloi\, it is not clear 
whether he is referring to one or two types of light infantry.  As such, it may be worth 
including the Greek here: 
pe/mpth d’ e)kalei=to summori/a tw=n o)/lgou pa/nu tetimhme/nwn 
a)rguri/ou, o(/pla d’ h)=n au)tw=n sauni/a kai\ sfendo/nai: ou(=toi ta/cin ou)k 
ei)=xon e)n fa/laggi, a)lla\ yiloi\ kai\ kou=foi sunestrateu/onto toi=j 
o(pli/taij ei)j tria/konta lo/xouj divrhme/noi. 
My translation: 
The class which was called in the fifth place consisted of those whose property 
was rated very low, and their arms were javelins (sauni/a) and slings 
(sfendo/nai); these had no fixed place in the battle-line, but being light-armed 
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men (yiloi\) and nimble men (kou=foi), they campaigned with the heavy-armed 
men and were distributed into thirty centuries.300  
The passage may be understood to mean that the fifth class included two types of light 
infantry: javelin-men and slingers.  Alternatively, kou=foi may be translated as an adjective 
rather than a noun.  In this case, the passage may be understood to mean that the yiloi 
(light-armed troops) are kou=foi (nimble/agile) and that they may be armed with either the 
javelin or the sling, or both.  These men also resemble Polybius’ description of velites insofar 
as they are deployed with heavy infantry in battle.301  What is most probable then is that 
Dionysius is not certain what term to use for these troops.  As a result, it may be that 
Dionysius is labelling the Servian light infantry with two Greek terms (yiloi\ and kou=foi), 
seemingly unable to decide which term is more suitable.302  Nevertheless, this does not clarify 
why they were apparently equipped with two types of missile weapons.303  So, perhaps what 
we should draw from this particular use of kou=foi is the association between any kind of 
light troops (and especially troops armed with slings), and their being regarded as agile or 
mobile (kou=foi).304  
Similarly, Appian lists slingers and archers amongst the eàteroi kou¤foi under Eumenes at 
the Battle of Magnesia (6.33).  Appian also regularly refers to kou=foi on both sides during 
the civil wars under the Second Triumvirate.  At BC 5.12.113, he mentions Numidian 
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 Ant. Rom. 7.59; It is interesting to note Dionysius’ use of the word sauni/a for javelin here, as it is a word 
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infantry and the allies or mercenaries.  This shifting of ‘light’ tactical delegation from the more lightly armed 
troops to the heavy infantry is something we already see by the time of Caesar with his antesignani.  Cf. Chapter 
6,‘Tactical Roles’, below. 
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kou=foi on the Pompeian side, although this is the only reference to ethnicity.305  Here they 
are described as  
the light-armed troops from Numidia in Africa, who hurled darts from long 
distances and made their escape when charged by their enemies.  
The non-Roman ethnicity should be noted here, since it would be the non-Roman troops of 
the imperial auxilia that would take up the role of ‘light’ troops shortly thereafter.  At BC 
5.12.110, Appian notes that there were 1000 kou=foi in Octavian’s army compared to 
approximately 15,000 legionaries (three legions).  In section 116, Octavian’s army at 
Tyndaris had 5000 kou=foi and 20,000 legionaries.  Although we cannot draw any specific 
conclusions from these numbers, it is interesting to note that there were significantly fewer 
light-armed troops than heavy infantry.306   
Appian also gives us an example of their tactical uses.  Cornificius sent his kou=foi from his 
camp in Tauromenium, Sicily to face Pompeian cavalry after a naval battle during the civil 
wars (App. BC 5.12).  Again the theme of using light-armed troops against cavalry appears.  
Similar instances can be found in Plutarch’s Publicola (22.3) and Arrian’s Ektaxis (23).307 
Troops described as kou=foi occasionally have the lightness of equipment emphasized.  At 
Dio 49.3, Sextus’ forces at the battle at Naulochus are described as follows: 
the enemy leaped overboard into the sea whenever their vessels sank, and because 
of their good swimming and light equipment succeeded easily in climbing aboard 
others, the attackers were at a corresponding disadvantage.308 
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 However, regarding troops fighting against Romans, Josephus uses the term to describe Jews at 2.543, and 
Plutarch describes Iberian light infantry as such at Sert. 12. 
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 This is a drop in light-to-heavy ratio from the manipular legion, and contrary to the closer ratio between 
legionaries and auxilia of the Empire.  At the end of the civil war, the ratio is even smaller according to Appian, 
with 40,000 kou=foi next to approximately 200,000 heavy infantry (45 legions) (App. BC 5.13).  This disparity 
between the light-to-heavy ratio of the civil wars and that of the early Principate may suggest that Appian’s 
numbers are inaccurate.  Perhaps there had been more foreign or other ‘light-armed’ troops than Appian was 
aware of.  At the same time however, Dio’s discussion of the same events in Appian BC 5.12.115-116 
emphasizes the lack of light-armed troops on Octavian’s side, but specifically under his general Cornificius (Dio 
49.6-7).  In any case, it is difficult to draw any substantial conclusions from Appian’s approximate data. 
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 However, the Arrian reference here uses kou=foi as an adjective to describe the logxofo/roi, who are 
stationed with horsemen and picked troops.  Nevertheless, combining cavalry-light infantry tactic is also a well 
known tactic (see Chapter 6, ‘Tactical Roles’, esp. p. 156, below).  In the Plutarch reference, to\ koufo/taton 
are ostensibly acting alone.  
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 Translation: Cary: e)kphdw/ntwn de\ au)twn e)j th\n qa/lassan o(po/te bapti/zointo, kai\ e(te/rwn 
skafw=n r(a?di/wj e)/k te tou= kalw=j nei=n kai\ e)k tou= kou/fwj e)skeua/sqai e)pibaino/ntwn, 
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Although not Roman troops, Dio describes the Dalmatians facing Tiberius as kou=foi, noting 
they were effective at skirmishing, with excellent speed and agility because of their 
equipment (Dio 55.30).  The same is said about the Iberians under Sertorius who caused the 
heavy-armed Romans under Metellus great difficulty, and consistently defeated the Roman 
armies sent to Spain.309 
In another instance of the speed associated with kou=foi, Antony’s general Ventidius pursued 
the fleeing Sextus Pompey with to koufo/taton tou= stratou= shortly after the battles of 
Philippi, (Dio 48.39).  Here, it may be suggested that as with expediti, the army may simply 
be in light marching order, however, as with the other kou=foi in our sources, these details 
and/or the specifics of their armament are impossible to ascertain.310 
yiloi\ 
Yiloi\ is generally used by our sources to refer to light troops who are also capable of using 
missiles.311  From tables 1 and 2 in the following chapter, it is evident that yiloi\ is also the 
most frequently used light infantry term.312  Interestingly, unlike any of the other terms, it is 
used at least once by all the authors.  It is used most often by Arrian, and least often by 
Polybius.  The consistent usage of the word may rest in the fact that it is often used as an 
umbrella term to refer to missile-bearing troops.  Indeed, this is how Arrian uses it in his 
Texnh/ Taktika/, where it appears 13 times as a general reference to light-armed troops. 
Polybius provides the earliest historical use of this term in reference to Roman troops, which 
appear under Marcus Minucius Rufus during the Second Punic War (3.104).  However, in the 
following passage (3.105), Polybius refers to these very troops as eu)zw/nwn, a generalizing 
                                                                                                                                                        
a)ntirro/pwj h)lattou=nto. NB. As this is a naval battle, being lightly equipped may have been regarded as 
being advantageous. 
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 Plut. Sert. 12.5, cf. Pomp. 27.2 
310
 For further comparisons between Latin and Greek terminology, see Chapter 4 on Vocabulary Comparisons, 
below. 
311
 Cf. Liddell & Scott’s definition: ‘as a military term, of soldiers without heavy armour, light troops, such as 
archers and slingers, opp. o(pli=tai’  Thucydides (4.23.4) provides a general description of yiloi which could 
probably be applicable to certain yiloi fighting for Rome as well. 
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 See pages 113 and 114, in Chapter 4, below. 
84 
 
trend I have already noted in Polybius and other authors.  Indeed, Polybius often uses yiloi\ 
as a reference to bare ground, rather than as a reference to soldiers.313 
A relevant earlier reference to Roman yiloi\ comes from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, when 
he describes the Battle of Asculum in 279 BC (20.1-2).  Uniquely for the Roman army, the 
yiloi\ here were used with a special contraption designed to combat Pyrrhus’ elephants.  He 
describes the situation as follows: 
Outside the line they stationed the light-armed troops and the wagons, three 
hundred in number, which they had got ready for the battle against the elephants 
... Furthermore, standing on the wagons, which were four-wheeled, were many 
also of the light-armed troops — bowmen, hurlers of stones and slingers who 
threw iron caltrops; and on the ground beside the wagons there were still more 
men.314 
It should be noted that Dionysius has grouped missile troops under yiloi\, which, as we shall 
see, is a recurring usage in the ancient sources.  Also, it seems these yiloi\ were not 
necessarily prepared or armed for close combat, for 
when the men stationed in their towers [on the elephants] no longer drove the 
beasts forward, but hurled their spears down from above, and the light-armed 
troops [on Pyrrhus’ side] cut through the wattled screens surrounding the 
[Roman] wagons and hamstrung the oxen, the men at the [aforementioned 
Roman] machines [i.e. the yiloi\], leaping down from their cars, fled for refuge 
to the nearest infantry and caused great confusion among them.315 
Onasander’s discussion on the tactical uses of yiloi\ includes the advice they should be sent 
to forage (10.8) and that they should be used in broken terrain (18.1).316  Also, as mentioned 
in the sections below on a)kontisth/j and sfendonh/thj, Onasander suggests that these 
yiloi\ should be deployed in front of the heavy infantry.  By grouping a)kontisth/j and 
sfendonh/thj under yiloi, Onasander appears to class yiloi as troops who are known to 
use missiles as an essential form of combat, and this is confirmed with further suggestions he 
makes for their tactical deployment.  He states, 
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 E.g. Bare (treeless) ground: 3.55, 3.71, 18.31; he also uses in it reference to his writings in the sense that they 
are not embellished: e.g. 9.1, 29.12. 
314
 Translation: Cary. 
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 Translation: op. cit.  My square brackets, inserted for clarification. 
316
 This reflects the deployments discussed in Chapter 6, see pp.150-151; 168-173. 
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If each army should have a number of yilw=n to be the first to hurl their weapons 
against their opponents before the hand-to-hand battle; or after the clash of the 
phalanx, attacking from the flank, they should makes use of their missiles 
(be/lesin), for thus the enemy will be forced together into a narrow space and 
will be greatly confused by such tactics.317 
Onasander’s suggestion that the yiloi\ might hurl their weapons before hand-to-hand combat 
indicates that these troops were probably capable of more than just missile combat.  It is this 
distinction of being able to engage in hand-to-hand combat that differs from Dionysius’ use 
of the term.  It should once again be pointed out that the contemporary understanding of the 
term may have had an effect on the author’s usage of it.318  Onasander is writing in the mid-
first century AD, when auxilia (who can also fight in the line of battle) were providing the 
role of light troops.  Thus, this may be why we see yiloi\ in Onasander as capable of more 
than just missile combat.  Nevertheless, Onasander’s use of the term also highlights the fact 
that missiles were a key component of their panoply.  This is further evident in his next 
chapter where he says, 
If the enemy remain in the crescent position, the general should post his yilou\j 
and archers opposite them, who with their missiles will cause heavy loss.319 
Josephus’ use of yiloi\ is also quite general.  The tactical deployments in which he describes 
them are quite standard for light-armed troops.320  He tells us that the yiloi\ under Vitellius 
were foreign allies, and they are seen being deployed with cavalry.321  During the Jewish War 
they are deployed with archers, Vespasian having ordered them 
...to march first, that they might beat back any sudden attack from the enemy, and 
might search out suspicious woods that had potential for ambushes.322 
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 20.2, translation Illinois Greek Club, Loeb Edition. 
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 This has already been mentioned above on p. 80. 
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 21.7, translation: ibid.   
320
 Cf. Chapter 6, below. 
321 Jos. AJ 18.120: Ou)ite/lloij de\ paraskeuasa/menoj w(j ei)j po/lemon to\n pro\j A)re/tan dusi\ 
ta/gmasin o(plitw=n o(/soi te peri\ au)ta\ yiloi\ kai\ i(ppei=j summaxou\ntej e)k tw=n u(po\ R(wmai/oj 
Basileiw=n a)go/menoj, ‘So Vitellius prepared to make war with Aretas, leading two legions of heavy 
infantry, as many yiloi \ and cavalry that belonged to them, allied from the kingdoms under the Romans’ (my 
translation). 
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 Jos. BJ 3.116, my translation: Tou\j me/n yilou\j tw=n e)pikou/rwn kai\ toxo/taj proa/gein 
e)ke/leusen, w(j a)nakoo/ptoien ta\j e)capinai/ouj tw=n polemi/wn e)pidroma\j kai\ diereunw=en ta\j 
u(po/ptouj kai\ loxa=sqai duname/naj u(/laj.  It should be noted that this role is typically undertaken by 
light troops, see p 144 ff., below. 
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Plutarch likewise uses the term quite generally.  He mentions Roman yiloi\ in the Third 
Mithridatic War, where a legate of Lucullus is sent to protect the soldiers setting up the 
marching camp (Plut. Luc. 25).  This legate, named Sextilius, is sent with yiloi\ as well as 
cavalry and heavy infantry, and is unwillingly engaged by Tigranes’ general Mithrobarzanes 
who is killed and his attack force defeated.  Plutarch does not specify what kind of light 
troops these are.  Similarly, he mentions yiloi\ under Crassus (Crass. 20, 24), but is 
ambiguous with details.  We only know that they unsuccessfully attempted to skirmish with 
Parthian cavalry at Carrhae (24), and this could possibly make them some sort of missile-
using light infantry. 
Our evidence regarding Roman yiloi\ from the late-Republic ends with references from 
Plutarch’s Antony and his campaigns in the east.  When listing the composition of Antony’s 
army in Armenia, Plutarch notes that there were thirty-thousand foreign horsemen and yiloi 
(Ant. 37.3).  Plutarch notes that in Parthia, the yiloi had slings and javelins (Ant. 41.5), and 
it is also likely that the yiloi\ at Ant. 42.2 are the a)kontisth/j and sfendonh/thj 
mentioned in the preceding section (i.e. 42.1).  This is similar to Onasander, who also uses 
yiloi\ to group a)kontisth/j and sfendonh/thj together (Onas. 18.1), as mentioned above.  
At Ant. 45.3 and 49.1, Plutarch notes that the heavy infantry enclose the yiloi\ within a 
testudo formation, a tactic that is also mentioned by Dio at 49.30.1.  While Plutarch does not 
specifically state that the yiloi\ engaged the enemy from within the testudo (i.e. with 
missiles), he does say that the Parthians would not come to close quarters with the 
legionaries, and at 49.1 he says that the light infantry were ordered to engage.  If the yiloi\ 
were still enclosed by the testudo at this point, they would very likely have engaged the 
Parthians with missiles from a distance. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section (p. 83), Arrian uses this term frequently in his 
general work on tactics.  Interestingly, he separates them from peltasts, but this may simply 
be a Greek convention, since he is ostensibly describing a Greek army.323  Thus, his 
description of the equipment of the yiloi\ may not help our understanding of these troops for 
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the Roman army.324  The same argument might be used for the tactics that follow this 
description.  However, because these tactics are quite general, and because Arrian’s 
understanding of tactics is probably more Roman than Greek (given that he was a Roman 
military commander under the Principate), these tactics they may be worth discussing here.   
Arrian states that yiloi\ are deployed next to the heavy armed troops, so that the heavy army 
may protect the lightly armed yiloi\ (Tact. 9).  We see a similar notion in Plato in his 
description of the ‘pyrrhiche’, or war dance.325  We might equate this to the velites’ retiring 
into the ranks of heavy infantry.  Arrian also says that another place for the yiloi\ would be 
on the flanks of the heavy infantry (ibid.).  This was a typical tactical deployment of light 
infantry in the Roman army.326  Arrian further notes that the use of missiles on behalf of the 
yiloi\ was advantageous in keeping the heavy infantry protected.  Indeed, it seems that for 
Arrian this term expressly denotes missile troops.327  As mentioned in the section on 
logxofo/roi below, Arrian’s use of yiloi\ in the Ektaxis also refers to missile troops.328   
Arrian puts great emphasis on the tactical use of yiloi\.  He highlights the variety of tactical 
deployments in which they may be used (Tact. 13, 25), and claims that they should constitute 
half of each formation (14).  Gilliver has noted the tactical flexibility of Roman light infantry, 
and this is a primary part of the discussion of tactics in Chapter 6, below.329  So while there 
are evident tactical connections with Roman light infantry, Arrian’s discussion remains too 
general for us to determine anything specific about these troops.330  For Arrian then, yiloi\ is 
a general term, and he uses it to refer to some of the most lightly armed missile troops.  
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 He claims that they were the opposite of hoplites because they had no breast plate, shield, greaves or helmet, 
and they primarily used missile weapons (Tact. 3.1).  Some slingers are equipped in this way on Trajan’s 
column (see p. 49, above), but Arrian does not use the term for slingers (sfendonh=tai) to describe these 
troops. 
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 See p. 188, below.  
326
 Especially if they were deployed with cavalry, cf. Polyb. 11.22; Caes. BC 3.88-9; Gilliver 1999, 103, 106. 
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 Ibid: to\ de\ yilo\n e)nantiw/tata e)/xei tw?= o(plitikw?= pa/nta, o(/tiper a)/neu qw/rakoj kai\ a)spi/doj 
kai\ knhmi=doj kai\ kra/nouj e(khbo/loij toi=j o(/loij diaxrw/menon,  cf. Tact. 9. 
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 They are armed with a lo/gxh at Ektaxis 25, and various other types of missiles at Tact. 3.3, including bow 
shots (toxeu/masin), light javelins (a)konti/oij), slings (sfendo/naij), and stones thrown from the hand 
(li/qoij e)k xeiro/j).   
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 Gilliver 1999, 113-114. 
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 He does have specific discussion of their equipment and their organization (Tact. 14.3-4), but these are 
evidently related to Greek armies as we have no equivalent examples in Roman armies. 
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Appian refers to Roman yiloi\ at the siege of Astapa during the Second Punic War (Hisp. 
6.33), and although he does not discuss their armament specifically, he does mention that 
they are deployed with cavalry.  This deployment, as already mentioned, was a standard 
tactical use of velites, and it is probable that these yiloi\ included velites amongst them or 
that they actually were the velites.  The same goes for the Roman deployment at Cannae, 
where Appian has yiloi\ with cavalry deployed on the wings.331  Similarly at Syrian War 
6.36, Appian suggests the light-armed troops and cavalry would normally have been 
deployed together to guard the marching camp.  Though guarding the camp was also a 
regular assignment of the velites, that cavalry joined them for this task is unusual.332  At the 
Battle of Magnesia, Appian describes yiloi\ and bowmen mingled with the rest of the troops 
(App. Syr. 6.31).  These later envelop the Macedonian infantry, who were 
denuded of cavalry on either side, [and] had opened to receive [their own] light-
armed troops, who had been skirmishing in front, and closed again.  Thus 
crowded together, Domitius easily enclosed them with his numerous light-armed 
troops and cavalry (6.35). 
Under Manlius Vulso 189 BC, the yiloi\ appear to be missile troops, since Appian states 
that ‘the crowd was so dense that no dart (be/loj) missed its mark.’333  Whether they had 
other weapons as well is not clear; as with many of the Greek vocabulary, our sources’ 
technicality is far from precise. 
Appian mentions Roman yiloi\ several times in his Civil War, but most of these references 
are vague.334  However, it may be worth noting that they are mentioned alongside archers, 
slingers, cavalry and even gladiators (BC 4.10, 5.3); as with Plutarch and Onasander (noted 
above), this is yet another example where yiloi\ are deployed alongside slingers.  Their 
deployment alongside cavalry also reflects Josephus’ use of the term (see above).  
Furthermore, this particular case highlights the fact that these yiloi\ were probably 
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javelineers, since if they were slingers, archers or cavalry, this would mean Appian is being 
tautological.335 
Dio also mentions yiloi\ and cavalry during the civil war, when the general Cornificius is 
attacked by these from a distance (49.6.3).  The fact that they attack from a distance here 
underlines the fact that they are probably using missiles, although it is impossible to say 
whether they were armed with other weapons as well.  Dio also mentions Publius Sulpicius 
Galba using his yiloi\ in skirmishes against Philip (Dio 18.58.1) during the Second 
Macedonian War.  Again, we see them deployed with cavalry here.   
Using Caesar’s account of his forces before the battle against the Belgae, we can determine 
what kind of troops Dio refers to as yiloi\ prior to the battle.  At BG 2.7, Caesar mentions 
Numidian and Cretan archers as well as Balaeric slingers.  It is probable that these light-
infantry would have also been present throughout his campaign against the Belgae.  So, when 
Caesar needed light troops to ambush the Belgae, these are probably the same yiloi\ that Dio 
refers to when he tells us they, along with cavalry,  
fell upon the [Belgae], taking them by surprise, and killed many of them, so that 
the following night they all withdrew to their own land, especially since the 
Aedui were reported to have invaded it (39.1.4). 
At this point, the yiloi\ are solely missile troops.  However, both their deployment with 
cavalry and their use in an ambush should be noted as a common tactic for light infantry in 
general, as discussed in the chapter on tactical roles below.  Nevertheless, in Dio’s 
description of the battle between Suetonius Paulinus and Boudicca, his use of yiloi\ still 
seems to stress the use of missiles, as he mentions the missile exchange between the yiloi\ 
(62.12.3).   
Overall then, our sources seem to use yiloi\ as a general term for light-armed troops, who 
are often seen to be equipped with missiles.  This usage is fairly consistent over time, and it is 
only Josephus who does not specifically attribute missiles to these troops.  As mentioned at 
the beginning of this section, the consistent usage of the term across all of the relevant 
ancient sources may be a result of the fact that this term can be applied to ‘light infantry who 
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use missiles.’  This definition is obviously quite general, as all infantry with a ‘light’ panoply 
usually fall under this classification.336  Indeed, it seems yiloi\ were certainly considered to 
be ‘light’ troops, and were tactically used in that capacity.  However, the specifics of their 
armament beyond the fact that they were often equipped with various missiles are difficult to 
determine. 
Javelineers 
a)kontistai/ 
A)kontistai/ appears twenty times in the relevant sources, but fairly rarely in most authors 
aside from Polybius.  This suggests the term’s use went out of favour after the disappearance 
of a dedicated javelin (i.e. a)konti/wn) unit (e.g. the velites).  This is nevertheless, a fairly 
long-lived term that is used throughout the ancient literature, and generally denotes troops 
armed with a javelin or dart.337  In addition, this term is used in texts written both before and 
during our period.  Thus, these types of troops appear in a vast array of armies, including the 
Roman army. 
Polybius and Plutarch are the two sources who refer to these troops in the armies of the 
Roman Republic.  Polybius’ discussion of the battle of Telamon is the earliest 
historiographical use of this term in reference to Roman forces.338  Here, he discusses the 
equipment of the a)kontistai/ and the way it was used.  The details are worth repeating at 
length here:  
When the a)kontista/j advanced [in front of the legions], as was the Roman 
habit, rapidly and effectively throwing their missiles (be/lesin), the inner ranks 
of the Celts found their cloaks and trousers of great service; but to the naked men 
in the front ranks this unexpected mode of attack caused great desperation and 
difficulty. For the Gallic shields not being big enough to cover the man, the larger 
the naked body the more certainty was there of the be/lh hitting.  And at last, not 
being able to defend themselves, because the ei)sakonti/zontaj were out of 
reach, and their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their 
distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage and reckless 
violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death; while others gave 
                                                 
336
 For more on defining light infantry, see Chapter 5, below. 
337
 Cf. Liddell & Scott’s definition: ‘javelin - thrower, javelin-hurling’. 
338
 Other Greek authors such as Appian, Diodorus and Dionysius do not use the term in reference to Roman 
armies during the Republic. 
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ground step by step towards their own friends, whom they threw into confusion 
by this manifest acknowledgment of their panic. Thus the spirit of the Gaesatae 
had broken down by the method of attack of the a)kontista/j. But when the 
Romans received the a)kontistai=j in their ranks, and their maniples advanced, 
the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci received the attack, and maintained a desperate 
hand-to-hand fight.339 
From this passage it is very probable that the a)kontistai/ Polybius is referring to are the 
velites of the Roman army; the way in which they were deployed at Telamon is a well known 
tactic for the Romans.340  They appear three more times in his work, all before the end of the 
Second Punic War.  At 3.110, they are deployed once again as skirmishers, this time in front 
of the Roman heavy infantry at Cannae.  The remaining tactical uses of the a)kontistai/ 
include deployment that is familiar for the velites such as being taken on a reconnaissance 
mission, and fighting alongside cavalry (3.65, 3.69).  Thus, it seems that for Polybius, this 
term probably denotes velites, or light infantry that are similarly equipped.  As discussed 
above, Polybius uses several terms to refer to Roman light infantry, and it is probable that 
a)kontisth/j is just another synonym for him, particularly for velites.341 
Although Onasander only mentions these troops once, his advice on where to place the 
a)kontistai/ coincides with their deployments mentioned in Polybius (above) and Plutarch 
(discussed below).  He states that  
The general will assign his light-armed troops (yilou\j) – javelin-throwers 
(a)kontista\j), bowmen (toxo/taj), and slingers (sfendonh/taj) – to a 
position in front of the phalanx, for if placed in the rear they will do more damage 
to their own army than to the enemy.  And if in among the heavy-armed, their 
peculiar skill will be ineffectual because they will be unable to take a step 
backwards in throwing their javelins (a)konti/wn) or to charge forward and cast 
them, as other soldiers are in front of them and at their heels.342  
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This description gives us a fairly clear picture of how the a)kontistai/ would have been 
expected to use their weapon.  Here, they are evidently presented as light missile troops, 
which normally skirmish in loose formation in order to use their weapons properly.343  Again 
it must be remembered that Onasander is writing under the Principate, and so while his usage 
of the term is similar to that of Polybius, Onasander’s understanding of a)kontisth/j may 
reflect the organization of the army in his period (i.e. these are certainly not velites). 
Josephus describes a)kontistai/ with archers and slingers at both Vespasian’s siege of 
Jotapata, and the siege of Jerusalem (BJ. 3.168, 5.297).  Although Josephus does not tell us 
much more about these troops than this, it should be noted that this tactical deployment is the 
same as it is in Onasander.  This too, may reflect the fact that they are both writing during the 
Principate.   
Plutarch makes two references to these troops in the Roman army, and both refer to soldiers 
in Antony’s forces during his Parthian campaigns (Ant. 41, 42).  In both instances, the 
a)kontistai/ are deployed alongside slingers (as with Onasander and Josephus), and used in 
very fluid combat, emphasizing the role of the a)kontistai/ as missile troops.  In this first 
instance, they are used to fight cavalry, and in the second, they cover the flanks of Antony’s 
surrounded forces that were marching in square formation.  As Plutarch does not tell us much 
more than this, we cannot determine anything specific about the armament of these troops.  
As they are deployed with slingers, it is likely that they are auxiliaries of some kind, and it is 
further likely that these troops were equipped with light javelins. 
Our only other imperial source to mention these troops as part of the Roman army is Arrian.  
He places them in front of the standards of the 15
th
 Legion in his Ektaxis and tells us nothing 
more than this (5).  A)kontistai/ are mentioned again in section 14 of the same work, but 
here it is a synonym for the logxofo/roi from Rhizus (mentioned in the section on 
logxofo/roi below).  Notably in this instance, Arrian places them behind the heavy infantry, 
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 It should be noted however, that Onasander’s remarks suit a tightly-packed infantry formation, but as we 
know, this was not necessarily always the mode in which heavy infantry were deployed. 
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a tactic contradictory to Onasander’s suggestion regarding these troops, above.344  Arrian 
claims that the heavy infantry should be placed in front of the javelineers so that they might 
be protected while throwing over the heads of their comrades.  This also implies to me that 
Arrian may have deemed they were either not sufficiently skilled in skirmishing with cavalry 
(the Alans were primarily a heavy cavalry force), or that the way in which they or the Alans 
were equipped may have made these a)kontistai/ more effective as a static force of missile 
troops like archers or slingers.  Beyond this, the only thing we can say for certain about these 
troops is that they were armed with a javelin. 
Thus, for the Republic, a)kontisth/j may be compared to the velites: skirmishers armed with 
javelins that were very fluid in combat.  Our Imperial sources are less forthcoming regarding 
a)kontisth/j.  Beyond this, we may say these troops were armed with a javelin, yet like 
most of the contingents under review, specifics are indeterminable. 
a)krobo/loj 
This term is used as an adjectival participle to describe the action of skirmishing in our 
sources, rather than actual fighters.  This is a result of the fact that all of our examples derive 
from a)kroboli/zomai, the verb meaning ‘to skirmish’, rather than the noun a)krobo/loj.345  
That is, our examples all begin with the root a)kroboli/zom, derived from the verb rather 
than the root a)krobo/l derived from the noun.  The earliest historical use of this term in 
reference to a Roman army engaging in such skirmishes (a)krobo/lismou) occurs in 
Polybius at 1.18 during the siege of Agrigentum. 
Like kou=foi, this is one of the least frequently used words amongst all the terms, at six uses.  
This may be explained by the fact that it is mostly used to describe the action of skirmishing 
rather than skirmishers.  However, there are a few instances where the term actually refers to 
the skirmishers themselves.  
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 Also, a)kontistai/ appear behind the hoplites in the battle between the Piraeus and Athens in Xen. Hell. 
2.4.12.  Having missile troops fire from behind heavy infantry was perhaps not as uncommon as Onasander 
implies, cf. Chaeronea in 86 BC, Plut. Sull. 18. 
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 While this noun appears in Liddell & Scott, it does not appear in our sources.  This will be discussed in 
further detail below.  NB. A)kroboli/zomai is literally translated as ‘to throw from afar, to fight with missiles’, 
from which the meaning ‘to skirmish’ is derived. 
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While the sources do not specify any equipment or organization, these troops are (perhaps 
unsurprisingly) always used to skirmish, particularly before battles.  Polybius describes 
Caecilius ordering them out of the fortifications at Panormus to hold Hasdrubal’s army back 
with sallies (1.40).  Scipio pulls his skirmishing a)krobolizome/nouj back between the 
maniples before distributing them amongst the wings at Ilipa (Polyb. 11.22).  This resembles 
a well-known use of the Roman velites, and indeed as mentioned above, it seems Polybius is 
specifically describing these troops; in the same section he refers to them as both eu)zw/nwn 
and grosfoma/xouj.346  In several translations of Polybius, the latter term is translated as 
velites.347  Furthermore, at 11.32 Polybius describes an ambush set by Scipio where the 
grosfoma/xouj engage in major skirmishing (me/gaj a)krobolismo\j) against Iberian 
a)krobolizome/noij.  Thus, if grosfoma/xoi can engage in a)krobolismo\j, I would 
suggest that it follows that grosfoma/xoi can be a)krobolizome/noij.  Given all of this, 
when Polybius’ use of eu)zw/nwn (mentioned above) is also taken into account, it seems that 
the three terms for light troops can be used interchangeably.  Indeed, Walbank points this out 
for toij a)krobolizome/noij at 1.40.10, indicating that these troops are the eu)/zwnoi in 
§6.348  So, I would suggest that Polybius is simply using various terms for light infantry 
without any specific difference in meaning.  If this is the case, then as pointed out in the 
sections on grosfoma/xoi and eu)/zwnoi, it is possible that these light-armed troops are 
velites, or infantry equipped in a similar way.  This becomes especially probable when we 
consider that these troops are commonly used before battles – a regular use of the velites. 
Etymologically, grosfoma/xoi and a)krobolizome/noi are similar in meaning, the former 
literally meaning ‘those fighting with the gro/sfoj (javelin)’ and the latter meaning ‘to heave 
the lead point’.349  The main difference between the two is the way in which the terms 
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 Polyb. 11.22.9-11, noted under eu)zw/noj, above. 
347
 Cf. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh’s 1889 Macmillan translation and W.R. Paton’s 1922 Loeb translation for 1.33, 
6.21, 6.24, 6.35, 10.39, 11.22, 11.23, 11.24, 11.32, 15.9, 15.12; also Ian Scott-Kilver’s 1979 Penguin text for 
10.39; see also ‘grosfoma/xoi’, below. 
348
 Walbank 1957, 102; he also points out that the eu)k/nhtoi (‘light troops’) in §7 (those stationed before the 
trench and wall), appear in §12 as a)ke/raioi (‘fresh troops’), and that these are quite distinct.  NB. This is the 
only instance in our sources of eu)k/nhtoi being used to mean light troops.  This varying use of terms to refer to 
the same troops is another example of this writing convention in Polybius, discussed above. 
349
 a)krobolizome/noij from a)/kron (point) and boli/zw (to heave the lead), although boli/j is also another 
term for javelin, and so the term may also be translated ‘those with the javelin points’. 
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inherently refer to the javelin: the gro/sfoj, and the boli/j or a)/kron.  While all these words 
can mean javelin, boli/j has several ways of being understood (discussed below).  Because 
of this, a)krobo/lij may have a different literary effect. 
To clarify the different literary effects of grosfoma/xoi and a)krobolizome/noij, it is 
necessary to understand the various ways in which they refer to the javelin (i.e. gro/sfoj, 
and the boli/j or a)/kron).  While gro/sfoj is defined by Liddell and Scott simply as 
‘javelin’, a)/kron means point, or something sharp, and boli/j is any kind of missile.  Boli/j 
can also refer to a sounding lead (thus the meaning: ‘to heave the lead’, mentioned above) or 
a flash of lightning.350  Thus, the use of boli/j may carry a slightly more poetic sense to it 
because of its alternate translation as flash of lighting.   
Our other author with relevant references to this term is Plutarch.  He does not use any terms 
interchangeably with a)krobolizome/noi, and indeed his references to what specific kind of 
troops these are, are less clear.  In his Life of Aemilius Paulus, several hundred 
a)krobolizome/nouj from both the Roman and Macedonian armies skirmish before the 
battle of Pydna (18.2).  Plutarch notes that some of his sources suggest that 700 Ligurians 
fighting for Rome could have been responsible for beginning the skirmish, but he does not 
tell us any more about the forces involved (18.1).  In his Life of Marcellus, Marcellus coerces 
Hannibal to give battle by harassing him with a)krobolismoi=j (25.2), once again leaving us 
with a vague reference to these troops. 
As mentioned above, the interesting detail to note is that etymologically, all of our examples 
derive from a)kroboli/zomai, the verb meaning ‘to skirmish’, rather than the noun 
a)krobo/loj.  Consequently, the verb is acting as an adjectival participle in our examples, 
which is translated as a relative clause, e.g. ‘those who skirmish’.  To me, this could be 
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 v. Liddell & Scott a)/kron, and boli/j.  Although a pointed (a)/kron) piece of lead (boli/j) probably refers to 
a javelin, it may also refer to a sling stone, and this may be why Liddell and Scott also define a)krobo/loj as 
‘slinger’.  The translation as ‘slinger’ is suggested by Liddell and Scott based on the root of the word coming 
from ba/llw which can be used to refer to anything thrown.  However, our sources probably did not use the 
term to refer to slingers.  Indeed, the alternate translation of boli/j meaning ‘flash of lighting’ suggests to me 
that a javelin more appropriately suits the various definitions of boli/j than a sling stone.  This is partly because 
a flash of lightening more closely resembles a javelin than a sling stone, and because sling stones were difficult 
to see in flight, and so I think it is unlikely that they were correlated to lighting.  
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interpreted as having a sense of permanence, insofar as it could carry the implication that they 
are ‘those who always skirmish’.  I think the same sense could apply even if the present tense 
is translated in the continuous aspect, i.e. ‘those who are skirmishing’, or ‘the ones who are 
(continuously) skirmishing’.351  To me the adjectival use of the participle thus could be 
interpreted to imply that these men are a permanent feature of the Roman army, or in other 
words, the velites.352  At the same time however, I do not wish to suggest that ‘the ones who 
skirmish’, is equivalent to ‘the ones who only skirmish’.  As indicated in the chapter on 
tactical roles below, skirmishers or velites were flexible in their tactical deployment, and 
while they may be ‘the ones who always skirmish’, they certainly have other roles as well. 
grosfoma/xoi 
This is the word that Polybius uses to mean velites.  References to grosfoma/xoi only exist 
in Polybius, while gro/sfoj appears once in both Strabo and Plutarch.353  Polybius describes 
grosfoma/xoi in detail his discussion of the organization of the Roman army in Book 6.  
These are possibly the most significant references to grosfoma/xoi because they describe 
their organization and equipment.  From the passages in Book 6 we know a great deal more 
about the grosfoma/xoi than we do of other light infantry.354  Specifically, Polybius’ 
description of the grosfoma/xoi at 6.21-22 is the main reference for the organization and 
appearance of the Roman velites, hence the consistent translation of grosfoma/xoi as 
velites.355  Indeed, because our knowledge of the velites is heavily based on Polybius’ 
description of the grosfoma/xoi, we can equate the two terms, as Liddell and Scott have.356  
As such, Polybius’ descriptions of them have already been included and discussed above in 
the section on velites. 
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 As there are no temporal aspects in the ancient Greek Present tense, the continuous or the completed aspect 
may be used to translate the present tense into English. 
352
 Or some manifestation thereof, (e.g. rorarii) see ‘velites’ in Chapter 2 for a discussion of when they were 
established in the legion. 
353
 Strabo’s reference is to a Gallic weapon (4.4.3), while Plutarch’s refers to Roman weapons at Chaeronea, 
although he seems to be referring to the heavy infantry (Sulla 18). 
354
 Although many of the other Greek terms for light infantry may be synonyms for grosfoma/xoi, especially 
in Polybius, e.g. see a)krobo/loj above. 
355
 Evelyn S. Shuckburgh in the 1889 Macmillan translation translates the term to velites 16 out of the 17 times 
it appears in Polybius, translating it as ‘the light-armed’ once at 10.15.  Also, some of Livy’s descriptions also 
add to our corpus of knowledge about the velites, see ‘velites,’ in Chapter 2. 
356
 Cf. their definition: ‘fighting with the gro/sfoj, velites’ 
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Like a)krobo/loi, this term is also derivative from the participle grosfoma/xoj, the verb 
meaning ‘fighting with the gro/sfoj.’  The curious feature of this term is its rarity and its 
only appearance in the ancient sources in Polybius, as a reference to the velites.  There is no 
evident etymology of the term gro/sfoj, and so it is impossible to identify an etymological 
link to the velites.  Gro/sfoj is not paired with any other suffix aside from ma/xoj, and it 
only appears once on its own in Polybius (6.22).  Furthermore, although gro/sfoj appears 
three times in Roman literature outside of Polybius, all of these instances occur well after the 
second century BC.357  However, while it is difficult to determine the origins of this word, the 
term seems to have been fairly widely known, at least to such an extent that it was also 
known in Latin as grosphus by the fourth century AD (Arn. 6.200), meaning ‘the point of a 
javelin’.358  As a result, it follows that either the term gro/sfoj or the term grosphus, was a 
rare, but recognized word for a javelin, although it is impossible to tell which came first.  I 
think it is unlikely that Polybius invented the word, and indeed, the fact that Polybius does 
not feel the need to explain his usage of the word suggests that he assumed such an 
explanation was unnecessary.  This in turn was probably because his readers would know the 
meaning of the term.359  Perhaps the time period of usage can tell us something about its 
etymology. 
All of Polybius’ references to the grosfoma/xoi in action occur from the Battle of Tunis 
(255 BC) to the Battle of Zama (202 BC).  I would propose that the lack of references after 
the Battle of Zama may be explained by the suggestion that Polybius could have been using a 
different source.  So, for the period that he uses this term, Polybius may have been using a 
tribune’s commentarii (as Rawson suggests) in which the word gro/sfoj, grosfoma/xoi or 
grosphus was used.360  Whereas, it is possible that for his history after the Battle of Zama 
Polybius utilized a source that did not employ any of these words.  The suggestion that such 
military commentarii included the use of atypical or rare terms becomes more likely when we 
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 I.e. well after Polybius was writing; see Str. 4.4.3; Plu. Sull.18.; Horace C. 2.16; the term also appears in the 
4
th
 century early church father Arnobius 6.200 (although the latter is writing in Latin, and thus using the 
transliterated term grosphus). 
358
 This Latin term is the etymological root for the modern genus of Grosphus scorpions.  It would have been 
strange for this term to have persisted if it was as rare as it appears to be. 
359
 Cf. Rawson’s similar comments regarding Cato’s ostensible ambiguity, Rawson 1991, 41, and Arrian’s 
complaint regarding such ambiguity in old writers (Tact. 1.2) 
360
 Rawson 1991, 37. 
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consider that several very rare military terms appear in Cato the Elder’s now lost military 
treatise.  Some of the words that he seems to have employed uniquely include terms related to 
light infantry such as ferentarii, or procubitores.361  In any case, it is difficult to determine 
why the grosfoma/xoi do not appear between the years 201 and 146 BC (the rest of the 
period covered in Polybius’ Histories).  Nevertheless, Bell suggests that we should not take 
this to be indicative of anything significant, such as the disappearance of the velites.362   
logxofo/roi 
Roman logxofo/roi only appear in Arrian and Josephus, with The Jewish Wars having the 
earliest historiographical use of the term in reference to the Roman army at 3.120.  None of 
the references in these two authors involves logxofo/roi being used in typical ‘light tactics’ 
(these examples will be discussed below).363  Liddell & Scott’s definition of these troops as 
‘spear-bearing’ emphasizes the fact that their weapon acts as the main identifier of this group.  
As such, a brief discussion on the lo/gxh is warranted.  
Arrian’s Array against the Alans provides us with some clues as to what kind of missile this 
was.  In this work, Arrian has the logxofo/roi placed behind the front ranks of Roman 
legionary cohorts (Arr. Ektaxis 13-14).  Thus, as he points out, the logxofo/roi would have 
been expected to throw over the heads of the front ranks (op. cit. 14), and this is something 
that would have been most effective if they were armed with a light-javelin type of weapon.  
The suggestion that the lo/gxh was this type of javelin, accordingly makes sense in this 
passage.364  Furthermore, this can also explain its etymological connection to the Latin term 
lancea.365  The latter weapon is the spear attributed to the late Roman unit of lanciarii.  We 
have several depictions of this weapon on the gravestones of men from these units.366  These 
depictions indicate that the lancea had two key features that signify a direct relationship to 
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 See both Accensi and Velites in the Latin vocabulary chapter, above. 
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 On the contrary, he suggests a gradual decline of the velites with their complete disappearance sometime 
after the Jugurthine War, see Bell 1965, 419-421.  Furthermore, Livy mentions them several times after the 2
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Punic war as well.  Walbank does not discuss Polybius’ overall use of velites, nor does he discuss their 
disappearance. 
363
 For light tactics see Chapter 6. 
364
 Polyb. 1.78 indicates that the lo/gxh was a javelin of some sort. 
365
 v. Lewis & Short: ‘lancea’, who note that Paul. ex. Festus makes the correlation at P. 118 M: ‘a Graeco 
dicta, quam illi lo/gxhn vocant.’ 
366
 E.g CIL III 6194; AE 1993, 01574; cf. Lanciarii in Chapter 2  
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the light javelin.  First, they were thin enough that several could be held in one hand; this is 
exactly how Livy describes the iacula of the velites at 26.4.4.367  Accordingly, examples that 
mention logxofo/roi as some sort of light infantry make perfect sense.   
Our earlier references to logxofo/roi see these troops commonly deployed as light infantry 
(in skirmishes and ambushes), but the sources only refer to them as part of non-Roman 
armies in these instances.368  Indeed, logxofo/roi were very probably a type of light infantry 
in Hannibal’s army.369  Although we have no explicit examples of logxofo/roi in the Roman 
Republican army, it is possible that similar mercenary forces were hired to fight for Rome.  
Our examples for these troops under the Empire come from Arrian and Jospehus, and both 
seem to have different definitions for logxofo/roi, which is something we might expect 
given the cultural, stylistic, and chronological differences between the two authors. 
In Josephus, there is a possibility that logxofo/roi might not be light infantry.  In his 
description of the sacking of the temple of Jerusalem, he mentions Titus’ request that a 
logxofo/roj and a centurion beat their fellow soldiers with their staves (ξύλοις) (Jos. BJ 
6.262).  Here, it is not clear whether this refers to the centurion’s vine and the soldier’s spear 
respectively, or whether they both have vine-sticks.  In any case, because the logxofo/roj in 
this instance is given a task of authority, it is possible that he is an officer of some sort, or a 
soldier from Titus’ bodyguard (see below).  The other references to logxofo/roi that we 
have in Josephus appear in his description of the Roman army on the march.  In his reports of 
both Vespasian’s and Titus’ marching columns, the logxofo/roi are placed very close to the 
commander.370  They are a part of Vespasian’s bodyguard and they also march directly behind 
the bodyguard of Titus.  This is not a typical position for light troops on the march in the 
Imperial period, since, as discussed below, they were commonly sent to the front as scouts or 
a vanguard or to the rear in a protective role.371  Thus, though the logxofo/roi in Josephus 
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 Also, the modern Italian term ‘lanciare’ meaning to throw, has an evident root in this word. 
368
 Particularly in Hannibal’s army, v. Polyb. 3.72, 3.73, .3.83, 3.84, 3.85, 3.93, 3.94, 3.101, 3.113.  The tactics 
they are involved in are typical for light armed troops, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
369
 See Daly 2002, 108-111. 
370
 Jos. BJ 3.95, 3.120, 5.48. At 3.95 Josephus calls them epi/lektoi, which for Polybius is the same as 
extraordinarii in Latin, see n. 182, above. 
371
 See Chapter 6: ‘Tactical Roles: Guarding the Marching Column’ below. 
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were probably armed with a light javelin (or several), this may have been the only light 
equipment in their panoply.372   
In Arrian’s Ektaxis, the logxofo/roi appear as foreign troops, coming from Colchis and 
Rhizus (Arr. Ektaxis 7, 14).  Bosworth notes that these are indeed auxiliary infantry, although 
they are local natives, raised ad hoc rather than a permanent unit of the imperial auxilia.373  
Arrian also describes the logxofo/roi as κούφων in section 23.374  This in turn suggests that 
the logxofo/roi were not always lightly armed.  Indeed, in section 25, Arrian notes that 
there are two types of logxofo/roi: those that are lightly armed (yiloi\) and those armed 
with a shield (οἱ θειασταί. Φερέσθωσαν).375  This implies that those armed with a shield are 
understood to be not yiloi\ or perhaps more heavily armed, and indeed this is expressly 
stated by Arrian at Tact. 3.3.376  Both types of logxofo/roi, however, are missile troops in 
this instance.  The logxofo/roi also appear as missile troops in section 14.  So, it seems that 
although logxofo/roi are not always lightly armed (i.e. yiloi\), they usually appear as 
missile troops.  Correspondingly, they are also referred to as a)kontistw=n in section 14, and 
as we have seen above, during the Imperial period, this term is normally used to refer troops 
armed with the javelin.  And indeed, Bosworth suggests a lighter missile javelin for the main 
weapon of the logxofo/roi, while Goldsworthy suggests that they are armed with a lancea 
or type of javelin in these instances.377  As mentioned above, the lo/gxh (and lancea) is very 
probably a light javelin.  In accordance with the description of them as kou=foi, Arrian 
assigns them the task of chasing a retreating army, a typical manoeuvre for lightly armed 
troops.378   
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 Cf. Jos. BJ 3.95 where the commander’s bodyguard are armed with the lo/gxh and Arr. Ektaxis, 25, 
discussed in the following paragraph. 
373
 Bosworth 1977, 237; DeVoto also notes their local native status, DeVoto 1993, 122. 
374
 This passage is discussed in further detail above under κοu=φoi. 
375
 DeVoto 1993, 122, notes that the θειασταί here most likely should read peltastai\, and indeed Arrian 
himself notes that yiloi do not carry shields and that peltastai\ do, Arr. Tact. 3.3. 
376
 Arr. Tact. 3.3: to\ de\ yilo\n e)nantiw/tata e)/xei tw?= o(plitikw?= pa/nta, o(/tiper a)/neu qw/rakoj kai\ 
a)spi/doj kai\ knhmi=doj kai\ kra/nouj e(khbo/loij toi=j o(/loij diaxrw/menon, toceu/masin h)\ 
a)konti/oij h)\ sfendo/naij h)\ li/qoij e)k xeiro/j. 
377
 Bosworth 1977, 238; Goldsworthy 1996, 17, 229. 
378
 Arr. Ektaxis 29; for this being  a typical light infantry tactic see Chapter 6, below. 
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Thus far, the picture we get from Arrian is that logxofo/roi are probably equipped as 
missile troops, but this should not be taken to mean that they were necessarily light infantry.  
This is especially true when we consider the probability that any infantryman was capable of 
throwing a javelin, a point which Goldsworthy has already noted.379  Moreover, further 
analysis supports this observation. 
In Arrian’s description there is a significant similarity to Josephus’ description, insofar as 
they are mentioned as being part of the commander’s bodyguard (23).380  There has been 
some scholarly debate over the identification of the logxofo/roi in this instance, and so it 
will be best to include the relevant paragraphs from Arrian here. 
(22) The equites singulares will be stationed around Xenophon (Arrian), as well 
as up to 200 infantrymen from the legions (fa/laggoj [tw=n] pezw=n) as a 
personal bodyguard (swmatofu/lakej), centurions commanding the picked 
troops and bodyguard, and the decurions of the equites singulares.  (23) About 
100 of the light-armed javelinmen (κούφων logxofo/roi) will be stationed 
around him so he can inspect the battle line and wherever he learns there is a 
weakness he can go and attend to it.381   
First, it should be noted that the logxofo/roi here are not the same type of logxofo/roi that 
are mentioned as being part of the battle-line (i.e. the missile troops at 14, and 25).  Rather, 
the scholarly debate revolves around their status as swmatofu/lakej, or the bodyguard of 
the commander.  Regarding their status, Ritterling has suggested that the swmatofu/lakej 
were the beneficarii of the legate’s staff and that we should understand the logxofo/roi to 
be separate from the swmatofu/lakej.382  He goes on to suggest that the logxofo/roi are 
pedites singulares, recruited from the auxiliary cohorts and independent of the men drawn 
from the legions that make up the bodyguard.383  Speidel has followed this argument as well, 
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 Goldsworthy 1996, 18. 
380
 We also have one reference in Lucian where logxofo/roi appear as part of his personal escort from 
Cappadocia when he traveled to the Pontic coast (Alexander 55). 
381
 My translation: (22) ) oi¥ de£ e¦pi¢lektoi i¥ppei¤j a¦mf' au¦to£n Cenofw¤nta eãstwsan, kai£ tw¤n a¦po£ th¤j 
fa¢laggoj [tw¤n] pezw¤n oàson ei¦j diakosi¢ouj, oi¥ swmatofu¢lakej, kai£ e¥katonta¢rxai oàsoi toi¤j 
e¦pile¢ktoij cuntetagme¢noi hä tw¤n swmatofula¢kwn h¥gemo¢nej, kai£ dek- (23) a¢rxai oi¥ tw¤n 
e¦pile¢ktwn. eãstwsan de£ a¦mf' au¦to£n *** aj e¥kato£n kou¢fwn logxofo¢rwn, w¥j pa¤san e¦pifoitw¤n 
th£n fa¢lagga oàpou ti e¦ndee£j katamanqa¢noi, e¦kei¤no i¦%¤to kai£ qerapeu¢oi. 
382
 E. Ritterling, "Eine Amtsbezeichnung der Beneficiarii consularis im Museum zu Wiesbaden," Bonner 
Jahrbiicher 125 (1919) 9-37, esp. 25-26. 
383
 Ibid. 
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even going so far as to suggest that the swmatofu/lakej are legionary horsemen, since 
they are brigaded with the equites singulares.384  Bosworth has contested Ritterling’s 
suggestion and his view also contrasts that of Spiedel; however, his view is that logxofo/roi 
is a standard term for the beneficiarii and not the singulares.385  This assertion is based on one 
passage in Josephus, where the bodyguard of the commander on the march are armed with 
the logxh.386  Bosworth goes on to say that 
beneficiarii...were specially seconded to the legate and permanently attached to 
headquarters; there would seem no reason for Arrian to specify that they were 
drafted from the phalanx.387 
Speidel has also made note of this, stating that it is unlikely that administrative staff were 
used as specialized infantry (like a bodyguard).  However, he also interprets Arrian’s mention 
of the phalanx here to suggest that the bodyguard came from the ‘infantry legion but not the 
legionary infantry’, and are therefore legionary horsemen (as mentioned above).388  To me, 
the phrase ‘fa/laggoj [tw=n] pezw=n’ is not at all indicative of anything to do with 
horsemen, but rather the legionary infantry.  To explain Arrian’s reference to the phalanx, 
Bosworth suggests that his bodyguard was drafted from the legion, rather than from the 
auxilia, which as he points out, was a rare arrangement, but not unique.389  If this was actually 
the case, it would obviously mean that the logxofo/roi that are a part of the bodyguard were 
not drawn from the group of logxofo/roi recruited from Colchis and Rhizus (who were 
local natives and not legionaries, as noted above).  Yet, it would also suggest that some 
legionaries could have been equipped differently (i.e. as logxofo/roi).  Whether this was 
done ad hoc (e.g. for such instances as these where a commander recruited a bodyguard from 
the legionaries) or whether they were specialist legionaries (i.e. always equipped differently 
than other legionaries) is indeterminable.  
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Bosworth also suggests that the 200 swmatofu/lakej would have probably consisted of 
100 logxofo/roi and 100 kontofo/roi.390  This suggestion seems to be heavily reliant on a 
particular interpretation of the lacuna in the passage, at section 23: 
a¢rxai oi¥ tw¤n e¦pile¢ktwn. eãsrtwsan de£ a¦mf' au¦to£n *** aj e¥kato£n 
kou¢fwn logxofo¢rwn, w¥j pa¤san e¦pifoitw¤n th£n fa¢lagga oàpou ti 
e¦ndee£j katamanqa¢noi391  
Bosworth’s interpretation suggests that the a¦mf' au¦to£n is a reference to the position of the 
koufwn logxoforwn which appear after the lacuna (i.e. around the commander).  This is 
the exact phrasing used in 22 to describe the position of the swmatofu/lakej.  In this way, 
the kou¢fwn logxofo¢rwn are assumed to be part of the bodyguard mentioned just a few 
lines earlier.  However, the lacuna is of indeterminate length,392 and so Bosworth’s 
interpretation cannot be considered definite.  Nevertheless, the task with which the kou¢fwn 
logxofo¢rwn are assigned certainly fits their possible role as swmatofu/lakej.393  Also, 
we know that there were 100 of them; a figure of 100 would be unusual for a regular unit, and 
so it may be more likely that they represent a group assigned to protect a commander, rather 
than any other group such as as a regular combat unit, for example.  Further, Bosworth’s 
suggestion that there were possibly two types of infantry in the bodyguard can be supported 
by the fact that in Arrian’s line of battle legionaries are armed differently.  Furthermore, I 
would suggest the term kou/fwn here is of particular importance, because it highlights the 
specialized function of half of his bodyguard.  The adjective denotes that the logxofo/roi 
are agile or exceptionally mobile, and its use also suggests that these swmatofu/lakej are 
not just e¦pilektoi falaggwn, armed with the lo/gxh.  As distinctly mobile troops, they 
would be particularly capable of inspecting the battle-line with the commander, especially if 
he was mounted.  The other half of his bodyguard might be more static (i.e. not kou/fwn), 
and in this way the commander would have flexibility in his bodyguard: various troop types 
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which would be able to adapt to the actions he engages in.  To sum up, I think these 
logxofo/roi are particularly mobile swmatofu/lakej. 
In the role of commander’s bodyguard, Arrian’s logxofo/roi may be correlated to Josephus’ 
references to the same troops.  As mentioned above, Josephus presents troops that do not 
seem to be light infantry, and if we accept Bosworth’s argument, then Arrian’s logxofo/roi 
are legionaries (at least within the commander’s bodyguard).  Nevertheless, as noted above, 
the logxofo/roi acting as a bodyguard could potentially be quite mobile.  Those 
logxofo/roi on the wings of Arrian’s battle line (i.e. the local natives) are missile troops, 
although not necessarily yiloi\.  The conclusion must be then that during the Imperial 
period, logxofo/roi is the term applied to soldiers armed with the lo/gxh and that they do 
not necessarily have a completely light panoply, aside from the lo/gxh. 
Reasons for the less frequent use of this term in other sources may lie in the fact that it is 
more specific than other terms denoting light infantry: it specifically denotes troops armed 
with the lo/gxh.  Since logxofo/roi are thus not necessarily ‘light’, the term was probably 
seen as less applicable to general light infantry in Roman armies.  That our only relevant 
references come from Arrian and Josephus point to the possibility that for the period under 
assessment, the logxofo/roi may have been an eastern element of the Roman military. 
peltastai/ 
According to Diodorus Siculus, the Athenian general Iphicrates introduced small oval wicker 
shield to the Greek army and furnished former hoplites with them.  These troops were 
thenceforth known as ‘peltasts’ (peltastai\) after this light ‘pelta’ (pe/lthj) they carried 
(Diod. Sic. 15.44).  Whether this actually happened in this way has been debated by both Best 
and Trundle.394  Nevertheless, the point remains that peltastai\ appear in Greek sources 
and Greek armies well before the Roman period under review, and so, perhaps it is not 
surprising to find most of our sources’ references to this type of light infantry in Greek 
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armies, rather than in the Roman army.395  However, they do appear in Roman armies as allies 
several times through the mid and late-Republic.396   
Plutarch and Appian contribute a total of nine uses of this term (five and four respectively), 
out of a total of twelve relevant references in the sources.  Plutarch is the earliest author to 
use this term referring to the Roman army (Life of Sertorius 12).  It is not a very common 
term amongst other authors.  Like logxofo/ori, the reason that this term is used less 
frequently than others may lie in the fact that it is less general than other terms denoting light 
infantry, and so may have been seen as less applicable to general light infantry in Roman 
armies. 
In his description of various divisions or general parts of Greek and Roman armies (as part of 
his Teknh/ Taktika/), Arrian describes peltastai\ as follows: 
The peltast [part] happens to be lighter than the hoplite [part], though heavier than 
the lightly armed [part] (yiloi\).  The rimless shield is smaller and lighter than 
the [regular] shield and javelins [are] shorter than sarissas.397 
Aside from this, our sources only offer details regarding the equipment of peltastai/ in 
Greek armies that existed in earlier centuries, particularly in the 5
th
 and 4
th
 centuries.  Indeed, 
representations of the peltasth/j on Greek pottery provide us with the most details on their 
equipment.398  Yet, as Trundle has pointed out,  
Peltasts were not uniformly armed in the fifth and fourth centuries: some carried a 
thrusting spear, while others carried javelins.399  
Thus, it is very difficult to ascertain the relevance of such particulars to the peltastai/ 
fighting for Rome, and what differences in equipment (if any) existed.  Since our first 
reference to peltastai/ fighting for Rome occurs in 190 BC, Plutarch’s reference to them 
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on the Macedonian side at Pydna in 168 BC may provide a useful description of them.400  He 
states that 
...the Macedonians engaged man to man or in small detachments, they could only 
hack with their small daggers against the firm and long shields of the Romans, 
and oppose light wicker targets (peltari/oij) to their swords, which, such was 
their weight and momentum, penetrated through all their armour to their bodies.  
They therefore made a poor resistance and at last were routed.401 
This description presents a somewhat typical image of light infantry insofar as they are 
unable to stand up to heavy infantry, their armour (or lack thereof) simply being too light.  
Beyond this, none of our references to peltastai/ in the Roman army explicitly describe 
their equipment, and so we cannot come to any substantial conclusions. 
In any case, peltastai/ should be classified as light infantry.  Our sources’ references to 
them fighting for Rome support this.  Appian relates how Sextus Pompeius used 300 of them 
in a swift night ambush in 35 BC (App. BC 5.14).  He also uses the term e)pe/ltazon to refer 
to the light-armed troops on Caesar’s side at Pharsalus.402  Dio has Antony mention them 
beside archers, slingers, cavalry and mounted archers before Actium (Dio 50.16).  In 
Plutarch’s account of Actium, the crews of the naval ships engage pe/ltaij not only with 
spears and missiles, but also in hand-to-hand combat (Plut. Ant. 66).  While these men are not 
explicitly peltastai/, the reference emphasizes the fact that men armed in such a way were 
used in more fluid styles of combat (i.e. non-pitched-battle), which in turn was the type of 
combat light infantry most often engaged in. 
Plutarch implies that peltastai/ died ‘inglorious’ (a)kleh/j) deaths because of their 
combat style.  In describing the death of the Spartan general Lysander, he says he threw away 
(paranalw/saj) his life ingloriously, running like a peltasth/j (Lu/sandroj de\ 
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peltastou= kai\ prodro/mou di/khn a)klew=j paranalw/saj e(auto/n).403  What we 
should take from this passage is the skirmishing associated with peltastai/, further 
confirming their usual role as light infantry. 
Our sources do not tell us how peltastai/ may have been organized in the Roman army, 
aside from Appian’s implication that they were grouped into cohorts at Pharsalus (App. BC 
2.10).  Moreover, the size of the particular fighting force of peltastai/ in the Roman army 
at a given engagement would have probably influenced how they were organized.404 
Slingers 
liqobo/loi 
This term is a very rare one in our sources, particularly in reference to a type of infantry.  
More commonly, the term is used to refer to artillery such as catapults.  In fact, there are only 
two citations where this term refers to troops that might have been fighting on the Roman 
side.405  Furthermore, there is only one additional instance in the sources that refer to ‘stone-
throwers’ as infantry fighting in a battle involving Rome, though these liqobo/loi fight for 
Antiochus at Magnesia, and it is also found in Appian (App. Syr. 32).406   
In Josephus, we are told that Vespasian relied on Arabian archers and Syrian slingers and 
liqobo/loi (BJ 3.211), though we know nothing more about this group of soldiers.  Appian’s 
reference comes in his description of the Battle of Cannae, where he notes that  
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When the trumpets sounded the foot-soldiers raised a shout and first the archers, 
slingers (sfendonh/tai), and stone-throwers (liqobo/loi) ran forward at each 
other towards the middle of the battlefield and began the battle.407 
The curious aspect of this passage is that Appian indicates a notion of some difference 
between the sfendonh/tai and the liqobo/loi.408  There is no modern scholarly 
commentary on this passage, but a tentative suggestion may be that the Roman slingers 
somehow differed from the Carthaginian slingers,409 and so Appian attempts to highlight this 
with this varied terminology.  However, there is no way to confirm this speculation, and in 
the face of Appian’s semantic ambiguity, there is very little we can determine here.   
Appian’s reference to liqobo/loi on Antiochus’ side at the Battle of Magnesia includes 
additional references to other light-armed troops, including toxotw=n, a)kontistw=n and 
peltastw=n (App. Syr. 32).  Here liqobo/loi may be appropriately translated as slingers, 
since in this way they would complement the full range of missile-throwing infantry.  Yet, 
the fact that Appian does not use sfendonh/thj to describe these troops is somewhat 
perplexing, as it is that term seems to be his preferred word when referring to slingers.410  
Again, this could be because he is referring to a specific type of slingers (as suggested for 
Hann. 21), but this is impossible to determine.  
Thus, with these two citations in Appian being our only references to infantry liqobo/loi in 
Roman sources, it seems liqobo/loi was preferred as a term used to denote artillery.  I 
would suggest that this is because there was already a more specific and suitable term in 
Greek for ‘stone-throwing’ infantry (slingers); that is sfendonh/thj.  The latter term finds its 
root in the word sfendo/nh, or ‘sling’, and so having a term that denotes ‘those using the 
sfendo/nh’ is much less ambiguous than a word meaning ‘stone-throwers’; especially if the 
latter can denote artillery. 
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sfendonh/thj 
Sfendonh/thj appears 28 times amongst the relevant ancient authors, and its appearance is 
fairly regular over time, with the exception of Polybius, where it is not used in reference to 
Roman troops.411  Our evidence for sfendonh/thj is very much like the evidence for 
funditores, insofar as we have very few details about their organization and equipment, and 
we must mostly rely on archaeological evidence for this information.412  Furthermore, all of 
these details are prone to variation depending on where, when and for what sfendonh/thj 
were levied.   
It should also be noted that although the Balearic Isles were renowned in the ancient world 
for their slingers (see Strab. Geo 3.5.1, Polyb. 3.33), it should not be assumed that 
contingents of these troops mostly came from these islands.  Our sources also mention 
Armenia, Persia, Syria, Achaia, Thrace and Crete as places from which sfendonh/thj were 
levied.413  The earliest author to use sfendonh/thj is Dionysius of Halicarnassus at Roman 
Antiquites 5.68.   
Tactically, our sources commonly mention them being deployed alongside archers and other 
light infantry such as a)kontisth/j.414  Also, they are often explicitly said to be used in 
skirmishing roles, such as when Antony used them with a)kontisth/j to drive off Parthian 
cavalry (Plut. Ant. 41).  Other examples of sfendonh/thj being used in skirmishing action 
include references to Hellenistic armies at Polyb. 10.29, 30.  Although these troops are not 
fighting for Rome in these instances, it is probable that sfendonh/thj were used in similar 
tactics in both Greek and Roman armies.  Like references to funditores, our sources do not 
mention sfendonh/thj engaging in hand-to-hand combat.  This emphasizes their role as 
missile troops, who were probably not sufficiently armed for the melee.  Indeed, as 
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mentioned above, Appian refers to the sfendonh/thj from the Balearic Isles as Gumnh/sioi 
(Pun. 7.40), and Strabo called the islands ta\j Gumnhsi/aj (Geo 3.5.1).  In this way, the 
authors underline their lack of armament.  Furthermore, Onasander’s understanding of light 
armed troops (yiloi/) is that sfendonh/thj were soldiers who used missile weapons.415  He 
further states that ‘the sling is the most deadly weapon that is used by the light-armed troops 
(yiloi=j)’ (Onas. 19.3).  It is also important to take note of Onasander’s suggestion that light 
troops like the sfendonh/thj should be placed in front of the phalanx (along with 
a)kontisth/j as mentioned above) (Onas. 17.1).  On the other hand, our sources occasionally 
place them intermixed with the heavy infantry (e.g. App. Pun. 7.40; Dio 41.60), and generals 
might have these light troops sally through the line infantry (Plut. Ant. 41) to attack enemy 
heavy infantry (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.3; Dio 41.60) or cavalry (Plut. Ant. 41).  The picture 
we get from these references is a style of combat that must have been fairly fluid and low-
intensity for the sfendonh/thj.   
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4  A Comparison of Greek and Latin Vocabulary for Light Infantry  
As we have seen in the two previous chapters, there is little correlation between the Latin and 
Greek terminology for Roman light infantry.  The Greek terminology seems to be particularly 
imprecise.  This chapter intends to review the differences and similarities between Greek and 
Latin vocabulary for light infantry.  It will also bring together the discussion of the various 
terms from the previous chapters with a view to establish any similarities between definitions 
(within one language, as well as between both).  Also, it aims to examine the possible reasons 
for the ancient authors’ lack of technicality in their vocabulary.   
Historiography 
Many modern historians have shown some awareness of the imprecision of the ancient 
authors’ vocabulary, and the ostensible conflict in terminology.416  Others seemingly accept 
the variations of terminology without comment, although they are outnumbered by the 
former.  Some examples of modern scholars disregarding the contentious terminology include 
Kromayer and Veith’s statement that ferentarii were undoubtedly lightly armed, and 
Toynbee’s discussion of the supposed establishment of the velites in 211, mentioning the 
rorarii and accensi without any discussion of either term.417  Further, Walbank’s discussion of 
Polybius 11.22-23, where the ancient author uses several terms for what are probably the 
velites, makes no note of this, nor does he comment on the military terminology used in book 
6.21.418  Sumner discusses the etymology of the ‘heavy’ infantry units in the manipular 
legion, but only briefly mentions the velites using Polybius 6.19 as a reference, making no 
comment on the fact that Polybius uses the term grosfomaxoi (in 6.21), and does not 
include any etymological discussion of them.419  Gabba mentions velites and their 
establishment with no etymological discussion of possible previous terminology for them.420  
Connolly makes the claim that Livy’s description of the army with rorarii and accensi must 
                                                 
416
 E.g. Kromayer & Veith 1928, 268, 309; Sumner 1970, 69; Delbruck 1990, 278; Rawson 1991, 55-57; 
Goldsworthy 1996, 20; Oakley 1998, 470; Keppie 1998, 20; Gilliver 1999, 17-18, 19; Goldsworthy 2000, 48; 
Daly 2002, 73; Rawlings 2007, 56; Dobson 2008, 48; Sage 2008, 73, 88. 
417
 Kromayer & Veith 1928 279; Toynbee 1965, 517. 
418
 Walbank 1967, 299-301 and 647 respectively. 
419
 Sumner 1970, 68. 
420
 Gabba 1976, 5, 11, 21 n.7. 
112 
be correct and Forsythe discusses the Republican army without mentioning accensi or 
rorarii.421   
Despite all these concerns, scholarship has been fairly consistent over time in recognizing the 
difficulties with light infantry terminology.  We cannot determine the precise grounds for the 
variations in terminology and this is undoubtedly the reason why the question of varying 
terminology has not been directly addressed by scholars.  However, I also think it is 
important to be careful of dismissing our sources as careless or inaccurate when considering 
said variation.  Doing so discounts the possibility that our sources may not have been careless 
or inaccurate, but simply not specific enough to reconcile our lack of understanding.  This in 
turn, is due to the general deficiencies of the extant corpus of ancient sources.  However, I am 
wary of applying this hypothesis to Livy 8.8, where scholarship differs on the authenticity of 
Livy’s digression on the legion.422  Rather, I am inclined to interpret Livy’s description as a 
faulty description of the army, as discussed in the Latin vocabulary chapter above. 
Any specifics discussed in modern historiography on the vocabulary of light infantry have 
been included in the various discussions of the terms, below.  The contemporary stance of 
scholarship on defining light troops is discussed in the next chapter. 
This chapter will begin with tables indicating the frequency of usage of the terminology from 
the previous chapters.  Some general conclusions drawn from the tables will be followed by 
specific comparisons between Latin and Greek terms. 
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Frequency with which ancient authors use various Latin vocabulary referring to Roman light-armed troops 
Table 1 
 Caesar Frontinus Livy Sallust Tacitus Varro Vegetius Totals 
accensi  -  - 3  -  - 3 1 7 
antesignani 5 1 19  -  -  - 3 28 
auxilia 7  - 7  -  -  -  - 14 
expeditae 9 3 22 6 11  -  - 51 
ferentarii  -  -  - 1 1 1 6 9 
funditores 13 1 10 5 2  - 11 42 
iaculatores  - 6  -  -  -  - 3 9 
leves 12 7 30  - 8 2  - 59 
rorarii  -  - 2  -  - 1  - 3 
sagitarii 21 1 9 4 6  - 27 68 
velites  - 3 17 1  - 2 1 24 
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Frequency with which ancient authors use various Greek vocabulary referring to Roman light-armed troops 
Table 2 
 Appian Arrian Dio Dionysus423 Josephus Onasander Plutarch Polybius Totals 
a)kontisth/j 2 2  -  - 2 2 3 9 20 
a)krobo/loj424  -  -  -  -  -  - 2 1 3 
grosfoma/xoi  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 17 17 
gumnhj 10 2  -  -  -  - 2  - 14 
eu)/zwnoj 4  -  - 1  -  -  - 30 35 
kou=foi 6 1
425 1 2  -  - 3  - 13 
logxofo/roi  - 7  -  - 3  -  -  - 10 
peltastai/ 4 1 1 1  -  - 5  - 12 
sfendonh/thj 6  - 6 4 6 2 4  - 28 
yiloi\ 12 13 6 3 2 9 8 1 54 
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From the tables above, we can see that we do not have many examples for the various terms 
of light infantry.  Due to the scarce use of many of these terms in both Latin and Greek, it 
should be pointed out that these are probably not very diagnostic for Roman light infantry 
terminology.  Indeed, aside from the terms for slingers and archers, the highest numbers of 
references come from the generic terms for light infantry (e.g. expeditae, leves, eu)/zwnoj, 
yiloi\).  The frequency of these terms may rest in the fact that light infantry armament varied 
and that authors were not interested in these specific variations.  Polybius, for example, who 
claims to be the most accurate of all authors (29.12) uses a variety of terms to refer to the 
velites.  His reasons for doing so may be simply because he is ‘deliberately resolved to 
confine [himself] to chronicling actions’, as he puts it (9.1), rather than focusing on the 
technicalities of vocabulary.  Alternatively, the possibility exists that the frequent usage of 
particular terms is simply due to the literary preferences of the author.  So for example, 
perhaps Polybius uses eu)/zwnoj 30 times because it is his preferred term to use when 
referring to light infantry.  There is a further possibility that authors favour particular terms 
because of the contemporary understanding or usage of the term.  Thus, Livy may use 
expeditae and leves more frequently than velites simply because the velites had not existed as 
light infantry for several generations before his time of writing.  As such, there was no first-
hand understanding or experience of the velites in his period.  Consequently, both Livy and 
his readers may have found terms like expediate and leves easier to grasp; old words like 
velites may have seemed archaic to Livy’s contemporaries.  Perhaps one of the most 
important points to make however, regarding the varied vocabulary for light infantry, is that 
authors may have chosen to describe these troops in different ways simply to avoid sounding 
repetitive.  That is, the variety of light infantry vocabulary is indicative of the simple fact that 
there was a wide range of terms to choose from when describing these troops, and so the 
authors used different terms just because they could.426  Indeed the same variety of vocabulary 
is used in other military contexts as well, as Koon’s recent study on Livy’s battle narratives 
indicates.427 
It is interesting to note the differences between the use of generic terminology in the Greek 
and Latin references to light infantry.  While expeditae and leves were often used 
adjectivally, eu)/zwnoj and yiloi, as well as gumnh/j are simply generic nouns.  The Latin 
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 Koon 2010, 45 et passim. 
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terms could be used like nouns as substantive adjectives, but the same does not apply for the 
Greek terms.  Indeed, as was indicated in Chapter 3, there certainly seems to be a greater 
generic usage of terminology in the Greek vocabulary.  One of the reasons for this may well 
have been that the Roman army was administered and organized in Latin, and as such, 
specific terminology was created in that language for that specific purpose.428  When Greek 
writers wrote about specific Roman military entities (such as troop types or weapons), they 
usually used terminology that already existed, rather than (as is probable with the Latin) 
terminology that was created with each Roman military entity, whether it be troop type or 
weapon type.429  The result is the unspecific Greek terminology for Roman light infantry that 
we have observed in this chapter.  Furthermore, given that Latin authors can also be 
unspecific in their use of technical vocabulary, we are faced with the added problem of Greek 
authors probably being equally unspecific, as well as not having the specific translations from 
the Latin.   
As noted in Chapter 1, light infantry was often been seen by ancient authors as less important 
than the heavy infantry.  This lack of interest seems to come through most clearly in the 
generic terminology associated with them.  For example, yiloi\ is the most popular term 
used by ancient Greek military writers to describe Roman light infantry, and this favoured 
usage is prevalent throughout the period under assessment.  Because it is a fairly general term 
describing troops armed with missiles (and possibly other weapons as well), perhaps its 
frequency rests in the fact that missiles were the single most consistent factor in various 
forms of light infantry over the entire period under assessment, and so the term could be used 
to describe the widest variety of troops.  For technically uninterested authors, such terms 
would have probably been seen as quite adequate.  The frequency of yiloi\ also indicates 
that vocabulary usage changed little from the Late Republic, since it is the dominate term 
from Dionysius onwards.  Our earliest source, Polybius, has eu)/zwnoj as his most frequent 
term, but because he is our only source from the 2
nd
 century BC, it is difficult to judge 
whether eu)/zwnoj was generally a more common term for military historians in that period.  
Yet, regardless of which term was most popular with a specific author, the tendency to use 
generic terms to refer to light infantry is a trend that did not change much over time.   
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429
 Exceptions to this include instances where Greek authors transliterate the Latin term, as Polybius does for 
example with cohort (koo/rtij) at 11.23. 
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Another possible reason for the lack of technicality may simply have been a lack of 
familiarity with the troops functioning as light infantry in the Roman army.  We know from 
the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 that light infantry contingents could often be foreign 
recruits in the Roman army, and so ancient authors may not have been familiar with the 
technical details of their organization and equipment.  Likewise, there may have been no 
Latin vocabulary for such technicalities.  As a result, they may have preferred to rely on 
generic terms to describe these troops. 
Similar Units 
In this section, I will discuss similarities between units despite varying terms being applied to 
them in our sources.  The aim will be to determine level the technical precision with which 
our sources use ancient military terminology.  This will be achieved by analysing correlations 
between units with varying terms.  
Antesignani & pro/maxoi 
There is a significant correlation between these two terms in our sources, and although 
pro/maxoi do not function in any sort of ‘light-armed’ capacity, the similarity between these 
groups should be emphasized. 
Liddell and Scott define pro/maxoj as a ‘champion’, ‘foremost fighter’ or ‘fighting in front’.  
We can immediately draw a clear parallel to the antesignani based on this definition alone: 
these are the men who are the foremost fighters, and as discussed in the section on the 
antesignani, they may have been some of the best soldiers, making ‘champion’ an 
appropriate description.  This idea that they were some of the best soldiers who fought in the 
front ranks is most evident with the Caesarian definition of antesignani, but it is less evident 
in other periods.  However, ‘fighting in front’ also applies to the Livian definition of 
antesignani established above, i.e. anyone who happens to be fighting in the front lines.  
Accordingly, we should evaluate our sources’ use of pro/maxoi to determine whether there 
is a practical parallel in addition to the corresponding definitions. 
Some of our earliest data regarding pro/maxoi as Roman troops comes from Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus.  Although Dionysius is writing about an earlier period than the one under 
review, he is writing during the late Republic, and so his understanding of this term may have 
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been a contemporary one.  Indeed, this is suggested in his description of them in a battle 
against the Volsci, where like Caesar’s antesignani, they seem to be the best soldiers, 
stationed in the front ranks.  He states that  
...when they were to engage the army of the Volsci and their commanders had 
drawn them up in order of battle, they refused to come to grips with the enemy, 
but both the centurions and the pro/maxoi, some throwing away their standards 
and others quitting their posts, fled to the camp.430 
As was the norm throughout later Roman military history, centurions are found at the front of 
the battle line, and it is perhaps natural to term those fighting alongside them pro/maxoi.  
What is particularly interesting about this quotation is that the standards are seemingly being 
carried by the pro/maxoi.  Indeed, in the very same chapter, Dionysius describes how the 
pro/maxoi were later punished for abandoning the standards (Ant. Rom. 9.50.7).  Thus, I 
think it is very probable that, as standard-bearers, the pro/maxoi were experienced troops.  
As such, they may have also been some of the best fighters, especially given the significance 
of their military role.  That this reflects the definition for Caesar’s antesignani could be a 
result of the fact that Dionysius was a contemporary of Caesar, and was writing under 
Augustus.  Now it remains to be evaluated whether this was the case in the time period under 
assessment. 
Plutarch uses pro/maxoi to refer to Roman troops twice, although both instances simply 
describe the front ranks of the battle-line.  The first instance occurs in his description of the 
battle of Pydna (Plut. Aem. 20.5).  Here, the front-line fighters are cut to pieces and the 
soldiers behind them are driven back.  The fact that they are in the front line of the manipular 
legion makes them antesignani according to both the Livian and Caesarian definitions 
discussed above.431  We can further make a tentative correlation to the self-selecting 
exceptional fighters examined above based on the actions of the soldiers.  They stand their 
ground, and are eventually cut down, but they do not fall back in fear.  Rather, it is the lines 
behind them that fall back after the first line fell.  This suggests to me that these pro/maxoi 
exemplified the courage required of a self-selecting elite soldier, and can therefore be 
considered antesignani as per the definition reached above. 
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who choose to be in the front ranks. 
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The second reference to pro/maxoi in Plutarch comes in his Life of Otho (Otho 12.4).  Here 
the pro/maxoi are the front line of Vitellian troops who are beaten back by Othonian forces.  
Although as front line troops these soldiers fit the aforementioned definitions of antesignani, 
we have no literary evidence for antesignani from the early Principate.432  As such, we should 
be cautious when labelling these pro/maxoi as antesignani.  However, there is no doubt that 
these were the front line of men.433 
While there is very little direct evidence for Roman pro/maxoi, there can be little doubt that 
these were front line fighters.  As such, we might correlate them to antesignani, although 
doing so for the imperial period without corresponding literary evidence should be considered 
tentative.  Nevertheless, Plutarch’s other uses of the term may strengthen the association.  
When not referring to Roman troops, the ancient author also uses pro/maxoi to refer to an 
athletic champion (Flam. 10.8), and an officer in Alexander’s army named Promachus who 
wins a drinking contest (Alex. 70.2).  Both of these examples suggest that the etymology of 
the term designates individuals who are the best at something.  Indeed, even if Promachus 
had not won the drinking contest, his name and high rank indicate that he was probably a 
good fighter. 
One final reference that may be of use to the current assessment is an instance in Polybius 
where he uses the term to refer to an ‘advance guard’ of Achean cavalry and light-armed 
troops (Polyb 4.12).  While these are not Roman troops, it is interesting to note the tactical 
function which is assigned to the pro/maxoi.  The combined cavalry-infantry tactic has also 
been assigned to the antesignani in Caesar.434  So, while we can only draw a tentative parallel, 
it is probably one worth noting. 
Thus, our evidence regarding the correlation between these two terms is limited, yet I would 
argue that it may be said that for the Roman army, it is probable that antesignani may be 
referred to as pro/maxoi, and vice versa.  This is especially true for the Republic where we 
have good corresponding literary evidence.   
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Antesignani, Delecti, Expedites, Extraordinarii and e)pi/lektoi 
The correlation between these troop types is not particularly forthcoming in our sources, nor 
is it similar to the other parallels listed here insofar as these units are not necessarily the same 
or similar types of troops.
435
  Rather, their similarity lies in their function.  As the etymology 
of the antesignani, expedites, and extraordinarii suggests, they are probably all troops that 
come out of the standard infantry formation: the antesignani are before (ante) the standards 
(signa) that mark the unit’s position in battle; the expedites are out (ex) of the infantry 
(pedites); and the extraordinarii are outside (extra) of the regular troops (ordinarii).  
Similarly, as we have seen above, this is often the tactical situation that troops who are 
labelled delecti and e)pi/lektoi find themselves in.  I will emphasize this connection in what 
follows. 
Some examples highlighting the deployment of expedites separate from the main body 
include skirmishing, quickly occupying high ground, or reconnaissance.436  The tactics in 
which light-armed legionaries (i.e. expedites cohortes, expeditus legio) are mentioned include 
attacking enemies conducting a siege (Livy 24.41), an ambush (Livy 27.40), and a joint siege 
operation with the navy against Gades (Livy 28.23).  In these tactics, the troops operated in 
smaller numbers away from the rest of the army; this is especially important for the current 
argument. 
In Sallust, we find expedites cohortes engaging in tactical manoeuvres away from the rest of 
the army, such as advancing ahead of the marching column (Iug. 46; 100), securing high 
ground (Iug. 50), and rushing ahead of the army to garrison a town with their provisions (Iug. 
90).  It is interesting to note two more cases where Sallust uses expeditus, to describe pedites 
mingling with cavalry (Iug. 59) and to describe soldiers in the front line at the battle of 
Pistoria (Cat. 60).  McGushin suggests that Sallust’s use of expediti at the battle of Pistoria 
was probably in reference to ‘those who ad pugnandum alacres videbantur’.  If this is true, 
we can correlate them to the antesignani, since as discussed earlier, Caesar’s antesignani are 
also ‘seen to engage in battle eagerly’.437  Furthermore, Caesar uses expeditus to describe his 
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antesignani in two out of his five uses of the term (BC 3.75, 3.84).  Thus, there seems to be a 
significant correlation between the terms. 
As noted in Chapter 2, Frontinus notes one instance of expediti being used for an ambush on 
an enemy camp under Fulvius at Strat. 2.5.8.  We should note the possible correlation to the 
antesignani here, insofar as they were a group used for a special task: a recurring theme for 
the groups under discussion here.  
There are three instances in Tacitus where expediti may be correlated with Caesar’s 
antesignani.  These instances refer to expediti being used with or against cavalry.438  Caesar’s 
antesignani also engage in this tactic at BC 3.75 and 3.84.  Furthermore, as already 
mentioned above, the antesignani are also described as expediti in these instances.  Thus, our 
sources from the Republican and Imperial periods are consistent in their usage of expedites 
insofar as the term is often used to describe a group of soldiers separate from the main body 
of troops. 
Regarding the extraordinarii, I have already pointed out the very tentative link to 
antesignani, but their fighting in the front line (mentioned in Livy at 35.5), should still be 
noted.  Also, as mentioned above, the etymology of their title is particularly important in the 
present analysis.  Since Polybius directly correlates them to e)pi/lektoi we should also note 
his mention of their duty to cover the rear of the marching column in the event of an expected 
attack (6.40).  Not only is this a case of functioning outside of the regular infantry formation, 
but it is also similar to the tactic executed by Caesar’s antesignani at Caes. BC 3.75.   
Throughout Roman history, there is a tactical tradition of using ‘picked men’ for specialized 
tasks: a tradition commonly assigned to antesignani during Caesar’s day.  One of the 
standard ways of referring to these men in Latin is to use the term delecti.  In Greek authors 
writing about the Roman army, the term is e)pi/lektoi.   
Delecti is never paired antesignani, extraordinarii or auxilia, or the like.439  Nevertheless, like 
these other troops types it seems that delecti were deployed separately from the main body of 
troops.  Examples include Gnaeus Scipio’s deployment of his ‘delecto milite’ on ships to face 
Hasdrubal in a naval engagement off the coast of Spain; Antony did the same at 
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Brundusium.440  Also, Metellus had ‘delecta manu’ march with the van in his column in 
Numidia.441   
For some authors there is a specific role consistently given to e)pi/lektoi.  Polybius is the 
only historian to equate the e)pi/lektoi to extraordinarii directly, and he almost always uses 
it to refer to these men.442  He occasionally uses the term to refer to a special group, such as 
the legionaries sent to fight alongside velites.443  Appian similarly tells of the e)pi/lektoi 
being deployed to reinforce Scipio’s left wing at Zama (Pun. 744).  Josephus’ uses of the 
term most often refer to the bodyguard of a commander, especially under Titus.444  Some of 
his uses of the term refer to specially selected groups of men who are assigned special duties.  
For example, he mentions a group of e)pi/lektoi led by Cestius who attempt to break into the 
temple whilst attacking Jerusalem (BJ 2.535), or select soldiers from Alexandria chosen to 
protect the artillery during Titus’ siege of the city (BJ 5.287).445  Plutarch also associates the 
term with a commander’s bodyguard, as does Appian.446  It should be noted that Appian’s 
e)pi/lektoi are sometimes much larger than the other groups of e)pi/lektoi mentioned by 
him and other authors.  At Mith. 11.76 these soldiers constitute a 10,000-man garrison under 
Varius at Lampsacus.  Similarly, at Mith. 12.84 Lucullus marches against Tigranes with two 
te/lesin e)pile/ktoij.  Appian is the only author to suggest such large numbers of 
e)pi/lektoi; as we have seen, many of these groups are a single commander’s bodyguard, 
which is normally made up of several hundred men.
447
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As has been shown, the various assignments given to delecti and e)pi/lektoi include several 
references to tactics beyond the main body of infantry, thus making these troops comparable 
to the others discussed in this section, above. 
Thus, soldiers classified as antesignani, delecti, expedites, or extraordinarii share a common 
function.  All of them engage in tactics separate from the rest of the army; as their names 
suggests, they come out of the standard infantry formations.   
Rorarii & Velites 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the rorarii seemingly have several things in common with the 
velites.  These include their use of javelins, and skirmishing (especially before the battle).  
We should also note the possibly that they may have existed at the same time.  Because of 
this, I suggested in Chapter 2 that the velites replaced the rorarii, or that the former term 
replaced the latter since they seem to have been the same type of troop.448 
Unfortunately, our evidence for rorarii is extremely fragmentary, and so there is little 
discussion to be had on determining the exact link between these two units.  Nevertheless, 
both Goldsworthy and Daly have proposed that the two terms are synonymous.449  I would 
agree that the fragmentary evidence points to in this direction.  This is because the etymology 
of rorarii suggests that they were younger, more inexperienced soldiers who were given the 
task of skirmishing before a pitched battle began.450  This is precisely the same role assigned 
to velites.  Furthermore, it is also probable that Livy’s placement of the rorarii at the back of 
the legion is an attempt to create a false parallel with the five Servian classes.  Livy’s use of 
the term seems to be imprecise.  This, in turn, leaves Goldsworthy inclined to believe that the 
term rorarii was somehow related to velites.451  Walbank has suggested that the earlier light-
armed troops were called rorarii and that the name persisted until the end of the second 
century.  He further notes that the name probably changed to velites in 211, basing this 
suggestion on Livy 26.4 (which claims that the velites were established in that year – see 
velites in Chapter 2).452  Daly has a very similar argument.  He notes that Livy’s suggestion 
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that the velites were founded in 211 may have actually been a result of re-equipping the 
various lightly armed forces in the legion.  He says the reform of 211 may have actually been 
an upgrading of the leves (mentioned in Livy 8.8 along with rorarii) to the same standards as 
the rorarii.  The result would have been the standardization of the force of light troops in the 
legion, resulting in the newly labelled velites.  He goes on to point out that this new force was 
thus simply an enlarged force of rorarii.453  Though his specific suggestions are based on 
conjecture, they point to the probable reality that all Roman light infantry, even if not 
homogenously equipped, still probably fulfilled the same function.  This points to a 
correlation which may have blurred the etymological lines for Livy.  Indeed, there is a 
tactical and etymological synonymy between rorarii and velites which Livy was clearly 
unable to clarify.  To be sure, because our evidence is fragmentary, we are likewise unable to 
ascertain the exact relationship between the two units.  Nevertheless, some similarity is quite 
evident. 
Koufoi/ & Yiloi\ 
Both of these terms are used by the ancient sources to describe any kind of missile troops.  As 
such, javelineers, bowmen and slingers fall under the definitions for both of these terms.  
Again, this is another example of the variety of vocabulary available to ancient writers on 
military matters.  The major difference between the two terms is that koufoi is often used as 
an adjective, while yiloi\ is used exclusively as a noun describing the light infantry.  This 
difference might be due to the ancient authors’ personal preference based on the particular 
context in which the term was being used, despite the fact that they generally refer to the 
same thing. 
A)kontisth/j, A)krobo/loj, Grosfoma/xoi, Eu)zw/noi Iaculatores & Velites 
We have very little information on the iaculatores, but as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
possibility exists that the term is simply another way of describing velites.454  Both of these 
types of troops are seen to engage in the same tactics, and they are similarly equipped (i.e. 
with javelins).   
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A)kontisth/j also seems to be simply another synonym for the light infantry of the Roman 
Republican army.  As in noted in the section above, they are not only armed in the same way 
and perform the same function as the velites, but Polybius also uses this term interchangeably 
with the term most commonly translated as velites: grosfoma/xoi.  I have already noted our 
ability to equate this term with velites, and as such, it should also be seen as an equivalent to 
a)kontisth/j.  Because the word a)kontisth/j also emphasizes the javelin as the main 
weapon of these troops, I would suggest that iaculatores can be associated with them as well, 
since the latter are known as primarily javelin-throwers.  Furthermore, as pointed out in 
Chapter 3, in the section on a)krobo/loj (p. 93), this term can also be used to describe the 
velites, and so must be added to the present list.   
Finally, eu)zw/noi are also occasionally used to describe troops that can be equated to the 
velites, especially in Polybius.  However, this term is also used to describe armies in light-
marching order, or soldiers who are either well-equipped or lightly armed, or both.  So, 
unlike the other terms listed here, it is not one that we can consider synonymous with velites 
in every instance of its usage, but it can nevertheless function as such.455 
Other light infantry 
There are other groups of light infantry mentioned in the chapters on vocabulary that can be 
loosely correlated with one another.  These include the ferentarii and their resemblance to 
both velites and accensi; the tentative link between leves armaturae/cohortes and the auxilia 
in Tacitus; and the similar generality of both ferentarii and gumnh/j.  Yet, drawing parallels 
between these groups is generally quite speculative, and is not necessarily worth making 
significant note of, especially due to our lack of evidence for such assertions. 
Conclusions 
Thus, it would seem our sources are imprecise in their usage of military terminology when 
referring to the light-armed troops of the Roman Republic.  However, we should also 
consider whether we as historians have generally been too restrictive with our notions of how 
military terminology should be used.  Perhaps we are too eager to label groups of soldiers 
with specific terms, while our ancient counterparts saw no such need.  On the other hand, this 
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modern tendency might be a result of the ancient labelling and tri-partite division of the 
legion: we have specific definitions for the hastati, principes and triarii, and so historians’ 
labelling of the light-armed troops with one term suits this tradition.  It may have also been 
that the authors’ audiences would have understood the different uses of terminology, having 
knowledge that we presently lack.  For example, rorarii seem to be equivalent to the velites, 
and it is possible that they were an earlier form of these troops; it is only the disparity of our 
sources that prevent us from knowing this for certain, but perhaps our authors’ audiences 
were aware of the reasons for this change in terminology.456  Alternatively, Livy’s use of 
cohors when describing the manipular legion may not have been as inaccurate as the 
expression may seem at first, since it is possible that the cohort formation existed for the 
majority of the maniple organization’s existence.457  Also, as discussed above, the variations 
in terminology may well have been intentional, and could have offered some inherent 
rhetorical sense that we cannot grasp.  The use of velites versus iaculatores (examined in 
Chapter 2 under iaculatores) provides a good example of this.  They are probably the same 
type of light infantry, only the former emphasizes their headgear while the latter term 
emphasizes their main function; thus, the possibility exists that the difference between terms 
here was purely rhetorical.  It should also be pointed out that several terms exist for heavy 
infantry, such as pedites, milites, cohortes, pezoi/ and o(pli/thj.  Therefore, as I suggested at 
the beginning of this chapter (p.115), I would argue that using varying vocabulary for 
particular troops was normal, and a result of the simple rhetorical and philological value of a 
wider vocabulary. 
Furthermore, as has been suggested, most light infantrymen were probably all similarly 
armed and in addition, were probably tactically deployed in a similar way from the beginning 
of their existence.  This seems to have remained consistent until the disappearance of their 
formal division, i.e. the velites.  Thus, it might be suggested that the ancient authors may not 
have found the need to clarify the specific differences between all of the various terminology 
they had available for light infantry, especially if they perceived light infantry to be generally 
all the same.  Indeed, as we have seen, this perception is not without merit as many of these 
terms do seem to apply to the same troops.  This is also why I have suggested that the 
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variations in terminology may have simply been rhetorical or philological, rather than 
technical.   
I hope to have shown in my etymological assessment of the Latin and Greek in the previous 
chapters, that the technical differences between many terms are indiscernible, and so I further 
suggest that this in itself is indicative of a correspondence in equipment and roles between 
these apparently different categories of light infantry. 
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5  Defining Light Infantry 
This chapter aims to draw conclusions from the previous chapters on the vocabulary of light 
infantry.  It seeks to define light infantry based on the findings of these chapters.  It will also 
review the developments and customs in the Roman military that have an effect on this 
definition.  This includes the tactical flexibility between light and heavy infantry as well as 
the loss of the velites and the emergence of the cohort. 
Defining Light Infantry : understanding ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ infantry  
As seen in the previous chapter, our sources favour the use of generic light infantry 
terminology over the use of technical terminology.  Thus, we cannot apply a technical 
definition to light infantry.  Instead, I would suggest that it may have been the task and 
immediate tactical role of any given group of infantry, which could have provided the 
reference for their classification in the ancient sources.  With this in mind, I would go even 
further and suggest that tactical mobility could have possibly been a key reason for labelling 
units as ‘light.’  For instance, units engaged in static fighting, or infantry that was relatively 
immobile in their function, e.g. infantry fighting in a battle-line during pitched-battle, are 
often referred to as infantry, and thus by metonymy ‘heavy’ infantry .  In contrast, infantry 
that has a much more mobile function, e.g. any operation outside of static fighting, are often 
labelled ‘light’.  This is true even if they are equipped in exactly the same way as the 
aforementioned ‘heavy’ infantry.  Indeed, they may even function in both roles without any 
evident change in equipment, such as the Caesarian antesignani.  Thus, a highly mobile 
function or tactical deployment (such as skirmishing for example) is often accompanied by 
light infantry terminology.  In this way, the given task has much more to do with the sources’ 
uses of light infantry terminology than the specific equipment of the groups labelled as such.  
Part of the reason for this is that soldiers equipped in various ways engaged in light infantry 
tactics, especially after the disappearance of the velites.458  So, our understanding of ‘heavy’ 
versus ‘light’ infantry in the Roman army could be one that is not defined by their equipment, 
nor indeed their belonging to a specific unit – but rather the way they were employed at a 
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given time.  Unit designation as light or not is thus dependent on the context in which they 
are used – it is defined by task and immediate tactical role, and moreover, by the mobility of 
that task, rather than a predetermined and permanent role. 
It has not been common for scholars to recognize this trend, although recently this has begun 
to change.  Rawlings has noted that hoplites were able to participate in various types of 
combat outside of the phalanx, ‘many of which were individualistic, endemic and low-
intensity.’459  Modern historiography does not often discuss present-day comparative 
examples for ancient armies, but it so happens that with light infantry, modern armies provide 
corresponding paradigms.460  The British Army for instance, describes their light infantry as  
battalions [that] operate with minimal transport and sometimes almost entirely on 
foot. They are equipped with the full range of small arms, mortars, anti tank 
weaponry and surveillance equipment. The Light Role Infantry battalion is a 
versatile organisation that can work in support of Armoured and Mechanised 
manoeuvre brigades to dominate urban areas or control mountainous terrain and 
forests/jungle. They are employed in all major UK operations.461 
Thus, just like many groups of ‘light’ infantry discussed above, their tactical roles determine 
their classification, rather than the amount of equipment that they carry.  Indeed, as described 
in the quotation, modern British light infantry seem to be quite heavily equipped.  
Alternatively, their role as support for the heavy infantry may be equated to the traditional 
role of socii, auxilia and velites in the Roman army who supported the heavy infantry in 
pitched battle.  In this way as well, their role which contrasts that of the heavy infantry, 
determines their classification. 
It is interesting to note that light infantry in modern armies simply refers to men assigned to 
fight on foot, whereas heavy infantry is equivalent to mechanized infantry units, i.e. soldiers 
in tanks or armoured vehicles.  Naturally, in the Roman army, heavy infantry fought on foot, 
yet the same is often true for modern armies: infantry, no matter how they are classified, 
usually end up being re-assigned to light-infantry duty at one point or another, depending on 
the circumstances.  For example, tanks (so-called ‘Infantry Fighting Vechicles’) cannot be 
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sent into the mountains, but the men operating them can.462  This may be loosely compared to 
the Roman army: ‘heavy’ infantry after the disappearance of the velites are also seen to 
operate in a ‘light’ capacity; their assigned tasks are not invariable, but tactically flexible. 
So, it could be argued that the classification of a group of soldiers as light often had nothing 
to do with their panoply.  Exceptions to this might include units that have a specific name 
rather than just an adjective describing them as light (e.g. the velites or grosfoma/xoi).   
Thus, generally, as with so called ‘light infantry’ of later periods, the term more adequately 
describes the more immediate tactical use of such infantry rather than the actual weight of 
their equipment.463  As a result, I would endorse Quesada Sanz’s suggested usage of 
terminology for infantry: so-called ‘heavy’ infantry should perhaps more correctly be termed 
‘line infantry’.  We can probably retain the term ‘light infantry’ for any infantry engaged in 
that role, since as noted above, this technical understanding of the name seems to have been 
apparent for our ancient military sources and has likewise persisted through to modern 
armies; it must simply be kept in mind that this term does not necessarily describe their 
equipment. 
Tactical Flexibility between Line Infantry and Light infantry  
One of the Roman military customs that allows for the suggestion that the given task dictated 
the classification of troops is the tactical flexibility of both line infantry and light infantry.  
This section discusses instances of soldiers carrying out tasks (i.e. tactics) that would not 
necessarily be assigned to them based on traditional classifications derived from their 
equipment.  As a result, these soldiers can be classified as both light and heavy infantry, 
depending on their function.  In order to understand tactical flexibility and various tactical 
roles of light-armed troops in our sources, it is necessary to assess how they may have been 
equipped, and so this will also be dealt with briefly throughout the chapter. 
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Line Infantry in Light Roles 
Antesignani 
This assessment of antesignani will consider their role and appearance in the cohortal legion, 
since it is here (under Caesar specifically) that they are referred to as expediti, or light-armed 
troops.   
As discussed on pages 21-27 above, the antesignani have been shown to be regularly enlisted 
legionaries under Caesar, rather than a distinctive unit.  Aside from the gladius and some 
form of helmet, archaeological evidence suggests that the typical armament for a Caesarian 
legionary included ring mail (commonly known as ‘chain’ mail) and a large scutum.464  
Although Caesar’s legionaries carried more equipment than this (e.g. pila, a dagger), their 
mail and shield is arguably what traditionally classifies them as line infantry, insofar as these 
pieces of equipment were typically carried by troops who functioned as line infantry in 
pitched-battle.  Also, these pieces of equipment were not carried by troops deemed to be 
solely ‘light’ by our sources (e.g. the velites).   
There are four instances where antesignani engage in tactics that are typically given to light 
infantry.465  They are as follows: quickly occupying high ground (BC 1.43), engaging in non-
pitched-battle combat (BC 1.57), and fighting in concert with cavalry (BC 3.75, 3.84).  The 
latter instances use the term expediti to describe the antesignani in these cases, but as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (p. 21-27, above), this should not be translated as ‘lightly armed’.  
When the antesignani were not engaging in such tactics, they would have functioned as line 
infantry in pitched battle.  Thus, the functions of Caesarean antesignani make them 
classifiable as both light and line infantry, depending on their given task. 
Auxilia 
This section will focus on the permanent auxilia of the Roman army in the imperial period, 
which often function in typically ‘light’ roles.  These roles include guarding the marching 
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column, reconnaissance, deployment in swift operations and deployment in difficult terrain.466  
It is interesting to note however, that they were duly effective in pitched battle.467 
Despite their usage in ‘light’ tactics, they do not seem to have been equipped as lightly as 
some of the other types of infantry associated with these roles, such as velites.468  Part of the 
reason for this may have been their regular use as flanking units on the battle-line.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2 under auxilia (p. 32), the armour of the auxilia probably consisted of a 
heavy mail cuirass (probably not segmented armour but either scale or ring mail), a large oval 
shield and a heavy thrusting spear.469  This equipment may be considered as typically ‘heavy’.  
Thus, terms that are used in our sources to designate the professional imperial auxilia as 
‘light’, seem to be a classification of their function, rather than their equipment.470 
Light Infantry in Heavy Roles 
Velites/grosfoma/xoi 
It has been established that these troops were outfitted more lightly than their legionary 
counterparts, and often engaged in ‘light’ tactics.471  Thus, the following discussion will 
evaluate their involvement in typically ‘heavy’ tactics. 
The use of missile weapons should not be discounted as a tactic reserved for light-infantry 
engaged in skirmishing.  Instead, as discussed above and in Chapter 6, recurrent missile 
combat seems to have been a regular and vital feature of the heavy infantry clash during 
pitched battles.472  Although speculative, since we know that the velites or grosfoma/xoi 
retired into the heavy infantry ranks during pitched battle, it is plausible that they may have 
been involved in returning any usable missiles.  Furthermore, given that a javelin is best 
thrown with a short run-up to the release, perhaps the withdrawn light infantry of the 
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manipular legion would have been best suited to return such missiles during pitched battle, 
since the heavy infantry would need to keep their ranks.473  From there they would have to 
throw over the heads of the line infantry.  If we assume that the manipular legion deployed 
with maniple-wide gaps between each maniple (in order to form the quincunx), the velites 
might fill these gaps upon retiring from the initial skirmishing.  In this way, they could keep 
the enemy from outflanking the individual maniples of legionaries with missile fire, and with 
their mere presence.  If velites simply retreated to the rear of the legions (i.e. behind the 
triarii), it must be remembered that if this were indeed the case, then they would be engaged 
in combat alongside legionaries should envelopment occur, as it did at Cannae for example.  
Unfortunately, our sources do not mention this kind of combat for the velites. 
According to Livy, the velites were very capable of hand-to-hand combat as well.474  This is 
most evident at the battles of Mount Olympus and Ancyra in 189 BC, where the light infantry 
destroyed the army of Galatian Gauls.  It should be noted however, that this occurred after the 
latter had panicked due to their inability to cope with the missile attack of the velites.  Indeed, 
we might presume that the velites would not have been able to withstand a line-infantry clash 
for extended periods, if only because of their lack of heavy equipment.  This does not mean, 
however, that velites were necessarily inferior in skill during hand-to-hand combat.  Rather, 
they were simply equipped for a different primary function (i.e. weakening the enemy with 
missiles).475  Indeed, they would not have been equipped with a gladius and a parma if they 
never engaged in hand-to-hand combat; occurrences of this could possibly have transpired in 
pitched-battle.476  There is no evidence supporting the idea that this happened regularly, so 
what we should take from these references is that the light-infantry were capable of fighting 
in hand-to-hand combat, although they would probably not be able to withstand an onslaught 
of ordered and disciplined line infantry on their own. 
So while our evidence suggests it was much rarer to find designated light-infantry engaging 
in typically ‘heavy’ tactics such as hand-to-hand combat during pitched battle, we cannot say 
that this never happened. 
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The Loss of the Velites 
A key development that allows for the suggestion that function and mobility defines light 
infantry was the disappearance of the velites, and so this change will be evaluated here.  This 
section aims  to determine how significant the loss of the velites was, and what the 
ramifications of their disappearance were.  As Bell has indicated, the velites had wholly 
disappeared by Caesar’s time.  There are a number of possible reasons for this which Bell 
summarizes: 
...the changed conditions of warfare, the greater availability of foreign auxiliaries 
and the destruction of the economic base for military class distinction.  Above all 
perhaps, the long service and professionalism of the first century army made the 
ordinary heavy infantryman better able to fill the role of velites as well as their 
own.477 
Thus, as Bell has demonstrated, the loss of the velites seems to have been tactically 
insignificant; the line infantry were capable of fulfilling many of these ‘light’ roles.  When 
they were not capable of doing so, foreign infantry, especially specialized foreign ‘light’ 
infantry such as Spanish caetrati, Cretan archers, and Balearic slingers helped fill these roles.  
Thus, foreign light infantry seems to have been necessary to fulfill battle tasks that the 
legionaries could not fulfill themselves.  This would have probably been because of the 
specialized equipment of these foreign recruits (e.g. slings and arrows). 
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, (Tactical Roles), the ramifications of this change may have 
included a greater reliance on the permanent Roman auxilia for their fighting capability.  The 
fighting capabilities of the ‘light’ infantry of the cohortal legion made them more capable of 
standing their ground against other line infantry than the light infantry of the manipular 
legion seems to have been.  However, we should not attribute the fighting capability of the 
auxilia to the loss of the velites.  Rather, the emergence of the cohort as the primary tactical 
unit may have been one of the developments that led to the loss of the velites and so this will 
be assessed next. 
The Cohort and its Effect on the Velites  
The emergence of the cohort as the primary tactical unit in the Roman army is a critical event 
in the discussion of function and classification of troops.  This change in heavy infantry 
                                                 
477
 Bell 1965, 421. 
135 
 
organization allowed for more tactical versatility in smaller groups, a task which is directly 
linked to the disappearance of the velites and the amalgamation of their ‘light’ function with 
heavy infantry.478 
In order to understand this development more completely, the origins of the cohort must be 
discussed.  This is especially true because as Bell argued in his seminal article, the cohort 
probably developed out of the need for small-scale mobility,479 which is something we can 
readily associate with ‘light’ tactics.  Furthermore, in understanding the development of the 
cohort, we might better understand the Roman approach to low-intensity warfare and non-
pitched battle over time.  At this point then, it would be worth discussing the evolution of the 
cohort, whilst likewise noting any possible association with ‘light’ tactics or light infantry. 
Bell suggests that the development of the cohort began in the later 3
rd
 century BC, where we 
have a reference to a cohors Romana under Lucius Marcius in 210.480  However, his 
hypothesis is based on Livy’s usage of the term cohort during the Spanish Wars, along with 
additional evidence from Polybius, Appian and Frontinus.  This method, he explains, is 
necessary since there is a general view (from Marquardt in particular) that Livy’s usage of the 
term was due to his mistranslation or misinterpretation of his sources.481  And indeed, while 
his method is sound, Bell’s main argument is that the cohort developed from tactics 
encountered by Roman armies during the Spanish Wars, and as Rawson has already pointed 
out, this argument does not hold, as the unit probably existed outside of the Spanish theatre.482  
As Quesada Sanz has sensibly indicated, Iberians were not necessarily the stereotypical 
‘guerrilleros’ they are often believed to have been,483 and they probably engaged in pitched-
battle combat wherever opportunity allowed.484  So, while it is likely that the wars in Spain 
may have had some influence on the progression to cohorts as the permanent tactical unit, we 
should be careful in dismissing its possible existence elsewhere.  Indeed, as Rawson writes,  
...if Livy (with other annalistic writers), mentions cohorts in Spain but not in the 
East, this may be because it is only for the West that he uses not Polybius but late 
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annalistic authors, who believed that the cohorts had existed from the regal period 
on (and of whom little notice need therefore be taken – Coleius, however, also 
used by Livy, might be better evidence).485 
Certainly, as Quesada Sanz indicates, warfare in the west probably allowed for more 
opportunities to use the cohort, because of a similar approach to battle as far as weapons and 
hand-to-hand combat were concerned.486  In contrast, the Hellenistic approach to battle with 
the phalanx may have not allowed for as many opportunities or reasons to deploy the legion 
in this way.  So, while Bell makes a good point about warfare in Spain having direct 
influence on the development of the cohort, he should not have excluded other enemies in 
western theatre, such as the Gauls, or the Carthaginians.  I would also suggest that the cohort 
could have been used for whatever tactical exigency that required it, regardless of the theatre 
of combat.   
One of Bell’s primary reasons for focusing on Spain for the development of the cohort lies in 
the second part of his argument.  He suggests that the cohort came about from the need for 
tactical concentration on the battlefield, i.e. to fill the gaps in between the maniples.  He 
suggests that these gaps were particularly problematic in the Spanish theatre due to the 
guerrilla tactics encountered there.487  Aside from the aforementioned point that guerrilla 
tactics may not have been as common as previously assumed, this argument is flawed in 
several points.  Firstly, it implies that the Roman battle-line was not solid once pitched battle 
was underway, and that it had maniple-wide gaps.  This is tactically very unlikely, and we 
should not assume that this was a reality.  Maniple-wide gaps would essentially see the 
regular and simultaneous engagement of the front two lines in a triplex acies (i.e. the hastati 
and the principes), as the gaps would allow enemy units to surround the first-line maniples 
and thus necessarily engage the front lines of the second-line maniples.488  This is, firstly, 
something our sources never mention, and secondly, on the contrary, the manipular and 
cohortal systems that used the triplex acies were effective because of their ability to replace 
the front lines, which is something an engagement with maniple-wide gaps could not allow.  I 
would argue that the system of replacing the front lines was a process that probably took 
place during lulls in combat: another necessary feature of pitched battle.   
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Another argument Bell makes is that the cohort provided the perfect size for punitive 
expeditions for both tactical and supply reasons.489  Indeed, there is little doubt that the cohort 
developed out of tactical necessity, and because the manipular battle array was used for so 
long with the Roman army, it is more likely that this tactical necessity was derived from 
outside the realm of pitched battle.  Furthermore, these tactical necessities were caused by the 
numerous instances of non-pitched battle combat that had become more common beginning 
in the second century BC.  Thus, if non-pitched battle combat required the development of 
the cohort, then this implies that the manipular system was effective in pitched battle 
deployment.  This then raises the question of why the manipular system was later abandoned 
for pitched battle.  The answer may lie in the possibility that the cohort and manipular system 
co-existed. 
If cohorts developed out of tactics outside of manipular pitched battle, then they could have 
simply been an alternative tactic that was deployed as a part of the manipular system.  If the 
cohort developed out of the manipular system, it did not exist prior to the establishment of 
that system, despite the fact that it is mentioned in Livy at earlier dates.490  That cohorts co-
existed with the maniple as a tactical unit is a reality that has already been addressed by 
several scholars.491  This co-existence is important because it means that unit organization 
could have not only affected its function, but also the need for velites.  The reasons for this 
are as follows: the deployment of the cohort in the manipular system could have seen velites 
deployed with the maniples that they were attached to within the cohort, (e.g. as in Polyb. 
11.23).492  This in turn, could have had serious ramifications on the need for an exclusive light 
infantry unit.  I will return to this shortly.  First, the primary issue that results from this 
postulation is the lack of references to the cohort in formal descriptions of mid-Republican 
military organization.  However, this may be easily explained by the fact that that it was only 
a tactical formation, rather than an administrative one.493  In this way, the omission of the 
cohort from formal descriptions of military organization is more understandable: none of our 
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sources for the mid-Republic were writing tactical treatises listing various formations as some 
later sources do; instead, their descriptions of the Roman system were based on the 
administrative units into which men were levied.  The idea that this was the reason behind the 
lack of earlier references of the cohort is not a new one.  Bell himself alluded to this design of 
the cohort, and Rawson has explicitly stated this.494  Livy provides us with some possible 
evidence for the co-existence of these formations, as well as for the formal tactical nature of 
the cohort.  At 27.13 after the second day of battle at Canusium, Livy has Marcellus 
reprimanding his commanders for having standards taken from the maniples and cohorts.  He 
then explicitly differentiates between the two units, having the centurions of the former 
punished, and the soldiers of the latter to be put on barley rations.495  Further, he has those 
same cohorts drawn up in the front lines for the third day of battle.496  Whether cohorts 
actually had separate standards here is impossible to determine, but a favourable assessment 
might be to dismiss Livy’s reference as an anachronism.497  However, standards were required 
to carry out tactical manoeuvres effectively, and if we accept that the cohort was a tactical 
unit, it is also possible that some standards were reserved for that formation so that it might 
properly function as a whole and complete unit.   
Having established the potentiality for co-existence of the maniple and cohort, we are 
presented with two possible deployments of this formation.  This mid-Republican cohort was 
either just a cohort made of line infantry from the maniples (as in later periods), or, a cohort 
of line infantry and the light infantry administratively attached to their maniples.  If the line 
infantry and light infantry worked in concert as inferred by Polybius (11.23), they may have 
had to fulfill one another’s roles.  There are some possible examples of this in Livy, where 
cohorts engage in tasks often assigned to light infantry.  For instance, though deployment 
with cavalry was often assigned to light infantry in the manipular legion, at 25.39 Livy has a 
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cohors Romana set an ambush with cavalry in the woods near the Punic camp.498  In another 
example, Flaminius sent cohorts to forage whilst in Ambracia (Livy 32.15), yet foraging or 
guarding foragers was also often assigned to light infantry (see Chapter 6).  We see this again 
at 34.26, where the foraging body of troops is described as expeditas cohortes.  Again, we 
have a Roman cohort guarding foragers before Cynoscephalae at Livy 31.37.  Acting as 
guards was not uncommon for velites as it was also their task around the camp (Polyb. 
6.35.5).  Yet, we hear of cohorts acting in this role as escorts for Cato and later for Aetolian 
leaders (Livy 34.19, 37.3).  Polybius tells us that the light infantry would also guard the 
marching column (a task their imperial successors would also perform), but Livy tells us 
Quinctus had five cohorts guard his column as he marched through Greece (Livy 34.28).  
Finally, in a role that is loosely related to foraging, Cato has expeditas cohortes engage in 
plundering while in Spain (Livy 34.19).  It must be kept in mind however, that none of these 
examples provide concrete evidence.  This is because Livy could simply be mistaken, or 
guilty of anachronism.  Furthermore, if these are indeed cohorts formed from maniples and 
velites, then there would have been light infantry participating in all of these examples.  Thus, 
two possibilities remain: either the line infantry is fulfilling the role of the light infantry in 
these examples, or they are working in concert as a mixed-arms force. 
While there is no hard evidence for the republican cohort being a mixed-arms force, its 
hypothetical possibility is perhaps strengthened by modern parallels.  So-called ‘battlegroups’ 
or ‘task forces’ in the British and US armies respectively, are mixed-arms groups, organized 
for specialized tasks.  They are only tactical units, rather than administrative units, which is 
precisely what has been suggested for the mid-Republican cohort, above.499  In the British 
army, battlegroups are described as follows: 
The Battlegroup is structured according to task, with the correct mix of infantry, 
armour and supporting arms. The Battlegroup organisation is very flexible and 
the units assigned can be quickly regrouped to cope with a change in the threat. A 
typical Battlegroup fighting a defensive battle on the FEBA (Forward Edge of the 
Battle Area) ... could contain about 600 men ... The number of Battlegroups in a 
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division and a brigade could vary according to the task the formation has been 
given.500 
Indeed, it is simply tactically sound to deploy infantry forces in this way, as commanders can 
be sure that their force has the appropriate capabilities for any possible scenario.  A mixed-
arms cohort in the mid-Republican legion would allow the unit to be able to deal with any 
problem that an entire legion would be capable of dealing with but on a smaller scale, as in 
punitive expeditions for example, as Bell suggests.501  Yet, while this modern parallel favours 
the present hypothesis, without concrete evidence, this suggestion remains purely speculative.   
Whether the mid-Republican cohort was a mixed-arms force, or a unit of line infantry 
fulfilling the tasks of light infantry, the use of the cohort could have led to the phasing out of 
the velites.  The reason for this is as follows: if the line infantry were indeed fulfilling the 
velites’ roles in these deployments, then this in itself would have reduced the need for an 
exclusive light infantry unit.  So, if this combined deployment became more common 
towards the end of the second century, there may have been a greater demand for the velites 
to be better equipped for such tasks.  As Bell has pointed out this may have led directly to the 
re-equipping of the velites with scuta under Marius.502  While Bell argues that the last we hear 
of the velites is probably under Sulla in Frontinus (2.3.17), Bell’s claim that Marius may have 
re-equipped his light infantry stands as a possible reason behind the eventual disappearance 
of the unit.503  Furthermore, as mentioned above on page 134, in the section on the loss of the 
velites, as specialised foreign light infantry became more available to the Roman army (with 
its expanding empire), the need for velites diminished.504  The result was the division of the 
former function of the velites between cohortal infantry (e.g. antesignani), and foreign light 
infantry (e.g. Balearic slingers, Numidian missile troops).  This is particularly noticeable 
under Caesar, where on the one hand he had his antesignani engage in several of the tactical 
roles which the velites formerly engaged in, and on the other hand, he regularly employed 
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foreign light infantry to supplement his legions.505  Yet, to a certain extent, even the latter 
eventually evolved into dual-purpose light and line infantry, seen in the emergence of the 
imperial auxilia.  This, in turn, may have been a result of the marked effectiveness of so-
called ‘light’ infantry in hand-to-hand combat scenarios.  In general, the emphasis on light 
infantry seems to have increased over time in Roman warfare, with the importance of a 
versatile and effective ‘light’ infantry corps culminating with the imperial auxilia.  The 
velites certainly established the importance of these tactics with the high level of tactical 
versatility that they were capable of, and this is reflected in the heavier-equipped units that 
adopted their role (e.g. antesignani, auxilia).506   
In this way, light infantry had a significant effect on the organizational developments within 
the Roman army.  The establishment of the cohortal organization seems to have resulted in 
the adoption of the tasks of the light infantry by line infantry, and further reconstructed light 
infantry as it had originally been created (i.e. soldiers with little or no body armour), to a 
‘light’ infantry that to this day we are still familiar with.507  This transferrance of tasks 
between light and line infantry, also contributes to the definition reached at the beginning of 
this chapter – that light infantry is defined by function and not equipment.  It now remains to 
discuss said tasks of the light infantry in the following chapter on tactical roles. 
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6 The Tactical Role of Light-Armed Troops 
The understanding of light infantry reached in the previous chapters is heavily based on the 
tactical function or roles that these troops were used in.  This chapter seeks to review these 
various roles of light-armed troops for the entire period under review.  Therefore, it will 
review the role of light infantry in the manipular legion and the cohortal legion separately.  
The reason for this is the transference of many light infantry tactics from very lightly 
equipped troops, to more heavily equipped soldiers in the cohortal legion. 
Following Greek practice set forth by authors such as Xenophon and Thucydides, ancient 
Roman military historiography has a tendency to highlight tactics and stratagem.508  Indeed, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 7 in the section on the rhetoric of battle narratives, our sources 
often describe combat from a command-centred point of view; the resulting narrative focuses 
on the overall movement of units, i.e. tactics.  Tactics also directly affected the psychological 
state of the soldiers involved in them, for both those ordering the tactical manoeuvres, and 
those executing them.509  In this way, tactics are a major part of understanding the ‘face of 
battle’. 
For ‘Face of Battle’ studies, discerning the tactical roles of specific groups of men in the 
army helps to clarify their experience of combat.  This is especially important with light 
infantry since, as shall be shown, they were often assigned a wide variety of tactical tasks, 
some of which led to combat that can be labelled as non-pitched battle.510  Therefore, in order 
to clarify the ‘face of non-pitched battle’, it is necessary to assess these tactical assignments 
and how the light infantry were deployed within them. 
Vegetius gives us an ancient overview of light troops as follows: 
Yet, there were amongst the ancient infantry those they called levis armaturae, 
funditores, and ferentarii, who were chiefly stationed on the wings and began the 
first phase of the battle. The quickest and best-disciplined men were collected for 
this; they were not very many in number, but if the battle had necessarily 
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compelled them to withdraw, they were in the habit of falling back in between the 
first ranks of the legion, thus while standing fast the battle line was unmoved.511  
Vegetius’ comment on the light-armed troops is one that most scholars might not find 
contentious, and as such, this view has been the norm in Roman army scholarship to date.  
Further investigation, however, suggests that light-armed troops were used in many other 
capacities than those Vegetius mentions.  Also, interestingly, there was more truth than he 
probably realized in his statement regarding the ‘quickest and best disciplined men’ since, as 
shall be indicated below, just such men would have probably been required to fulfill all of 
said demanding capacities successfully.  
Tactical Role of Light Troops in the Manipular Legion  
Scholarly discussions of the function of armies during the Roman Republic have commonly 
focused on the role of the heavy infantry rather than that of the light troops.  This might be 
explained by the notion that the heavy infantry were the military arm that decided battles, and 
were therefore seen as the most important feature of a fighting force.512  However, a closer 
assessment of the role of the Roman Republic’s light troops reveals that they were capable of 
much more than simply missile combat and indeterminate skirmishing.  Indeed, as Vegetius 
points out, light-armed and missile troops were indispensable throughout Roman history.513 
I will examine the possibility that the light-armed troops of the Republic, the velites in 
particular, were actually amongst the most versatile units in the Roman army, capable of 
performing a wide variety of tasks that would not be equalled until the establishment of the 
permanent force of professional auxilia during the Empire. 
The following section will describe in detail the various tactical uses of light-armed troops in 
the mid-Republic.  As tactics are often the focus of ancient battle narratives, it is also worth 
examining how this is reflected in modern historiography.  This short historiographic review 
will be followed by a discussion of the tactical uses of light infantry on campaign: in 
ambushes and reconnaissance, around the marching camp, and in pitched battles. 
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Historiography 
Despite the importance of light-armed troops, and especially velites in the mid-Republic, 
scholarship on the armies of that period has a tendency to gloss over this significant aspect of 
the Roman military.514  Moreover, specific tactical details on the usage of light troops are few 
and far between, as scholarship tends to focus on either the narration of the numerous battles 
that took place during this period (especially the most famous battles of the Second Punic 
War) or on the organization and equipment of the soldiers themselves.515  In 1939, F.E. 
Adcock claimed that research in this field was difficult, saying ‘on this we are reduced to the 
interpretation of passages in Polybius and a chapter in Livy which has darkened counsel’,516 
and it seems that scholarship’s opinion on the subject has not changed much.  Indeed, 
compared to the evidence available for the late Republic and the early imperial era, our 
sources are fewer in number.  However, the available information warrants serious attention, 
since the evidence is quite forthcoming, as shall be shown.   
Although no single modern author gives substantial attention to the tactical role of light 
troops, current scholarship on the subject can be pieced together to provide some suggestions.  
Their role as skirmishers plays a predominant part in our modern sources, especially as units 
to be used at the beginning of a battle.517  This was a formulaic deployment used by several 
different armies in our period, and this often resulted in light infantry skirmishing with their 
light infantry counterparts.  In this manner, dissimilar troop types rarely engaged; preventing 
an exploitation of ‘the offsetting strengths and weaknesses within the [standard] combined 
arms mix.’518  Yet, as Lendon suggests, perhaps there was more to the light infantry’s role as 
skirmishers: skirmishing could lead to notable displays of virtus, such as single combats.519  
Furthermore, the notion that light-armed troops engaged in hand-to-hand combat is an 
important aspect of the present assessment of their tactical versatility.  The velites’ role as 
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hand-to-hand combatants is scarcely discussed in modern sources, but Meiklejohn aptly 
points out that the Battle of Baecula was ‘remarkable because for the first time in Roman 
history the legions were used on the flanks and the light-troops were used in the centre.’  He 
goes on to say that this indicates, ‘the Romans had at least trained their light-armed troops 
properly.’520  His observation is perhaps over-simplified, but the reference is valuable 
nonetheless.  Bell’s seminal article on the development of the cohortal legion contrasts this 
suggested multi-purpose function of velites (i.e. that they not only skirmished, but fought 
hand-to-hand as well).  Discussing the reasons for the velites disappearance at some length, 
he suggests they were only useful at a specific range as missile troops, and because of this, 
they were easily outclassed by many enemies, which was a contributing factor in their 
disappearance.  Despite his notion of their limited usage, he defends their existence by saying 
that the argument of Marquardt and Schulten is doubtful, i.e. that they completely 
disappeared in Spain during the mid-Republic.521  Regardless, his narrow view of their 
function shall be shown to be unjustified.  Sabin has also recently dismissed the effectiveness 
of the missile weapon, pointing out that large infantry shields would have intercepted them 
easily.  However, his use of Livy’s unmilitary assertions to prove his point in this instance 
causes his argument to remain suspect.522  Indeed, it will be shown below that the sheer 
number and reusability of the javelin naturally increased a soldier’s susceptibility to the 
velites’ missiles.  The light infantry’s role alongside the cavalry is occasionally mentioned in 
modern scholarship, but Sabin is perhaps the only one to acknowledge that this was ‘by no 
means peripheral to the outcome of the heavy infantry contest.’523   
Modern scholarship then, has certainly considered the tactical role of velites and light troops, 
albeit briefly.  More recently, Sage has summarized the variety of roles that light-armed 
troops in the manipular legion were capable of: 
In general, they were used for reconnaissance, for foraging, to drive off opposing 
light-armed troops, to screen the movements of their own forces from the enemy, 
and in pursuit once the opposing army had been broken.  They were also used to 
extend the battle line in cases where the wings rested on broken and uneven 
ground not suitable for heavy infantry.  They seem to have been especially 
effective in dealing with the elephant on the battlefield, after its appearance on 
Italian and western battlefields in the course of the third century.  From this 
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period we often find them operating with cavalry in reconnaissance and pursuit 
and occasionally in battle.524 
While Sage’s overview is certainly judicious, these troop types require a more in-depth 
analysis. 
Ambush and Reconnaissance 
The tactical role of light infantry outside of pitched battle is an important aspect in studying 
the nature of combat in the Roman world.  In a single campaigning season, reconnaissance 
and ambushes were regular tactics for gaining advantage over an enemy.  Once opposing 
armies drew close, skirmishing parties attacking enemy marching columns, foragers, 
reconnaissance, or on the camp itself were also regular features of non-pitched-battle combat.  
Light-armed troops had significant roles to play in these tactics, as our sources indicate. 
Austin and Rankov point out that reconnaissance as a specialized strategy (usually occurring 
prior to a major invasion) did not exist in the Republic.  Our republican sources seem to 
suggest that tactical reconnoitring, however, was a regular part of warfare.525  Reconnaissance 
often required a quick survey of what was commonly difficult terrain, i.e. hills, forests, etc.  
From the infantry, the forces best suited for this in the Republic were the light-armed troops 
as it would have been easier for them to negotiate this terrain.526  The fact that while 
reconnoitring it was possible for an engagement to take place further indicates the tactical 
versatility and combat value of the light-troops used in these situations.  The battles of 
Cynoscephalae and Ticinus are examples of reconnaissance missions (in which the deployed 
force included velites) that led to combat.527  Another danger of reconnaissance was being 
ambushed.  In 208, the consuls M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quinctius Crispinus set out on 
a reconnaissance mission with their lictors, 30 grosfoma/xoi, and some cavalry.  This group 
was then ambushed by Numidian light-infantry (Polyb. 10.32; Plut. Marc. 7.29).  The 
Numidians killed Marcellus and managed to hit Crispinus with two javelins.  Such quick light 
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infantry could only have been countered effectively by another force of light infantry or 
cavalry, and unfortunately for the consul, some of his supporting force fled in surprise and 
panic, and the others were simply outnumbered (Livy 27.27.3-11).  The death of Marcellus 
cannot be blamed on the lack of heavy infantry as they would have been too slow to counter 
the light Numidians.  When facing enemies known for skilled light-infantry, delegating 
reconnaissance and ambushes to the light-infantry and cavalry would have been most 
tactically sound.528  An example of this can be seen when Scipio set an ambush against 
raiding Spaniards.  Luring the enemy into his trap with cattle, he sent velites against the 
skirmishers to hold them in place while his second-in-command, Laelius, sent cavalry to cut 
off the retreat.529  Caesar also used light infantry to set ambushes; he used Numidian and 
Cretan archers as well as Balaeric slingers in a night ambush against the Belgae.530  These 
particular ambushes were a success, yet the question remains whether light infantry were 
always used for ambushes, and if so, whether it was only light infantry that they faced.  Our 
sources tell us of many ambushes where heavy infantry was threatened or used to attack, one 
of the most notable in this period being Trasimene.531  So, although varying types of units 
were used in reconnaissance and ambushes, the light infantry were not excluded from 
performing these tasks in the appropriate circumstances, and so this should stand as a notable 
indicator of their tactical versatility. 
Around the Camp 
Guards 
Another of the velites’ tactical roles was guarding the camp, as Polybius (6.35.5) states: 
The whole outer face of the camp is guarded by the velites (grosfoma/xoi), who 
are posted everyday along the vallum – this being the special duty assigned to 
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them.  From the same body, ten men are also stationed before every gate that 
leads into the camp.532 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 on page 65, Festus (332.35L) confirms this, assigning this task to 
procubitores, whom he equates to velites noting:  
They were said to be called velites, who kept watch before the camp at night, 
especially with the camp of the enemy nearby, regarding this, so M. Cato writes 
about in his treatise on military matters.533 
As guards while the legion was in camp, velites had the opportunity to see more combat than 
their fellow soldiers as there are several references in the sources of skirmishes that occur 
between enemy camps on behalf of light-infantry.534  As Goldsworthy points out, 
“skirmishing and single combats between the cavalry and light infantry of the two sides 
occupied much of the time [before deployment].”535  Strategically speaking, this tactic 
probably had little overall value, but it was probably beneficial as it could have provided 
ample combat experience for the young troops involved, who might be eager to prove their 
virtus.536  Indeed, Daly argues that this was part of Fabius’ strategy, as his troops had less 
experience than those of Hannibal.537  Combat experience meant increased endurance, morale, 
and skill on the battlefield, and in view of this, having light-infantry skirmish between camps 
in the name of guarding it, could have been tactically beneficial for the Roman consul in 
charge. 
Foraging 
As Roth points out, the commander decided which troops to use for particular purposes; and 
the fact that light troops were also available for the tactical function of protecting troops 
during foraging is of particular interest here, as it further indicates their tactical versatility.538  
A vital part of keeping a campaigning army well fed and supplied was successful foraging 
expeditions for food, water and timber.  Yet, there was great risk involved in these missions, 
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as foraging parties were often small and vulnerable, naturally finding it difficult to protect 
themselves when distracted by foraging or burdened by their supplies when returning from 
foraging.  For example, in 171 BC, when Perseus learned from a deserter that the Romans 
were foraging without a guard, he sent cavalry and light infantry to attack them, capturing 
about 600 men and 1000 loaded carts.539  As discussed above, light infantry and cavalry 
would are likely to have been the only effective force against such an ambush of such troops.  
Probably knowing this, Fabius, for example, sent levis armatura with cavalry to guard 
foragers and be ready for sudden onsets (composita instructaque in subitos tumultus).540  
Naturally however, the inherent danger in foraging often caused commanders to guard these 
expeditions with more than light infantry and cavalry.  Aemilius Paulus had an entire one-
third of his army camp closer to the foraging area before the battle of Cannae (Polyb. 3.110).  
Scipio Aemilianus had to send 1000 soldiers to help a small foraging-guard of cavalry who 
were attacked (App. Hisp. 14.89).  Appian does not specify what kind of troops these were, 
but I would suggest that velites might have been involved as they were equipped lightly 
enough to respond quickly to the situation.  Likewise, if Aemilianus had sent maniples of 
infantry, velites may have joined them if they were tactically attached to these maniples, in 
the same way that they were attached administratively.   
Skirmishing in Pitched Battle  
As indicated above, scholarship on the tactical usage of light-armed troops generally focuses 
on their role as skirmishers during pitched battles.  This is reflected in Vegetius who, as 
mentioned above, states that their expected role was to begin the battle.541 
There are many examples in our sources that confirm Vegetius’ assertion, describing 
skirmishing by the velites or other light troops at the beginning of battles.542  This usage of 
light troops is of course what scholars most commonly perceive as the typical or universal 
tactic for these troops, as mentioned above.  Therefore, it would be interesting and 
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advantageous to understand the reasons or benefits behind this tactic, and it will be shown 
that they were manifold. 
Connolly suggests that this tactic was used ‘to harass the advancing enemy…to try to break 
up the enemy formation in anticipation of the charge of the heavy infantry.’543  The concept of 
‘softening up’ the heavy infantry seems to come from evidence highlighting the danger that 
light infantry could pose to their more heavily-armed counterparts.544  This would be 
especially true if the light-armed troops managed to attack the flanks of the enemy, as 
Onasander points out,  
Attacks of the light-armed troops (yilw=n) on the flanks cause the enemy greater 
loss, since they cast their javelins from the side of and of necessity strike the body 
where unprotected.545 
Yet, an initial attack from the light infantry was a tactic not reserved for Roman armies; 
Greek armies were known to deploy peltasts and/or agryraspides in front of their heavy 
infantry, as at Thermopylae (191 BC) and Magnesia, and the Carthaginian armies commonly 
met Roman skirmishers with their own, as at Cannae.  Thus, the skirmish at the beginning of 
a battle often involved two opposing forces of light troops, rather than one side consisting of 
units of stationary heavy infantry.546  Breaking up formations of the latter, therefore, was 
probably not always the expected result of the pre-battle skirmish tactic.  Still, some result 
was certainly expected, which is something Livy makes clear for us when he makes the claim 
that during skirmishing exchanges during the Samnite wars ‘even the slightest skirmish had 
an unimportant outcome.’547  The implication here might be that slight skirmishes normally 
had important outcomes, perhaps not always the breaking up of a stationary unit, but possibly 
some losses or injuries on the enemy’s behalf.  At the same time however, Sabin points out 
that  
it was only in unusual circumstances [i.e. enemy using elephants or chariots – 
where ‘the light infantry might play a more important role in protecting or 
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opposing these instruments’] that the skirmishers had much effect on the battle 
proper.548   
Furthermore, while Daly contends that it is unfair to say that preliminary skirmishes were 
insignificant, he admits that they were frequently inconclusive.549  As far as the course of a 
pitched battle is concerned, it seems that this is true.  Thus, the idea that light infantry was 
used at the beginning of battles to break enemy line infantry does not seem to hold sway; 
however, there are other possible reasons for this tactic. 
Screening forces deploying for pitched battle is a tactic useful to any commander.  Maurice’s 
strategikon, composed around the end of the sixth-century AD, advises commanders that 
contact should not be made with the main body of the enemy before commanders secure the 
tactical positioning of their own army.  Further, it is important that the enemy not observe 
these formations before the commander is made well aware of the enemy’s formations and 
intentions.550  Sending light-armed troops before one’s main infantry was not unusual, and the 
value of concealing troop dispositions prior to a formal pitched battle can be seen at the battle 
of Ilipa, when Scipio deployed his troops in reverse formation (a manoeuvre that won the 
battle for the Romans) but screened his cunning tactic with light infantry.551  So, sending out 
light troops to skirmish in front of one’s battle line, might make observing troop disposition 
difficult, especially if the battle was fought on ground where dust was easily kicked up by the 
movement of many men.552  At the same time however, enemy troop dispositions were 
commonly noticed by opposing commanders, and Onasander later advised generals that they 
wait to observe enemy dispositions before forming their own.  In this case, skirmishing 
before battle could possibly work as a protective tactic for troops forming up, rather than one 
of concealment.553  In either case, skirmishing light-armed troops benefited the deploying 
army. 
Another possible expectation and/or benefit of the initial skirmish may have been a morale 
boost for the line infantry.  As the skirmishing velites were composed of the young and the 
poor, they were men who had everything to gain in a society where valorous deeds on the 
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battlefield brought fame and fortune not only to the individual himself, but to his family as 
well.  Veterans carried the reputation of their deeds throughout their lives; their spoils and 
decorations kept in the eyes and minds of their friends, family and the public.554  The animal-
skin that the velites wore on their helmet to be recognized by their superiors was a result of 
their desire to be seen performing valorous deeds.555  In turn, the line infantry who watched 
their younger, poorer, more lightly equipped and less experienced counterparts pursue 
recognition through conspicuous courage, were being put in a position where they were 
expected to out-perform their fellow soldiers taking part in the initial skirmishing.  As Daly 
points out, “an enthusiastic performance by the skirmishers would in this way have inspired 
the main forces to fight harder when the ‘real’ fighting started.”556  In contrast, Koon has 
recently argued that watching the skirmishing would have induced fear and stress in the line 
infantry, and that the triplex acies was a method of keeping soldiers fresh by distancing them 
from the horrors of fighting.  While this may have been true for some soldiers, and likewise 
may have been the case in situations where the Romans faced overwhelming odds, such an 
analysis cannot be universally applied to this portion of the battle.  Rather, I would argue that 
the ethos of the Romans fits the more positive purpose of a morale boost, especially when we 
consider the importance of virtus, disciplina and audacia in Roman warfare.557 
As we have seen, the single tactic of sending velites to begin a battle with initial skirmishing 
was actually a multi-faceted one: with this one action, the skirmishers could harass enemy 
lines, screen their deploying forces, as well as boost their fellow soldier’s morale.  This alone 
is a testament to their tactical versatility; however, there were certainly other tactical uses of 
velites in pitched battle, especially considering the power and efficiency of their weaponry.  
Although missile weapons in pitched battle have often taken a backseat to the role of the 
gladius and scutum, there is ample evidence that indicates that tactically speaking, these 
weapons were vital over the course of the battle, if not essential to victory. 
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Zhmodikov has discussed at length what he believes was the central role of missile weapons 
in combat, arguing that missiles caused the most serious casualties (i.e. especially to 
commanders), and that in fact, they were used constantly throughout pitched battle.558  One 
famous example he lists is that of P. Decius Mus, who dies ‘overwhelmed by darts’, as does 
his son.559  His stress on the continued use of missile weapons after the initial skirmish, and 
on their importance versus swords, points out the lethal capabilities of the weapon, which is 
something that has hardly been addressed in scholarship.  Yet, Rawlings has also noted the 
importance of missile weapons with the emergence of the maniple, noting, ‘the move to 
maniples was a move towards missile combat’.  He goes on to say that, the organization of 
the maniples ‘appears to have allowed relatively small groups of men to run forward to throw 
missiles and retire, or to be replaced by a second line.’560  His argument for the missile’s 
significant role is supported by Livy, who praises the large Roman scutum for its excellent 
ability to defend against multiple missile weapons being thrown, thus indicating both the 
need to have good protection against missiles, and the value of a weapon efficient in this 
field.561  Perhaps the greatest tactical benefit behind the usage of the velites’ light-javelin was 
its range and reusability.  Indeed, modern experimentation with light-javelins has indicated 
that they might have had twice the range of pila.562  That these javelins did not bend like pila 
also meant that could be reused.  Further evidence to indicate the effectiveness of the javelin 
is the number of javelins the enemy would have had to face.  Livy implies that seven javelins 
were carried by each veles, which meant that there were 8,400 to be thrown by a fully 
manned, fully equipped force of velites in one legion.563  If only one of every seven javelins 
thrown hit its mark, that meant 1,200 either wounded or encumbered soldiers (due to javelins 
stuck in shields).564  With significant figures like these, it is no wonder that light-armed troops 
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were often tactically opposed by other light armed, fast moving troops that might more easily 
avoid missiles.565 
Pitched Battle: Use with Elephants 
The versatility of light infantry can also be seen in their use with or against elephants.  As 
Sabin points out, elephants and light infantry often worked closely together, as elephants 
were also generally deployed in front of part or all of the army.  He suggests that each 
elephant was guarded by around fifty light infantrymen.566  Yet light infantry were also useful 
against elephants; which is demonstrated in a particular tactic executed at the battle of Zama, 
where Scipio filled the gaps between the maniples of heavy infantry with his light troops.  He 
ordered them to open the action, but when falling back, to retire into the gaps between the 
heavy infantry, leaving corridors for the elephants to run through, where the velites could 
assail them from all sides.567  Although this is the only reference to such a tactic in our period, 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us an earlier reference from the Battle of Asculum (279 
BC) where an array of light armed troops were used in different capacities (including being 
mounted on wagons) to face the elephants of Pyrrhus.568 
Pitched Battle: Use with Cavalry 
It has been shown thus far that the velites were tactically versatile troops, and their use with 
cavalry not only highlights this, but also underlines their potential to cause a severe shock to 
enemy forces.  Regarding this tactic, Vegetius, states: 
But if the cavalry are outnumbered, the ancient custom should be adopted of 
mixing in with them very swift infantry with light shields, specially trained for 
the purpose, once called velites.  If this is done, no matter in what force the 
enemy cavalry turn out, they cannot match the mixed formation.  They trained 
young men who were outstanding runners, placing them one between two 
horsemen, on foot and armed with light shields, swords, and javelins.569 
Other sources describe this tactic being used on several occasions, and Sabin points out that 
the Spanish caetrati used this tactics as well.570  Light infantry such as the velites and slingers 
were probably the only types of infantry capable of this tactic in the manipular era because of 
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their speed and light armament.571  Livy for example, notes that in Hannibal’s army, the light 
infantry kept up with the horses as they were equal in speed.572  Whether riding with the 
horsemen, or running amongst them, the strength and mixed skills of both units combined 
often caught their opponents off-guard – as the Roman units did to the Macedonian cavalry at 
a clash in 200 BC – since this does not seem to have occurred among the cavalry forces of 
Rome’s enemies.573  However, this tactic was not always as successful as Vegetius claims 
above.  At the battle of Ticinus, Polybius (3.65) says the light infantry had no time to throw 
their javelins and so retreated behind their cavalry, failing to participate in the skirmish.  
Sabin suggests that using light infantry to counter light skirmisher cavalry would be a good 
tactic, but admits that this might be difficult in theory as ‘the horsemen had the mobility to 
focus their attacks on less well-defended parts of the line.’574  Ultimately, the widespread use 
of mixing cavalry and light infantry amongst both Roman and foreign armies is indicative of 
its usefulness.  Furthermore, as McCall has pointed out, it was particularly useful in non-
pitched battle combat operations such as dispersing foragers or small groups of enemy troops 
operating away from the main force.575 
Hand-to-hand combat 
There are still tactical uses for light infantry, especially in naval and siege warfare.  As Livy 
puts it, ‘range is needed for missile weapons’, and so light infantry were used in situations on 
land and sea where hand-to-hand contact was a rarity.576  However, that should not give the 
impression that light infantry, velites in particular, were incapable of hand-to-hand combat 
without their javelins.  As discussed above, the velites were armed with more than just their 
javelins, and their parmae and gladii made them capable of close-quarters combat.577  
Furthermore, the fact that they retired in between the front lines of the heavy infantry 
suggests to me that they may have been commonly exposed to mêlée combat.  This was also 
sometimes the case when they were combined with cavalry, as discussed above.578  Indeed, at 
the Battle of Ilipa, Scipio placed the velites and cavalry on his wings, behind the line infantry, 
who were to flank the Carthaginians (Polyb. 11.22).  This is one of our first instances where 
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the light-armed troops were used for a fundamental tactical manoeuvre against heavy infantry 
in a battle.579  Furthermore, at the battle of Mount Olympus, the velites are described as fierce 
swordsmen, playing a prominent part in the Roman victory by slaying the Gallic warriors 
with their gladii.580  For ‘when they have to fight at close quarters,’ Livy says, ‘they transfer 
the javelins to their left hands and draw their swords.’581  This capacity gave them the ability 
to outperform their opponents in certain scenarios.  The clash with Macedonian cavalry 
mentioned above is described in the following way, 
for the velites, as if they were fighting with their whole line of battle, after 
discharging their javelins, carried on a close fight with their swords ... By this 
means neither were the king's cavalry, who were unaccustomed to a steady fight, 
a match for the others; nor were the infantry, who were skirmishing and irregular 
troops, and were besides but near half naked with the kind of armour which they 
used, at all equal to the Roman infantry, who carried a sword and buckler, and 
were armed, both to defend themselves and to assail the enemy equally.582 
The velites then, unlike their light-armed counterparts, especially such as archers or slingers, 
were tactically useful as both missile units, and as foot soldiers capable of hand-to-hand 
combat.  
Conclusions 
The tactical role of light-armed troops in the manipular legion was a multi-faceted one.  
Unlike the common perception that they were simply skirmishers meant to try and disrupt 
enemy heavy infantry at the beginning of a pitched battle, it has been shown that they were 
some of the most tactical versatile and important troops in the mid-Republican Roman army.  
As skirmishers, they likely garnered more combat time per season than most of their fellow 
soldiers, as they engaged in skirmishes sometimes for days (though not continuously) before 
any formal battle began.  They were often the first men to begin a battle, and if victorious, the 
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last to end it alongside the cavalry who pursued the routed forces.583  They were highly 
capable of wounding an enemy with a missile attack, due to the lethal efficiency of their 
javelins.  In pursuit of virtus, the aggression and courage that could have been displayed by 
velites may have been capable of causing significant wounds to enemy morale.  The light 
infantry’s lack of heavy armour not only also allowed ease of movement during skirmishes, 
but made them capable of keeping up with cavalry units for a two-pronged attack where the 
lethality of light infantry were exponentially increased by the speed and shock of the horses’ 
charge.  Their swiftness provided Roman commanders with units capable of securing high 
ground quickly in battle or in reconnaissance and ambushes: an increased mobility resulting 
from their lighter armament.  Above all, they could stand their ground in hand-to-hand 
combat, and were capable of engaging significant enemy forces, both on their own and 
alongside the heavy infantry in pitched battle.  Light infantry, and the velites in particular, 
were the Republic’s most versatile troops, and a key tactical unit for the Roman 
commanders.584  This certainly contrasts the way they are covered in the ancient sources.  Yet, 
as pointed out in Chapter 1 (p. 5), this lack of credit may be a result of the fact that the 
actions of the line infantry in pitched battles led to the most siginificant consequences, and 
were thus more worthy of coverage in the minds of ancient historians.  
Tactical Role of ‘Light’ Infantry in the Cohortal Legion 
With the eventual change from a manipular legion to the cohortal, both the appearance and 
role of ‘light’ troops began to differ.  As determined in the previous chapter, it was normally 
the function of troops that affected their classification as light, rather than their equipment.  
This definition is particularly important when discussing the ‘light’ troops of the cohortal 
legion.   
Perhaps one of the key realities of ‘light’ troops in this period is the change of tactical 
delegation of ‘light’ tactics from lightly armed infantry (such as velites) to more heavily 
armed infantry such as antesignani and the imperial auxilia.585  Thus, in the following section, 
the tactical roles of such troops will be the focus of the assessment.  
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In what follows, as with the preceding section, I will examine the possibility that the light 
infantry of the cohortal legions were tactically versatile, and further that they were often 
trusted with the difficult and dangerous assignments in Roman warfare. 
The following section will describe in detail the various tactical uses of light-armed troops in 
the cohortal legions.  It will begin with a short review of the historiography on the subject, 
followed by a discussion of the tactical uses of light infantry on campaign, particularly in 
reconnaissance and swift offensives, as well as their use in difficult terrain and other special 
deployments. 
Historiography 
Much of the scholarship on cohortal ‘light’ troops focuses on the auxilia and the important 
issues of the auxilia’s historical and geographical origins.586  There is relatively little on the 
other light troops associated with cohortal legions such as the antesignani, and other 
expediti.587  Cheesman’s seminal work on the auxilia, although written in 1914, still stands as 
one of the most useful scholarly works on the subject.588  As for its shortcomings, its age 
alone prevents the inclusion of a wealth of new archaeological evidence on the auxilia that 
has come to light since its publication.  In regards to its usefulness for the present work, 
Cheesman gives nominal attention to tactics, but he does mention the auxilia’s employment 
on the flanks in pitched battle, as well as their defensive use on the frontier as ‘police’.589  
Parker, writing in 1928, added little to Cheesman’s research on the tactical role of the auxilia.  
He implied that they fought in loose order – which made them stronger mêlée combatants 
than their legionary counterparts.590  Research on the auxilia advanced slowly over the 
century, Rainbird for example, had little to add other than noting that the increase in number 
of auxiliary units could mean the increase in their strategic and tactical use, an occurrence 
observable throughout Tacitus.591  In 1982, Saddington expanded on his earlier article 
regarding the development of auxiliary forces in the Principate, with the publication of a 
good improvement on Cheesman’s work.  Yet, as its antecedent from 1914, it is also limited 
in its scope, focusing mostly on the historical and geographical origins and movements of 
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auxiliary units.  To his credit, Saddington gathers and cites the many references to auxiliaries 
(in various capacities) in our ancient sources throughout his work, and does occasionally 
reflect on the strategic functions of the auxilia.592  More recently, there has been a greater 
volume of research on the nature of the auxilia’s roles in various types of combat, including 
discussions on their tactical uses, especially in pitched battle.  Gilliver’s article on the 
auxilia’s role at Mons Graupius convincingly argues for the tactical importance of these units 
in battle, and she has elsewhere suggested that the auxilia could bear the brunt of battle.593  
Deployment and use in pitched battle is the focus of Goldsworthy’s references to auxilia, and 
specific discussions of combat are grouped with those of the legions seemingly on the basis 
that both groups of infantry ‘were primarily swordsmen’ or otherwise similarly equipped.  As 
with Gilliver’s argument, he says that it was normal practice to place the auxilia in tactically 
decisive positions in battles.594  Lendon has stressed the importance of the auxiliaries in battle 
as well, emphasizing competition, virtus and the pursuit of glory amongst these troops.  He 
has further pointed out that the auxiliaries are often seen doing most of the fighting, while 
their legionary counterparts are assigned to non-combat duties such as building siege-works: 
an idea brought up in earlier scholarship by Richmond, and then Lepper and Frere.595  This 
can be especially observed in the iconographic evidence on Trajan’s column, and the idea 
that the auxilia excelled at combat over the legionaries will be examined below.596  In a recent 
chapter on tactics, Thorne had little to add about the auxilia or other light units, noting that 
the auxilia were used when the army needed rapid mobility.597  Finally, while Gilliver’s 
recent discussion on low-intensity warfare stands as a respectable introduction to the tactical 
use of light units, a longer discourse on the subject is warranted by the current state of 
scholarship.598 
Overall then, scholarship on the light infantry’s role within the cohortal legions has 
developed little over time, focusing primarily on the auxilia, with minimal investigation into 
the various other light infantry, and their assorted tactical roles.  Rather, in keeping with most 
scholarship on the Roman army, the focus has primarily been on pitched battle, and general 
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strategy.  This is a natural reflection of what our sources have to offer, as pitched battle was a 
key element in ancient literature.  Yet, as mentioned in Chapter 1, pitched battle was just the 
climax of extensive campaign combat in the Roman world, and it is the light-troops’ tactical 
role outside pitched battle that has yet to be discussed.  The topic needs further exploration, 
since it may be that the attention scholars have given to the importance of auxiliaries in 
pitched battle will be reflected in their other tactical uses within the Roman army, as well as 
those of other light troops. 
On the Campaign Trail  
While on campaign, light troops were used in various tactical capacities, including guarding 
the marching column, scouting and gathering intelligence while the army was on the 
marching or in camp, as well as both foraging and protecting foragers. 
Guarding the Marching Column 
Some of the most devastating ambushes befell the Romans when marching through enemy 
territory, the most famous probably being the Varian disaster.  Our sources often state the 
existence of guards in these cases, but the security of the column could be affected by many 
factors, such as lack of discipline and/or training, low morale, and poor intelligence.599  Since 
the marching column was vulnerable, the Romans had several forms of deploying their 
column depending on the perceived level of threat.  In many of these deployments, the light 
infantry had a significant role to play, as noted in numerous examples from our sources, 
throughout the history of the cohortal legion.  Sallust for example, points out that Metellus 
marched through Numidia ‘cum expeditis cohortibus, item funditorum et sagittariorum 
delecta manu apud primos’, even when the level of threat seemed low.  Later in the 
Jugurthine war, Marius similarly marched with light infantry guarding both the front and rear 
of his column.600  Using auxiliaries in the dangerous position of the advance guard was a 
regular feature of the Roman marching column and was a tradition that stretched back 
through the Republic.  As Gilliver has pointed out, the recommendations of Vegetius (as well 
as Onasander, although his suggestions lack detail on the placement of specific troops) are 
similar to those of Polybius.601  Polybius describes the marching column headed by the 
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e)ktraordinari/ouj or, ‘the select’ who ‘[out of] the whole force of allies assembled the 
horsemen and footmen [were deemed] most fitted for actual service’ (Polyb. 6.26.6).  These 
Republican predecessors of imperial auxilia were placed at the head or at the rear of the 
column, depending from where the Romans thought the enemy might attack (Polyb. 6.30.6-
9).602   
The tradition of using lightly armed troops to guard the column continued through the 
Republic after the end of the second century.  For Caesar, the antesignani were the expediti 
whom he trusted to this task, and was especially keen on joining them with cavalry for this 
purpose (BC 3.75, 3.84), and this was a manoeuvre that imitated the function of the velites 
and seemingly proved as effective as Vegetius claims.603  In the civil wars, Caesar did just this 
to protect his cavalry from Pompey’s, to which his was inferior in number, especially since 
Pompey’s horse was known to attack his vulnerable cavalry and marching column.604  Roman 
military theory also reiterates that caution be taken on the march, Vegetius for example, 
warns that  
The general should take steps with all caution and prudence to ensure that the 
army suffer no attack on the march, or may easily repel a raid without loss.605 
He goes on to say that levi armatura should reinforce the vulnerable areas of the column, 
particularly the side(s) where intelligence says the enemy is expected (Veg. 3.6).  In the same 
way, when Germanicus expected an ambush while marching through Germany, he too placed 
auxiliary infantry and cavalry at the head of his column, and used the rest of his auxiliaries to 
guard the rear (Tac. Ann. 1.50-51).  The Batavian and Transrhenane auxiliaries proved their 
worth in the face of danger against enemy reconnoitres during the civil upheavals throughout 
AD 69.  Zealously crossing the river Po in full armour they seized some of Otho’s scouts and 
by the rapidity of their attack terrified the rest into fleeing and announcing that the whole 
army of Caecina was at hand (Tac. Hist. 2.17).  Josephus notes that when Vespasian marched 
out of Ptolemais, he ‘put his army into that order wherein the Romans used to march’; that 
included  
auxiliaries which were lightly armed (yilou\j tw=n e)pikou/rwn), and the 
archers, to march first, that they might prevent any sudden insults from the 
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enemy, and might search out the woods that looked suspiciously, and were 
capable of ambuscades.606 
Josephus also mentions Titus using this formation (BJ 5.2.1).  Yet, the tactic of putting the 
light troops in the front or rear of the column was not only to guard against sudden attacks.  
The other benefit of this formation was that the column could wheel directly into a line of 
battle, with the traditional deployment of the auxilia on the wings and the legions in the 
centre.  This tactic is expressly stated by Tacitus when describing the prelude to the battle of 
the Weser River in AD 16.607  The above-mentioned cases of light troops’ positions on the 
march are just a few examples of one of their more hazardous roles within the Roman army.  
This role of being trusted to bear the brunt of a front or rear attack against the vulnerable 
marching column is evidence for what may be greater skill in hand-to-hand combat capability 
or simply a greater desire for such combat; either of which could be due to specific skill sets 
or regional specializations, exploited by Roman commanders.  This idea will be explored 
further below.608  
Tactical Intelligence 
Intelligence gathering and reconnaissance was another task commonly delegated to light 
troops and auxiliaries that was performed either on the march or from a base such as a 
marching camp or frontier fort by units known as exploratores.609  During our period, cavalry 
were commonly assigned with the task of exploratio;610 however, during the Empire, foot 
soldiers from the auxilia are found being used for reconnaissance as well, perhaps as a mixed 
unit.611  As Southern points out ‘it is expected that such units would be mobile, but they were 
not necessarily all mounted’; Cohors IX Batavorum and Cohors XX Palmyrenorum are 
examples of such mixed units.  The former was made up of mostly pedites, and in the latter, 
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the unit roster from AD 219 notes that there were five infantry with ten cavalry in the 
exploratores unit, and in AD 222, there were four infantry combined with five cavalry.612  
Austin and Rankov have suggested that this combination of infantry and cavalry is indicative 
of the possibility that these men were intended to operate individually rather than as a 
standing patrol, a method that could be well suited to keeping watch on a frontier.613  If this 
were indeed the case on campaign, the individual soldiers would be easy targets for the 
enemy: either simply to kill the wandering explorator as a spy or an unwelcome enemy, or 
capture him as a prisoner-of-war (a possibility more viable for those on foot who might find it 
harder to escape such as situation compared to those on horseback).  Based on the Roman 
army’s previously noted use of the combat tactic of placing light infantry with cavalry, I 
would suggest that these small units of exploratores worked together in scouting.614  In either 
case, whether operating individually or as a small detachment, scouting was a dangerous task, 
and furthermore a vital one for keeping a vulnerable marching column safe in enemy 
territory, highlighting the tactical value Roman commanders put in the light infantry.615 
The use of allies as scouts could have also been a result of the fact that when scouting in their 
own homeland, they would know the terrain best.  As Austin and Rankov have noted, 
the availability of allies for the collection of tactical intelligence was one of the 
factors which enabled commanders to proceed even when their sources of 
strategic intelligence had dried up.616 
Yet it was not until the establishment of the frontiers in the second century AD that 
specialized bodies of troops known as exploratores became standing units.617  Up until that 
time, as mentioned above, Speidel has suggested that ‘in every operational unit of the Roman 
army, some men…were assigned the job of reconnoitring’, and this important task was 
regularly given to the auxiliaries.618  Evidence for this can be found for example in Tacitus, 
who mentions the frequent skirmishes of auxiliary scouts in passing, unfortunately brushing 
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them off as ‘not worth relating’.619  Another example is the career of T. Porcius Cornelianus, 
recorded in a Greek inscription from the third century, which notes his time in several 
auxiliary command posts prior to his position as ‘commander of the scouts of Germany’.620  
Much of our evidence that specifically designates the auxiliaries as exploratores is like this 
one.  This evidence is epigraphic in nature, and includes Roman military tombstones, many 
of which Speidel has detailed in his article on the auxiliary scouts of Roman Germany.621  
Because these auxiliaries function as exploratores, we may identify them as light infantry.622 
Intelligence gathering occurred not only on the march or from stationary forts, but evidence 
from Ammianus (19.3.3) suggests it occurred during sieges as well.  Although his account of 
the siege of Amida is well after our period, the auxiliary units he describes gathering tactical 
intelligence are classified as exploratores, and it is likely that these late-Roman units retained 
not only the name, but also the function of their namesakes from the Principate.  During the 
siege, the Roman commanders unsuccessfully attempted to get exploratores into the town on 
several occasions, to give and receive information.  This incident has been pointed out by 
Austin and Rankov as evidence that exploratores were trained in security of movement, a 
possibility that may be further supported by other covert political operations performed by 
these units, which Ammianus also mentions.623  Yet, clandestine operations may simply have 
been a later development of the function of the exploratores and there is no evidence to 
indicate that they were involved in such clandestine actions in our period.624  Austin and 
Rankov suggest the opposite however; pointing out that Dio (68.23.2) mentions scouts 
(pro\skopoi\) circulating false reports, as directed by Trajan, who was attempting to keep his 
army and officers on their toes.  Yet it seems to me, that the reporting of intelligence – 
whether real or false by the commander’s order – should be a regular part of scouting, and is 
unlike the more clandestine activities of spying on imperial staff members (as noted above, 
Amm. 17.9.7; 21.7.2).  What we should take from Ammianus’ example then, is the likelihood 
that there were varying methods and situations in which tactical intelligence was gathered 
and distributed.   
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Scouting and intelligence gathering then, was a task that confided scouts with delicate 
information regarding where the army was headed, and what paths through enemy territory 
its leaders planned to take.  The scouts were entrusted to keep this information safe, when out 
of sight of their comrades and out of reach of immediate assistance in a desperate situation.  It 
provided soldiers with the possibility of betraying their army.  Despite this risk, it has been 
shown that auxiliaries were regularly assigned to function in a light capacity as scouts, thus 
underlining both their combat skill and overall trustworthiness. 
Foraging 
As with the previous section on the manipular legion, the light troops of the cohortal legion 
were available for the task of protecting fellow soldiers (along with other troop types) during 
foraging, and the danger of this task is highlighted in several examples from the cohortal 
period.625  The vulnerability of foraging soldiers could be especially high if working without 
the protection of their shield or helmets.  Onasander (10.8) provides suggests a solution, to 
this stating: 
When the general himself sends out foraging parties, he should send with the 
light-armed men (yiloi=j) and unarmed men (a)no/ploij), guards (maxi/mouj), 
both horse and foot, who shall have nothing to do with the booty, but are to 
remain in formation and guard the foragers, that their return to camp may be 
safely accomplished. 
Roth has suggested that this should be interpreted as legionaries guarding the auxiliaries who 
are foraging, but this suggestion is based on an unrelated passage in Josephus.626  Rather, 
maxi/mouj refers to warriors or warlike men in our sources, and these references seem to refer 
consistently to non-Romans.627  Furthermore, although our sources mention legionaries being 
assigned the task of guarding foragers, there are several examples of light troops and 
auxiliaries being put in this position as well.  Caesar had his German and Gallic auxiliaries 
skirmish with the enemy while the Roman troops were foraging, and an earlier attack on his 
foragers was warded off by the combined force of three legions and all the auxiliaries.628  In 
another example, Q. Fabius Maximus had his legionaries forage for grain or water, while 
                                                 
625
 e.g. Plut. Sert. 7.3; Caes. BG 5.17, 7.16, 7.20, 8.10, 8.16, BAfr. 24, BHisp.21; Dio 49.26.3, 65.4.5; Tac. Ann. 
12.38. cf. Roth 1999, 286-287. 
626
 Roth 1999, 290, claims Jos. uses maxi/mouj at BJ 5.43 to describe legionaries, but Roth must be mistaken, as 
this word is not used in said passage. At BJ 3.155, maximwte/roij is used to describe Romans fighting 
desperately, and this is the only usage of the word related to Romans in the work. 
627
 e.g. Strab. 7.3 (referring to light-armed troops), 11.3; App. Gal. 2, Hisp. 66, 72, Ill. 15, 25; Polyb. 1.2, 15.3. 
628
 Caes. BG 5.17, cf. also 8.10, 8.17. 
 
166 
legionary cavalry and auxiliary soldiers stand on guard close by – a similar method to that of 
Caesar.629  What these examples make clear is the importance of the role of protecting Roman 
foragers, which was regularly designated to auxiliaries and light infantry. 
Special Deployment 
Usage in Swift Operations 
Our sources tell us of many occasions where auxiliary or light infantry forces were relied 
upon to execute attacks and other manoeuvres quickly, when there was either no need or no 
time to use the bulk of the legions.  While this is a common theme with light units, our 
examples remind us of their tactical versatility.630  Caesar rode out to arrest the rebellious 
Gaul Litavicus with four-light armed legions (legiones expeditas) and his cavalry, and thus 
successfully caught up to his enemy on the march (BG 7.40).  When Afranius needed to 
secure strategic high ground during quickly the civil war, he sent a unit of Spanish light-
infantry (caetratorum cohortis) to hold the hill while he brought up his entire army.631  Also 
during the civil war, Caesar’s marching column was being harassed in the rear by Pompey’s 
cavalry, and so he relied on his fast moving antesignani to relieve his encumbered forces at 
the rear quickly, and so immediately routing the enemy forces, they promptly returned to 
their positions in the main body of troops (BC 3.75).  When his legions were entrenching a 
camp in Africa a few years later, Caesar’s legions were threatened by encroaching 
Numidians.  Having sent out light infantry (levis armaturae) and cavalry, Caesar’s units 
advanced on the enemy so quickly, that they managed to capture some men alive as 
prisoners, while routing the rest (BAfr. 39).  In a covert operation, the light infantry 
(expeditae cohortes) and cavalry were sent in a hasty overnight dash to attack the forces of 
the rebel Tacfarinas in AD 24, before the day dawned.  In the morning, the Romans took the 
rebellious Africans by surprise and wiped them and their leader out (Tac. Ann. 4.25).  To be 
sure, we have several examples of these impetuous attacks in our sources, carried out by 
expeditae.632  Thus, light-armed troops were naturally used in varying tactical scenarios that 
required a quick deployment of troops.  Some of these missions were vital to the wars and 
campaigns in which they were executed, such as the assault on Tacfarinas.  These examples 
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then, underline the fact that the light infantry were trusted to manage their rapid operations 
successfully. 
Usage in Difficult Terrain 
The Roman soldier is heavily armed and afraid to swim, while the German, who 
is accustomed to rivers, is favoured by the lightness of his equipment and the 
height of his stature.633 
Although this is probably just narrative rhetoric on Tacitus’ behalf, the theme of auxiliaries 
being used in difficult terrain is a consistent one in our sources.  Indeed, Onasander advises 
generals to use light infantry in these situations: 
If the battle should happen to be in country that is level in some places but hilly in 
others, then the light-armed troops (yilou\j) should by all means be stationed in 
the uneven section, and then, if the general himself should have seized the plain 
and some part of the enemy’s phalanx should possess the eights, he should send 
against them the light-armed troops (yilou\j); for from the uneven ground they 
can more easily hurl their weapons and retreat, or they can very easily charge up 
the slopes, if they are agile.634 
Other examples include the battle at the Axona in 57 BC, which was fought in and around the 
banks of the river (probably modern Aisne), a mode of attack that disordered the enemy but 
not Caesar’s auxiliaries.  According to Caesar, the auxiliaries showed even greater zeal in 
such difficult terrain, for when they had already killed a great part of the enemy, they 
continued to chase those who managed to cross the river, having to climb over the bodies of 
their fallen foes (Caes. BG 2.10).  Indeed, such heroic displays of courage, virtus, and as 
Caesar puts it in this case, audacitas, in difficult terrain are common to the auxiliary forces in 
our sources.  With the establishment of the professional auxilia, the Roman army was 
equipped with units of ‘light’ infantrymen who were very capable of executing difficult 
manoeuvres in unfavourable terrain.  There are numerous examples in the sources of the 
auxilia being sent in (or charging in on their own accord) when the terrain was unfavourable 
to the legionaries and their close-order, large-scale combat tactics.635  One of the most notable 
instances of this happening was the battle of Mons Graupius during Agricola’s campaigns.  In 
this particular battle, Agricola kept his legions in reserve and sent the whole of his auxiliary 
forces against the large congregation of Caledonians in what was literally an uphill battle.  
Tacitus claims the Roman commander deployed his units in that way because ‘victory would 
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be more glorious if achieved without the loss of Roman blood.’636  However, as Gilliver 
convincingly argues, this is far from the truth; that being that the auxiliaries were simply the 
best suited for the job, since the legionaries preferred static fighting on level ground in 
pitched battle.637  But the use of auxiliaries in difficult terrain often spread into the domain of 
non-pitched battle combat.  In the early first century AD, P. Vellaeus sent light auxiliaries 
into the Balkan mountains to quell plundering tribes, who were also recruiting followers.638  
Mountainous terrain also brought non-pitched battle combat to Corbulo’s troops on his march 
towards Tigranocerta.  His army was plagued by the men of the Mardi tribe who ‘are trained 
in brigandage, and defended by mountains against an invader,’ and he sent Iberian auxiliaries 
to counter them, who then ‘ravaged their country and punished the enemy's daring’.639  There 
were also many actions taking place in and around water.  In the Alexandrian War (BAlex. 
17), Caesar sent a select body of light infantry to take an island whose approach was steep 
and craggy, and was well defended by both enemy boats and inhabitants assailing the Roman 
forces from their rooftops.  Tacitus describes how in AD 68, German auxiliaries fighting for 
Vitellius took the battle to the difficult terrain of boat decks and the Po River on which they 
floated.  They attacked the Othonian gladiators manning the boats after diving into the river 
and out-swimming the boats (in full armour), pulling the vessels into the shallows, then 
climbed onto the decks, and ‘sank them in hand to hand combat’(Tac. Hist. 2.35).  During 
Agricola’s campaigning in Britain, a group of Batavian auxiliaries braved the waters of the 
Menai straight, swimming over to the island of Mona (modern Anglesey), and took the 
inhabitants by surprise, as the latter expected an assault by a naval fleet.  Astonished by the 
audacity of the auxiliaries, the inhabitants gave up the island, worried that ‘to such assailants 
nothing could be formidable or invincible.’640   
The question remains as to why the auxiliaries in particular were used in difficult conditions.  
Gilliver suggests that they were physically and tactically best suited for the job, a conclusion 
based on their armament.641  Bishop and Coulston’s assessment of the differences between 
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traditional legionary and auxiliary equipment comes to the same conclusion.642  To me 
however, solely attributing their armament as the reason for such deployments, while 
prudent, seems limited, especially during the Principate.  Rather, I think there are further 
historical grounds for this development. 
As indicated in the introduction to this section on cohortal light infantry, it is significant that 
the tactical delegation of ‘light’ tactics changed from lightly armed infantry (e.g. velites) to 
more heavily armed infantry (e.g. the antesignani), most of which fell to the auxilia during 
the Principate.  This could have been a result of a trend that began in with the manipular 
legion.  During the wars of the mid-Republic, where the versatility of the velites was not 
enough, specialist foreign infantry was hired, referred to as auxilia in our Republican 
sources.643  This tradition was not uncommon even before the period under review; for 
example, fifth-century Athens recruited specialist foreign infantry where and when required 
as well.644  Indeed, Best points out that hoplites suffered severe losses without the help of 
peltasts.645  So, regarding the Romans, the establishment of the professional army and the long 
service and the professionalism of the army allowed the legionaries (the antesignani in 
particular) to take over some of the roles of the roles previously assigned to the velites.646  Yet 
the first few decades of the cohortal system still saw the recruitment of specialist foreign 
auxilia.  Under the Empire, these were absorbed into the Roman military system, and became 
the ‘specialist’ imperial auxilia; many of these cohorts having been recruited from 
particularly skilled warrior societies.  Furthermore, these foreign specialties and the training 
of the Roman imperial army resulted in the establishment of its most tactically versatile 
corps.  These foreign specialties rested chiefly in their fighting capability. 
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Fighting Capability 
As noted briefly above, I suggest that the auxiliary forces were perhaps more zealous fighters 
than their legionary counterparts were.  This arises from the suggestion that auxiliary 
(auxilia, yi/loi) and ‘light’ (leves cohortes, leves armaturae, legiones expediatae, 
antesignani, yiloi) armament, was not necessarily that much ‘lighter’ than legionary 
equipment, and thus armament cannot be the only explanation for the preferred usage of these 
units in special deployments.647 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the armament of the professional auxilia and the antesignani 
reflected that of the legionaries: that the mail they wore could have been/was also worn by 
some legionaries, depending on personal preference.648  Moreover, the segmented armour 
traditionally attributed to legionaries was in fact lighter than the mail attributed to the 
auxilia.649  Regardless of this, differentiation between sets of armour between the infantry 
classes is a vexed question, and can still at times be difficult.650  The only difference between 
their equipment in the imperial period that we can be most sure of, was the shield and the 
spear, and this has been the evidence for the traditional argument discussed earlier, that the 
auxilia were used in various capacities because of their more suitable equipment to that 
end.651  Yet, the evidence remains that it was unlikely that auxilia were really ‘lighter’ troops.   
Furthermore, I find Bishop and Coulston’s argument regarding auxiliary shields to be better 
suited to open-order (i.e. non-pitched) combat, to be unconvincing.  They provide no concrete 
proof that the flat oval shield was in fact a better shield to be used in hand-to-hand combat 
than the rectangular curved shield of the legionaries.652  Rather, recent studies suggested that 
the curved shield was more effective as a defensive weapon in hand-to-hand combat.653  
Besides, our examples demonstrating the auxilia’s (and other light units’) skill, aggression 
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and success as hand-to-hand fighters cannot be attributed to equipment alone.654  Thus, there 
must be more to using the auxilia and light units in special deployments such as those 
discussed above.655   
Outstanding courage or bravery is one possibility for such use of auxiliary and light units.  
Rawlings has pointed out Caesar’s appreciation for courage (virtus, audacia) as a key to 
victory in battle.  Interestingly, in De Bello Gallico, Caesar applies the term to non-Romans 
more often than he does to Romans, with audacia being ‘a mainly Gallic attribute…with a 
more dynamic resonance [than virtus or fortis]’.656  This notion that non-Romans show 
outstanding courage in battle is one that has been picked up by other scholars as well.  While 
Lendon suggests that auxiliary troops were naturally more eager, spurred on by military 
decorations, and advancement in rank, he also believes their performance was driven by 
inherent virtus.657  Though he draws on Tacitus’ interesting comment that the Batavians are 
the foremost in virtus; that they are ‘set apart for fighting purposes, like a magazine of arms, 
[reserved] for [Roman] wars’, I would rather focus the argument on their social status.658 
I believe it would not be erroneous to say that auxiliaries and allied light-troops, as non-
Romans – that is, as people without full citizen rights of their fellow legionary soldiers –may 
have wanted to validate their equality as Roman soldiers by showing the highest possible 
levels of audacia or virtus in battle.  When they did, their pride remains as evidence for the 
struggle they overcame.  A funerary inscription from the Danube area, dated to the second 
century AD has a Batavian solider boasting of his fame for swimming across the Danube 
fully armed, and being the best javelin thrower and archer amongst his fellow auxiliaries and 
legionaries.659  This pride was also seen during the Civil Wars of AD 69-70, when Batavian 
cohorts boasted of their victories against legionaries to other Romans, claiming ‘that the 
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whole destiny of the war lay in their hands,’ starting brawls and quarrels with the other 
soldiers.  Yet, even the legionaries supposedly admitted that, despite their pride, the 
auxiliaries taken from them during the Civil Wars were the ‘bravest of men.’660  Whether it 
was virtus, advancement, or pride, there seems to have been more to the auxiliary forces than 
just a difference in armament that allowed for their tactical usage in difficult terrain.  Our 
sources also seem to stress excellent fighting capability and the zeal of the auxiliaries.  For 
example, Plutarch relates how ‘Against Otho's gladiators, too, who were supposed to have 
experience and courage in close fighting, Alfenus Varus led up the troops called Batavians’ 
who then swiftly eliminated the gladiator unit (Plut. Otho 12.4).  Another passage, already 
mentioned above (Tac. Hist. 2.35), where German auxiliaries out-swam enemy boats (whilst 
in full-armour) and in the following water-borne fight with Othonian gladiators ‘leapt into the 
shallows, laid hold of the boats, climbed over the gunwales, or sank them with their hands,’ 
provides similar evidence supporting their zeal for combat.  In another example (Tac. Ann. 
12.35), Tacitus explains how the auxiliaries helped lead Ostorius’ forces to a glorious victory 
against Caractacus’ army.  Josephus claims that in the Jewish War, some freshly recruited 
auxiliaries from free cities, made up for their lack of experience with ‘their alacrity 
(proqu=mi/aij) and in their hatred for the Jews’.661  A scene from Trajan’s column appears to 
reflect this understanding in the literary sources of the fighting capability and zeal of the 
auxiliaries.  In scene 24, an auxiliary is seen fighting with a severed head held by the hair in 
his teeth.  Not only was fighting in such a manner likely more difficult than fighting without 
the burden of a severed head (thus requiring notable skill), but the zeal and alacrity displayed 
by the auxiliary in this scene is plainly evident. 
Thus, it seems that our sources present a bias towards the virtus/audacia of the auxiliaries.  
Because of this bias, we should not assume that legionaries lacked virtus or audacia.  Rather, 
I would argue that if auxiliaries were especially keen on proving themselves (possibly due to 
their inferior social status), then commanders may have wanted to exploit this enthusiasm by 
using them instead of the legionaries in the most demanding tactical assignments, as argued 
throughout this chapter.   
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Conclusions 
With the gradual disappearance of the velites and the emergence of the cohortal legion, one of 
Rome’s most tactically versatile units needed to be replaced.  The auxiliary units of the 
Roman army took up the mantle, and with the establishment of the professional auxilia 
during the imperial period, they also came to replace the socii to an extent as well.  Although 
these new auxiliaries varied in equipment, organization and role from their predecessors, they 
were no less tactically versatile.  This can be seen in their usage in scouting, guarding the 
marching column and foragers, reconnaissance, urgent operations and as combatants in 
difficult terrain.  Their fighting capability, whether a result of natural aggressiveness or 
alacrity, resulted in their noticeable displays of virtus and pride.  Their commanders seem to 
have recognized this, and so deployed them accordingly in situations where they bore the 
brunt of combat, including pitched battle scenarios.  All of the various capacities that Rome’s 
auxiliary and light troops were used in, indicate their skill, alacrity, trustworthiness, and 
underline their tactical versatility. 
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7 The Nature & Experience of Skirmishing and Non-Pitched Battle 
Having analysed both the various types of Roman light infantry and their tactics, in this 
chapter I shall examine the ‘face of battle’ for these troops, looking primarily at skirmishes 
and non-pitched battle.  In doing so, I will attempt to elucidate the experience of various 
types of skirmishing and non-pitched battle combat from the perspective of the Roman 
soldiers involved in them. 
The major issue with this approach is that we do not have a lot of evidence for the ‘face’ of 
such combat.  Indeed, our best evidence for the experience or ‘face’ of combat comes from 
what our sources tell us about pitched battle.  As such, I will draw on this evidence to inform 
our understanding of non-pitched battle combat.  The practicality of this approach will be 
made clear with my definitions of non-pitched battle and skirmishing, discussed below.  
Initially however, it is advisable to begin with a review of the modern historiography on 
assessing battle and battle narratives.  This will be followed by a section on the 
aforementioned definitions, in order to clarify the modes and methods of combat I will be 
drawing upon.  Because I will be drawing on the ancient literature for descriptions of combat, 
my analysis will be preceded by a section reviewing narrative rhetoric and its use in combat 
descriptions.   
After defining skirmishing, non-pitched battle and reviewing how narrative rhetoric affects 
our literary evidence, I will suggest possible combat techniques used by Roman soldiers, 
based on our evidence for this.  The conclusions reached here will form basic models of 
combat technique.  These basic models will then be used in the analysis of skirmishing and 
non-pitched battle combat, to give us a clearer picture of the ‘face’ of such fighting.  Thus, 
the section following ‘combat technique’ will review examples from our sources for 
skirmishing and non-pitched battle.  The general approach to this ‘face of battle’ study will 
comprise two sections.  The first section will discuss the unit’s battle, and how groups of 
lightly armed infantry might have experienced combat between each other.  This will include, 
for example, an analysis of how light infantry skirmished with light infantry.  The second 
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section will assess the individual’s battle and consider how factors such as virtus and 
leadership and the psychology of the self-preservation instinct affected the soldier.  I will also 
make suggestions regarding how these factors may have affected the way Romans fought 
battles, and trained their youngest soldiers for the mental stresses of combat. 
Historiography  
Keegan’s ‘Face of Battle’ was the first work to offer a new way of assessing combat.  Rather 
than assessing battle from a tactical perspective, reducing soldiers to simple rectangles on a 
page, Keegan’s approach aimed to elucidate the soldier’s perspective of battle.  Goldsworthy 
has pointed out that this approach offers the possibility of a greater understanding of warfare 
and battle.  Goldsworthy’s work ‘The Roman Army at War’ (discussed below), structured its 
examinations after Keegan.662  However, MacMullen’s article from 1984 is perhaps the 
pioneering publication in the assessment of the Roman ‘face of battle’.663  By reviewing the 
social interactions and relationships within a legion, MacMullen touches on important aspects 
of the experience of battle, outside of tactics and hand-to-hand combat.  Human relationships 
in small networks are what MacMullen claims was one of the most important factors of the 
legion’s success.664  He also indicates how class distinctions affected these relationships and 
how they might be played out on the battlefield.665  While MacMullen’s observations are not 
strictly psychological, they play an important part in highlighting the social factors that could 
have affected the mental attitudes of soldiers on the battlefield.  However, his article is only 
the ‘tip of the iceberg’ in terms of ‘face of battle’ assessment, and as such, it provided the 
foundations for further developments in the field. 
Goldsworthy’s seminal work on the face of Roman battle is very thorough in its approach and 
covers many of the aspects of studying the experience of Roman battle.666  Though Lee 
published on the same topic prior to Goldsworthy in the same year, the latter’s work is a full-
scale examination of the topic, while the former’s serves as solid ‘preliminary foray’ as Lee 
puts it.667  As we shall see in the discussion on combat throughout this chapter, Goldsworthy’s 
assertions on the effect that the cohesion of units had on combat, is extremely relevant for our 
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understanding of the Roman ‘face of battle’, and by extension, the ‘face’ of non-pitched 
battle.  However, as Gilliver has pointed out, Goldsworthy is perhaps somewhat too trusting 
of his literary sources at times, and furthermore, his use of modern military studies as 
comparative material is not entirely effective.668  Nevertheless, its content provides the vital 
groundwork for the discussion of the experience of combat outside of pitched battle, 
including Goldsworthy’s suggestions on combat technique and the individual’s battle.669 
Further examinations of the Roman ‘face of battle’ include Sabin’s proposal of the ‘default 
state’ of fighting, and Zhmodikov’s suggestion that Roman battle was dominated by missile 
throwing.670  The former is a model of prolonged combat, where missiles and insults are 
thrown, but most commonly the combatants are not close enough for hand-to-hand dueling, 
except for a few sporadic instances of ‘brief, localized flurries of hand-to-hand combat, 
followed by the losing troops withdrawing with their weapons brandished to deter pursuit’.671  
Zhmodikov’s argument that hand-to-hand combat was relatively rare compared to missile 
throwing, is certainly in the same vein.  However, both of these authors ignore the 
development of one-use pila, and fail to discuss how often spears could be re-thrown.  
Nevertheless, both of their approaches provide some good discussion for informing this 
chapter’s assessment of missile combat and skirmishing within a pitched battle. 
Looking specifically at how Romans fought their Iberian enemies, Quesada Sanz has 
suggested an effective interpretation of the Roman fighting technique, taking Roman 
armament into account.  He argues for a fighting ‘cloud’, rather than neatly dressed ranks, 
once combat was underway.672  Though his model focuses on line infantry, the argument, 
alongside Goldsworthy’s, also provides the foundations for the discussion of the fighting 
technique of Roman light infantry in this chapter. 
Kagan’s recent alternative approach to the ‘face of battle’, entitled the ‘eye of command’, 
argues that a more suitable method for assessing the ancient face of battle is through the 
eponymous eyes of the commander.  This is because unlike some of the battles which Keegan 
assessed, we do not have direct evidence for the Roman ‘face of battle’ from the perspective 
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of soldiers themselves, and furthermore, even if we did have such evidence, it would not 
necessarily aid in our overall perception of the experience of combat.  The reason for this is, 
as Kagan has pointed out, ‘ordinary combatants often compartmentalize their experiences’.673  
Indeed, this reality probably causes combat to be a very individual rather than collective 
experience in regards to how ordinary soldiers perceived the event.  For example, Galba’s 
letter to Cicero after the battle of Forum Gallorum demonstrates how a participant focuses on 
the events immediately affecting his part of the battle line.674  Because of this, any evidence 
from individual soldiers would probably be just as biased as any other eyewitness sources we 
have.  In this respect, ideally we would need eyewitness reports from the majority of 
combatants (on both sides) to get the most realistic picture of the battle experience.  This 
considered, Kagan’s suggestion that the commander of a battle is in the best position to assess 
the event is quite sound: it is the commander’s role to understand all the micro-events in a 
battle and what consequences they can produce, and to issue orders or participate 
accordingly.675  Naturally, it is very difficult for one individual to perceive all of these micro-
events, but it is the general who receives the most information about them from his 
subordinates and messengers.  Because of this, commander-authors from whom we have 
eyewitness accounts for battle, such as Caesar, are extremely valuable.676  These reports are 
quite likely much more valuable than any reports from individual sources may have been.  
Furthermore, according to Kagan, the synergy of battle is only apparent from the kind of 
perspective that an observer has (such as Caesar).  She also adds that the face of battle cannot 
be reconstructed by simply piecing together individual soldiers’ perspectives since they may 
omit many interconnections that change the course of the battle.677  Commanders on the other 
hand, are more likely to be aware of such interconnections.  So, it is literary evidence that 
includes eyewitness reports of such interconnections, such as Caesar’s commentaries, that 
will be crucial to the present assessment.678  However, as M.B. Charles has pointed out, 
Kagan’s assessment could have included a greater consideration of morale, since as stressed 
in Goldsworthy’s seminal work, this was a major factor in the face of battle.679  Furthermore, 
though literary descriptions of non-pitched battle aid in reconstructing the ‘face of battle’, 
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there are many issues involved in using battle descriptions, including the possibility of topoi 
and narrative rhetoric, even if the sources were eyewitnesses.680  This will be discussed in 
further detail in the section below on the Rhetoric of Combat.   
The above selections from the modern historiography have made the most significant 
contributions to Roman ‘face of battle’ studies.  Others such as Lendon’s ‘Soldiers and 
Ghosts’ and Phang’s ‘Roman Military Service’ also contribute to the discussion, especially as 
regards cultural and ideological aspects of Roman battle.681  Naturally, I will be drawing on 
all of this historiography for my approach to the ‘face of battle’ for Roman light infantry. 
Defining Skirmishing and Non-Pitched Battle 
Modern ‘face of battle’ studies for Roman warfare have focused on heavy infantry combat in 
pitched battle.  This thesis has focused on the often-overlooked ‘light’ infantry of the Roman 
army and this chapter aims to elucidate their experience of combat.  In the previous chapter, I 
discussed their tactical roles and it is in those contexts which the ‘face of battle’ for light 
infantry will be assessed here. 
The combat role of Roman light infantry may be broadly divided into two types of combat, 
skirmishing and non-pitched battle.  It is the aim of this section to define the two for the 
purposes of analysis within this chapter. 
The battle standards of the Roman army are the implements of war which help to delineate 
the definitions contained herein.  The sources make it clear that the standards served as 
rallying points, as well as a guide for the soldiers in combat.682  They had a prominent role to 
play in controlling troop movement in battle.683  In this, we find a key difference between 
what I would define as a skirmish and a non-pitched battle.   
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When the standards were planted (to establish a front line of battle), troop movement was 
restricted insofar as soldiers would not advance too far from their stationary standard.684  They 
were required to adhere to the established front line to ensure unit cohesion and tactical 
control.  Fighting without planting the standards may have resulted in much freer movements 
covering more ground than movements restricted by planted standards.  If there were no 
standards, as with the velites for example, I would suggest that the movement of troops was 
much less restricted than it would have been with standards.  In these instances, soldiers 
would not have to adhere to an established front line whilst engaged in combat.  This could 
have resulted in unrestricted and flowing movement.  Though troop movements would also 
be restricted by other factors such as terrain, the enemy, and morale, not planting the 
standards probably increased the likelihood of wider-ranging, more dynamic movements 
amongst soldiers, compared to their movements with planted standards and the resultant 
battle line.  Though two sides might naturally establish an ‘unofficial’ front line without 
planted standards (especially because of terrain, for example), they would not have to adhere 
to any formal positioning on the battlefield.  They could thus move in out of their ‘cloud’ of 
comrades, or to and from the ‘unofficial’ front line (if there was one) as they pleased.  This, 
in turn, could see ‘unofficial’ front lines constantly shifting or even rotating, or simply 
appearing and then eventually disappearing.685  This more dynamic, flowing type of 
movement may be defined as a skirmish.  This type of combat probably involves more 
running and perhaps missile throwing than other forms of combat.  As we do not have 
evidence for standards amongst primarily missile units and more lightly armed units such as 
the velites, I would suggest that their main form of combat would have been skirmishing.686  
This includes their most well known role of skirmishing before a pitched battle, as discussed 
in Chapter 6.  Accordingly, some of our examples will include skirmishing in pitched battle. 
Combat techniques and the associated movements that would have been restricted by the 
presence of a planted or stationary standard would have been used by line infantry in pitched 
battle.  Thus, if groups of light infantry were accompanied by standards outside of pitched 
battle, and if those standards were planted to establish a front line (i.e. an ‘official’ front line), 
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I would argue that their combat techniques would have been the same or very similar to those 
of pitched battle.  That is, they would aim to form and keep a rough front line determined by 
the placement (i.e. stationary positioning) of the standard.  Indeed, this is what our few 
examples of such combat suggest.687  It is for this reason that the section on combat technique 
will draw on descriptions of pitched battles to inform non-pitched battle fighting.  When this 
type of combat would have occurred in non-pitched battle contexts, we may define this 
combat as such (i.e. non-pitched battle combat). 
It should be emphasized that most of our evidence for the Roman ‘face of battle’ comes from 
descriptions of pitched battles, rather than from descriptions of combat occurring outside that 
context.  As such, much of this chapter will be drawing on what we know of pitched battles to 
inform our understanding of skirmishing and non-pitched battle. 
Types of Non-Pitched Battle 
As indicated above, non-pitched battle combat has been defined quite generally.  However, 
various versions of this type of conflict should also be defined.   
Small group clashes 
We may define this type of conflict as combat involving forces smaller than one legion, on 
any kind of terrain, but not within the context of a siege or ambush.  The grounds for this 
reasoning include the fact that most of our examples of non-pitched battle combat involve 
forces smaller than one legion.  Also, during the mid-Republic, two legions was the standard 
size of a consular army, and so forces smaller than this were not technically classifiable as an 
army, but rather only part of it.  Therefore, when such small forces engaged in combat, the 
context was unlikely to be a pitched battle.  During the late republic and imperial period, one 
legion plus auxiliaries were used as campaigning armies, and so forces smaller than this may 
be defined as a ‘small group’.688   
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Siege Warfare 
Non-pitched battle combat within sieges may be defined as any hand-to-hand fighting that 
occurs without the two opposing forces first being set up tactically opposite each other.  
Indeed such setting up, or ‘pitching’ forces does not usually occur during sieges, so much of 
the hand-to-hand combat during sieges qualifies as non-pitched battle combat.  This includes 
combat that occurs as a result of sallies on behalf of the besieged, as well as combat within 
the city once the besieging force has breached the walls.689 
Ambushes, Insurgency and Counter-insurgency 
Insurgency and counter-insurgency are not a particular type of combat, but a cause behind 
many instances of non-pitched battle, particularly ambushes.  As a result, they are often 
associated with ‘guerrilla’ warfare or asymmetric warfare.  However, it is important to note 
that insurgency and counter-insurgency were very much entwined in politics, and as Mattern 
has pointed out, the military aspect of this kind of warfare is ‘only the tip of the iceberg’ 
surrounding such combat.690  With that in mind, the present work concerns only this military 
aspect, on a tactical level.  This aspect, as already noted, found its predominant form in 
ambushes.  The foundation of this type of tactical deployment was the element of surprise.  
Furthermore, ambushes could involve small forces (Tac. Ann. 4.25) or larger ones (Caes. BG 
5.34), and occasionally entire armies (Livy 22.4, Polyb. 3.83; Dio 56.20, 1.65).  They 
normally occur on difficult terrain, where one side has a topographic (and thus tactical) 
advantage over the other.  It must be noted that the ‘face’ of any ambush was subject to many 
relative factors, such as terrain, weather, time of day, numbers engaged, the experience of 
those engaged, and the leadership capabilities of the commanders and the resulting morale of 
the soldiers involved.  All of these factors mean that we cannot generalize regarding the 
‘face’ of ambushes 
Rhetoric of Combat 
Prior to assessing our examples of combat, a review of how narrative traditions affected our 
literary sources should be undertaken.  Since my definitions of skirmishing and non-pitched 
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battle above indicate that our evidence draws on pitched battle descriptions, this section will 
draw on such evidence to inform our understanding of the ‘rhetoric of combat’. 
As MacMullen has pointed out, ‘accounts of conduct in battle are peculiarly subject to bring 
to self-serving, dramatic, or ideological distortion.’691  Indeed, Koon has recently indicated 
that the literary evidence that is our main source for face of battle studies rarely describes the 
individualized experience, and instead it tends to resort ‘to metaphors or generic statements to 
explain the situation of large sections of the battle line’.692  Reasons for this could include the 
fact that for the Republic for example, the majority of Roman military writers’ readership 
would have had some experience as witnesses to or participants in such combat.693  Just like 
ancient battle narratives then, modern face of battle studies must be reconstructed based on a 
pre-determined method of approach.   
Lendon has discussed this subject at length, and a passage from his article adequately 
summarizes this problem and offers a sensible solution, 
All ancient battle descriptions, in short, reflect a series of decisions made 
beforehand...about how battles worked, decisions which guided how battle was 
depicted.  When reconstructing an ancient battle, the first necessity is to ascertain 
the set of conventions the sources are using, to find out what they may be 
predisposed to see, and to determine what they may be predisposed to ignore.  
The reconstruction of an ancient battle must be attended with a sense both of how 
ancient conventions of battle description channel ancient narrative, and with a 
humble sense of how modern conventions of battle description channel our own 
evaluation of that narrative.694 
Thus, there are customs and ideologies inherent in battle descriptions (as in all ancient 
historiography), and we cannot study accounts of combat independent of this problematic 
reality.  Such customs and conventions in writing may include fallacy and/or omit facts.  Yet, 
as Roth has pointed out ‘even the most accurate and objective account must follow 
conventions of writing’.695  So, we must review these customs in Roman accounts of military 
events. 
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Lendon’s article on this subject provides the vital groundwork for this section, introducing 
both the difficulty in describing combat for any participant, as well as the artificiality of battle 
descriptions.  Lendon highlights the ‘inherited way of talking and writing about battle’, 
referring to modern phrases like ‘pull-back’ or ‘pushing forward’ which are far from literal.  
He goes on to say that 
More than a half-awareness of this artificiality [on behalf of those describing 
combat], is, of course, impossible because this rhetoric is not merely a machine to 
convert experience into words, but the very armature upon which experience is 
organized and made sense of.  For the soldier the raw experience of battle is one 
of sights, noises, terrors, and alimentary misadventures.696 
The result of this, is the application of prevailing phraseology to a variety of events.  This 
phraseology may come from the experience of battle itself and likewise may evolve into a 
standard set of metaphors, such as references to weight or pressing.697  This in turn has been 
developed into a physical theory of battle, and this combined with discussions of order and 
deployment produces highly geometrical battle descriptions.698  Using such phraseology may 
result in the skewing of the actual experience of combat by making its description less literal 
and thus less accurate.  Because of this, an etymological assessment of specific phrases 
describing combat should be carried out when we attempt to analyse the experience of 
combat, as Koon has recently done.699  However, even such an assessment might not always 
successfully decipher how rhetorical certain phrases are. 
Beyond this fundamental problem in combat description, another lies in choosing what events 
and incidents to describe.  This issue particularly affects non-pitched battle descriptions, since 
ancient historians favoured pitched battle narratives as standard part of their historiographical 
methodology.700  Furthermore, since battle is a chaotic and nonlinear event (i.e. many 
simultaneous events occur at once, not all affecting each other equally or at all), making 
sense of it for a reader is extremely challenging.  Polybius makes note of this difficulty 
(Polyb. 16.20), criticizing other authors for their battle descriptions (12.17-22, 12.25) and 
remarks that even a writer’s best efforts may include unintentional flaws.  As Koon notes, 
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It is not possible to record exactly what happened when many thousands of 
individuals fought for several hours over distances of a few kilometres.  
Therefore, every ancient author had to decide how to construct his battle 
narratives, usually succumbing to the use of certain literary conventions specific 
to the culture in which he wrote.701 
Thus, battle narrative is necessarily stylized or formulaic; it often gives the reader the view of 
what seemed to be most important to both the original documenter of the battle and the author 
using such a source as a reference.702  The result is a framework such as that described by 
Kagan: the narrative often relates that which was noticed and/or executed by the general and 
his officers.703   
Lendon also observes that because battle in its totality cannot be described sensibly, battle 
descriptions can be considered works of artistry.704  And while they should not be considered 
works of fiction, it is necessary for any author to rely on pre-existing writing schemes to be 
able to clarify the confusion in a style that has already proven effective.  As Lendon has aptly 
put it, ‘understanding the detailed mechanics of battle and how to describe those mechanics 
in writing is learned, not natural.’705  Thus, because of the importance of the pitched battle 
narrative in ancient historiography, we can identify literary conventions and formulas for 
describing ancient battle.  For example, Livy regularly divides the battle in sections and 
stages.706  So, while such constructs cannot accurately reflect the reality of battle, they are a 
prudent method of clearly describing the chaos of combat.  Correspondingly, we may point to 
the irregularity and lessened predictability of skirmishing and non-pitched battle as possible 
reasons behind our sources’ lack of narrative on these matters.  This, in turn, makes an 
analysis of such combat not only difficult, but nearly impossible to recreate faithfully.  This 
is, again, why pitched battle narratives must inform our understanding of such combat. 
Greek military writers were especially influential in shaping the literary conventions of the 
pitched battle narrative for Roman authors.  They were a significant source in the late-
Republic because the Latin tradition of technical military language does not seem to have 
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been as strong as that of the Greeks in this period.707  Of course, this may have been a result 
of the fact that the Greeks were producing technical manuals whereas Roman literature 
focused on historical narrative.  Caesar’s writings however, stand apart in this respect, and as 
such are worth particular focus in this discussion.  While they are generally classifiable as 
historical narrative, they are also a blend of Roman military thinking, Greek theory and his 
experience.708  Yet, Caesar’s writings also favour the pitched battle over skirmishing and non-
pitched battle narrative.  This is probably because his commentaries had the potential to have 
some effect on his political popularity, and as with all generals in the period under study, the 
pitched battle itself could bring quick success and political advancement.709  His 
commentaries are nonetheless some of the best accounts of war that survive from antiquity.  
Alongside their military details, they have particular value because they are eyewitness 
accounts, or compiled from the reports of subordinates.710  Indeed, Caesar’s battle 
descriptions have been a source of particular interest for scholars, especially because he is the 
last of the soldier-authors and the only surviving Roman author to be a participant in the 
battles he describes for the period under study.711  As Gilliver has pointed out, much of the 
value of Caesar’s commentaries lies in his avoidance of literary formulas common in 
historical narratives.712   
That topoi are common to both Greek and Roman battle narratives is a familiar notion for 
scholars.713  McDonald and Walsh have noted that this tradition in Livian battle-accounts and 
siege narratives specifically includes physical metaphors used to describe battle, such as vis 
and impetus.714  Caesarian battle narrative differs from the Greek tradition insofar as it 
regularly includes two other topoi.  One is that of animus or the mental state of soldiers in 
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combat.  Lendon makes it clear that not only Caesar but many of our ancient sources were 
well aware of the importance of a soldier’s animus on the battlefield.715  Related subjects have 
been reviewed by other scholars as well, and they are closely linked with the psychology of 
combat.716  I will discuss psychology and combat in further detail in a later section. 
Another theme in battle narrative is that of virtus or courage.  While it is not predominant in 
Polybius, it is a main theme for Caesar, and for his contemporary Diodorus Siculus.717  Virtus 
seems to have been a key factor in battle for the Romans, and the only means of achieving a 
true victory.  Indeed, Champion has pointed out that fortitude and bravery are present 
throughout Polybius’ narrative of the First Punic War.718  For many ancient historians, the 
role of courage in battle was probably an inherent part of combat regardless of the outcome.719  
Even if a battle was lost, Romans could be portrayed as having had admirable virtus, 
particularly if they died fighting.720  Lendon adds that ‘at some level Caesar thinks that battles 
are supposed to be fought by virtus.’721  Because of this, the usage of the term can be biased 
or rhetorical.722  For Caesar in particular, it may well have been used for political ends.  He 
could have used it to make himself or his army appear in a favourable light, to deflect 
attention from his mistakes or to deceive his reader otherwise.  His ability to do this is 
allowed by the general Roman understanding that courage is a key factor at any particular 
point in battle.723  How this applies to skirmishing and non-pitched battle will have to be 
assessed on case-by-case basis.  However, because our definitions of these forms of combat 
are closely related to the combat within pitched battle, we may find the aforementioned 
elements of narrative rhetoric similarly applicable to skirmishing and non-pitched battle.  Yet, 
courage is a relative and subjective term.724  So, when evaluating courage, it is necessary to 
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judge individual actions in combat in their proper context, rather than apply the term from a 
general understanding, and in particular the Roman one that follows that it is an inherent 
factor in combat.  We will see that this is particularly important to keep in mind when 
assessing the possible psychological effects of skirmishing on soldiers and especially velites 
during pitched battles. 
We have seen that rhetorically, Caesar’s battle narratives reach beyond the standard Greek 
discussion of combat.  The latter is heavily structured on a tactical conception of battle, 
interspersed with interesting tidbits about individual actions or events within it.725  While 
Caesar’s descriptions owe much to the Greek standard, his topoi of animus and virtus add an 
additional element of rhetoric.726  This in turn can create somewhat artistic and 
impressionistic battle descriptions that often leave loose ends in their tactical summary.727  
Yet, this approach is far more useful to a ‘face of battle’ study than the traditional Greek 
tactics-focused approach.  Perhaps most importantly for this study, this usefulness in 
elucidating the ‘face’ of pitched battle, directly helps to clarify the face of skirmishing and 
non-pitched battle, which are, as I have defined them, closely related to pitched battle 
combat. 
Combat Technique 
As mentioned above, determining what we can in regards to the realities of combat technique 
and what may have been ‘typical’ will be key to an evaluation of the ‘face of battle’.  The 
techniques discussed in this section will be used in the sections that follow as an aid to help 
elucidate the ‘face of combat’.  This will be done by applying the suggestions made here to 
the specific scenarios and examples discussed in the following sections.  That said however, 
it must be remembered that various techniques may have been adapted to suit the local 
situation.728  As such, the suggestions made in this section may serve as basic combat models 
on which to build our analysis of particular examples. 
Because combat technique is dominated by the arms and armour of the combatant, the 
practical possibilities of combat technique will be based on known armament sets.  
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Lightly equipped infantry: lack of body armour and lack of large shields 
Since there are no contemporary accounts of how these soldiers would have engaged in hand-
to-hand combat, the following is purely conjectural.  Nevertheless, such speculation may aid 
in elucidating the possible ‘face’ of skirmishing and non-pitched-battle. 
For those Roman light infantry armed with a typical Roman gladius and perhaps a small 
shield or parma (e.g. velites), a slash-and-parry technique would probably be the most 
suitable type of combat with this armament.  Because these soldiers had little protection, and 
because their shields (if any) were not large, slow movement, both in terms of overall body 
position as well as arm movement would probably leave the soldier quite vulnerable in hand-
to-hand combat.  As a result, I would suggest that quick moves with both arms along with 
light footwork seem to make the most sense with this armament.729 
An excerpt from Plato’s Laws describes the ‘pyrrhiche’ or war dance, which presumably 
imitated the movements of such lightly armed or missile armed infantry.  Naturally, there are 
significant cultural and temporal differences between what Plato is describing and Roman 
lightly equipped infantry.  Yet, it may help to give us some indication of what the dynamics 
of Roman combat may have looked like:  
Of the noble kind [of dancing] there is,730 on the one hand, the motion of fighting, 
and that of fair bodies and brave souls engaged in violent effort; and, on the other 
hand, there is the motion of a temperate soul living in a state of prosperity and 
moderate pleasures; and this latter kind of dancing one will call, in accordance 
with its nature, “pacific.” The warlike division, being distinct from the pacific, 
one may rightly term “pyrrhiche”; it represents modes of eluding all kinds of 
blows and shots by swervings and duckings and side-leaps upward or crouching; 
and also the opposite kinds of motion, which lead to active postures of offence, 
when it strives to represent the movements involved in shooting with bows or 
darts, and blows of every description. In all these cases the action and the tension 
of the sinews are correct when there is a representation of fair bodies and souls in 
which most of the limbs of the body are extended straight: this kind of 
representation is right, but the opposite kind we pronounce to be wrong.731  
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The connection to skirmishing can be found in the line regarding ‘the movements involved in 
shooting with bows or darts’.732  Van Wees has suggested that such movements could be 
performed by the Classical hoplite, but due to the dynamism of these manoeuvres, I would 
suggest they are more suitable for lightly armed skirmishers.733  Plato’s phrasing indicates that 
it is representative (e)pixeirou/saj mimei=qai) of such action which suggests that it is 
probable that this dynamic may have been prevalent in Roman warfare. 
What we have as a possible basic model for lightly equipped infantry then, are very dynamic 
movements, grounded in light footwork and a wide range of swift motions. 
Infantry equipped with cuirasses and heavy shields 
This category is applicable to infantry throughout the period under review.  Though the styles 
and shapes of Roman heavy shields and cuirasses changed over our 500-year period, the 
changes were not substantial enough for us to be able to suggest that there were significant 
changes in combat techniques as a result. 
Although Vegetius argues that a stab or thrust with the point of the sword is more effective 
than a slash, from sculptural, archaeological and literary evidence we can extrapolate that 
both techniques were possible and likely used from the stance described below.734  Indeed, 
Polybius describes the sword as having as deadly an effect with the cut as with the thrust.735  
It should not be assumed however, that Roman fencing techniques were as simple as 
straightforward slashing and thrusting.  Vegetius’ description of the training exercises 
highlight the skill required in the proper use of the gladius, and its detail is useful in 
understanding Roman combat technique, especially as Vegetius is ostensibly drawing on an 
ancient source for this material (1.11).  As such, it is worth reproducing this passage in full 
here: 
We are informed by the writings of the ancients that, among their other exercises, 
they had that of the post. They gave their recruits round bucklers woven with 
willows, twice as heavy as those used on real service, and wooden swords double 
the weight of the common ones. They exercised them with these at the post both 
morning and afternoon.  This is an invention of the greatest use, not only to 
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soldiers, but also to gladiators. No man of either profession ever distinguished 
himself in the circus or field of battle, who was not perfect in this kind of 
exercise. Every soldier, therefore, fixed a post firmly in the ground, about the 
height of six feet. Against this, as against a real enemy, the recruit was exercised 
with the above mentioned arms, as if with the common shield and sword, 
sometimes aiming at the head or face, sometimes at the sides, at others 
endeavouring to strike at the thighs or legs. He was instructed in what manner to 
advance and retire, and in short how to take every advantage of his adversary; but 
was thus above all particularly cautioned not to lay himself open to his antagonist 
while aiming his stroke at him.736 
There is archaeological evidence found at Carlisle that could possibly help corroborate 
Vegetius’ description.  From there we have a wooden object roughly resembling a body in 
shape, measuring approximately 1.5 metres in length, bearing evidence of cuts on one side.  
As Davies has already suggested, this may have been a practice post.737  Practice against such 
posts would have been important to ensure the soldier knew how to perform under the duress 
of combat.  Such practice could have ensured fighting techniques were instilled into muscle 
memory, which would then allow the soldier to fight effectively even if the stress of combat 
had negative or restrictive physiological effects, as fear is often wont to do.738  I would 
suggest that such fighting techniques would be the same as those used in non-pitched battle, 
as per the definitions above.  As skirmishing would be more fluid, soldiers’ movements may 
have been more arbitrary. 
Further evidence for the technique described by Vegetius may be found in several ancient 
authors, all of whom describe how generals instructed their armies to aim at certain parts of 
the enemy’s body.739  The Adamklissi metopes and combat scenes from Trajan’s column also 
depict Roman soldiers raising their swords above their heads in a slashing movement.  
Though much of this evidence comes from pitched battles, we should not assume that 
drastically different techniques would be used in non-pitched battle scenarios.  
As Bishop and Coulston remind us however, it was the shield that was essential to Roman 
sword fighting, it helped to protect against bruising internal haemorrhaging, and other forms 
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of blunt force trauma sustained even under the most padded body armours.740  As such, it 
would have been essential in any combat, including non-pitched battle and skirmishing 
scenarios.  The scutum had a very sturdy yet flexible design due to its curve and construction 
of layered plywood, as is noted by Goldsworthy.741  The scutum thus served as an excellent 
defensive weapon, which of course would have been very beneficial, since Roman swords 
did not lend themselves to parrying effectively, as they were too short.  This is particularly 
important to remember when considering the nature of skirmishing.  Any loose-order single 
combats would have necessitated the use of the shield precisely because the gladius was too 
short to be used as an effective defensive weapon.  Furthermore, as James has noted, the 
usual psychological reaction to danger is not only a rush of adrenaline, but also an instinctive 
movement to block an attack.742  In a speech Tacitus attributes to Suetonius Paulinus, we find 
that both the shield and the sword were vital in combat.  The general instructs his army to 
‘close up the ranks, and having discharged your pila, with shields and swords continue the 
work of bloodshed and destruction’ (Tac. Ann. 14.36).  Tacitus is even more specific 
regarding the use of shields in his description of the Battle of Mons Graupius,  
So the Batavians came to blows with the enemy, striking them with the boss of 
their shields, to disfigure their faces.743 
If a legionary was holding the shield in front of him, standing slighting sideways to his 
opponent, with his left foot forward, the shield could have been also used as an effective 
offensive weapon.  This is not only because the soldier could have punched with his shield 
(e.g. using the bottom edge or the front), but its weight, which was between 12-22 lb, could 
be driven with a substantial amount of the soldier’s body weight behind it.744  There are 
several examples indicating that it was successfully used in this way.  The Batavian cohorts at 
Mons Graupius punched at the faces of the Britons with their shields to gain the upper-hand 
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(as noted above – Tac. Agr. 36).  A soldier on the monument at Adamklissi is also seen 
punching his enemy’s face with his shield boss.  A relief from the Arch at Orange depicts a 
soldier using the bottom edge of his shield to punch at the face of his enemy, which can also 
be seen in Scene 108 on Trajan’s column.  This was not a new technique, in fact; perhaps the 
most famous example is that of T. Manilus Torquatus, who won his legendary single combat 
against a Gaul with the offensive use of his shield.  Clearly, the scutum had an important role 
to play in offensive combat movements.745  As such, I would suggest it could have been used 
offensively in any kind of combat scenario. 
Because of the shield’s size, soldiers would have been relatively protected against most 
attacks.  However, the size and weight of the shield would have made it difficult to 
manoeuvre quickly, and if the soldier was not ready in a naturally defensive position with his 
shield in front of him, he likely would have found it difficult to parry an opponent’s attack 
swiftly.746  The size and weight of a Roman shield would have made it difficult to move 
swiftly and powerfully in a fight, yet, the advantage of using the shield offensively cannot be 
ignored.  A punch from the scutum would be a difficult manoeuvre to defend against without 
a similarly sized shield.  Indeed during Polybius’ time we hear that such shields did not exist 
amongst Rome’s enemies and thus gave her soldiers confidence in battle (Polyb. 15.15.8).  
For me, this also explains the popularity of depictions of using the shield offensively in the 
iconographic and literary evidence. 
However, because of the aforementioned cumbersome features of the shield, I suggest 
soldiers were not constantly swinging the shield about.  I would argue that they may have 
either waited to wear their enemies down in a defensive stance, or simply waited for an 
opening where a strike with the shield would be most advantageous.  Such defensive 
manoeuvrings coincide with Vegetius’ description above, and required that the shield be held 
facing the enemy.   
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While this stance is similar to what Connolly has already suggested, Connolly’s proposal 
differs significantly in the body positioning of the legionary.  Connolly argues that when 
facing enemies wielding a long-sword, the Romans could have adopted a crouching stance 
that would have allowed them to get underneath the guard of the opponent (especially a 
larger one) and attack the stomach.  He bases this finding on the shape of the Roman helmet 
from the mid-Republic to the early empire, as well as the design of the gladius.  He claims 
that the eye-level peaks at the back of the helmets allowed for this position, and that the 
Mainz-type sword, being more efficient at thrusting than its successor, meant getting in close 
for a thrusting strike was essential.  Over time, he says the Romans adopted a more erect 
stance, based on the longer neck-guards of later helmets and the better cutting efficiency of 
the Pompeii-type gladius.747  Although there is some evidence regarding soldiers getting 
under the guard of their opponents, this crouch position would have left the legionary’s back 
very much exposed.748  Furthermore, there is no evidence that supports Connolly’s argument 
regarding the efficiency of one blade over another.  Goldsworthy convincingly argues for an 
alternative stance, one that is depicted on the Adamklissi metopes and the relief from Mainz: 
Normally the scutum was held out horizontally in front of a man [i.e. the long 
side parallel to the body].  The soldier stood behind it in a slight crouch, his left 
leg towards the enemy, and his right side turned away…the shield covered a 
man’s torso, the top of his legs, and the bottom of his face.  The helmet protected 
the top half of the head, whilst its cheek pieces covered more of the face.  The 
only parts of the body exposed to the enemy were the legs, principally the left, the 
right arm, and parts of the face.749 
The anatomical evidence on skeletal remains also supports the likelihood of this suggestion.750  
Aside from Maiden Castle there are few skeletal remains from the Roman era, yet as 
Goldsworthy has pointed out, the similarities between our anatomical evidence and those on 
skeletons from the medieval ages suggests that we can legitimately generalize about combat 
wounds.751  That said, it is interesting to note that both in the anatomical and literary evidence 
a majority of wounds occur on the legs, right arm and head.  Suetonius tells of the heroic 
centurion Cassius Scaeva who fought with a wound in his eye and shoulder.  Plutarch notes 
the centurion Crastinus’ famous last deeds before he was killed by a sword through the 
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mouth.752  These are the exposed areas of a soldier when he stands in the stance described 
above, or even when he attacks.  A punch with the shield would give the soldier space 
between himself and his opponent, not only making it harder for his enemy to reach him with 
a weapon, but also potentially throwing him off balance, giving a Roman soldier a good 
opportunity to follow with an attack with his sword.  If his opponent were able to parry this 
attack, the Roman’s head, right arm, and lower legs would be exposed: the areas where 
wounds are most common.  However, an over-head swing with the sword may have also 
exposed the Roman’s torso.  This is corroborated by the noted importance of bearing battle 
scars.753  These scars could have only existed if they were glancing blows or cuts, rather than 
stab wounds to the vitals.  Roman soldiers were probably aware of the danger of exposing 
themselves in an attack, and so again, Goldsworthy’s suggestion that they stood on the 
defensive until the right opportunity became available to them is quite sound.754  Also, 
another example of this defensive type of combat can be found in Cassius Dio’s description 
of the battle of Phillipi, as he states that the soldiers ‘were at first cautiously looking for a 
chance to wound others without being wounded themselves’ (Dio 47.44).   
The Bellum Africum, includes a passage where Caesar instructs his men in fighting 
techniques which emphasize a back-and-forth movement in the battle-line (Caes. BAfr. 71).  I 
will return to this back-and-forth dynamic in the following paragraphs, presently it is worth 
noting that these directives were made necessary due to the swiftness of the light-armed 
auxiliaries that his legionaries had trouble with during the campaign against Scipio in Africa.  
This suggests that the legionaries’ normal mode of fighting may have been more static than 
the dynamic technique Caesar teaches them, which in turn further emphasizes this defensive 
combat technique.  It seems most sensible to me to have this technique applied with the 
shield facing the enemy, and is equally executable in non-pitched battle. 
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We have additional evidence however, that has not been sufficiently assessed by modern 
scholarship; furthermore, it points to a much more dynamic movement of the soldier, which 
in turn helps to explain the way in which lulls occurred and how the standards functioned in 
combat.  In Vegetius’ passage at 1.11 mentioned above, I would draw particular attention to 
the instruction to advance and retire appropriately.  This movement suggests a much more 
dynamic approach to combat.   
As already noted, the Bellum Africum, includes a passage where Caesar also instructs his men 
in fighting techniques which emphasize a back-and-forth movement in the battle-line (Caes. 
BAfr. 71).  Just as in Vegetius’ passage above, the notion of advancing and retreating is 
prevalent.755  Tacitus likewise implies that soldiers naturally extended and contracted their 
lines, and when this was not done in a controlled manner, the legions could end up in quite 
loose order, which made them vulnerable.  Tacitus tells us that due this exactly what 
happened to the Vitellian legions at the second battle of Bedriacum, because they were 
without a commander (Hist. 3.25).  We might liken this type of back-and-forth movement in 
combat to modern combat sports such as boxing, where fighters are most effective when they 
are literally ‘on their toes’.  Being overly static in life-or-death combat may not have always 
been advantageous against an enemy intent on landing a killing blow.  This is certainly what 
Dio believes to have been one of the causes behind the Varian disaster.  He claims that the 
freedom to advance and retire on behalf of the Germans was one of the factors that gave them 
the advantage over the legionaries in the Teutoburger Wald, thus implying that the Romans 
could not do so (Dio 56.21.4).  To be sure, giving ground when necessary is arguably what 
allowed for lulls in combat: both forces could back away from each other to take the breaks 
that we hear of in our descriptions of pitched battle.756 
Dynamic movement in combat is evident in two further instances in Vegetius, both of which 
include a running jump (Mil. 1.9, 2.23).  Such a manoeuvre would certainly shock an 
unprepared opponent, but the realities of fighting techniques however and how they 
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compared to Vegetius’ descriptions are difficult to determine.  Indeed, this technique seems 
somewhat reckless, and the size of the Roman line infantry shield (whether legionary or 
auxiliary) would probably hinder such a manoeuvre.  Nevertheless, if soldiers were to 
perform such a dynamic manoeuvre, I would suggest that non-pitched battle or skirmishing 
combat would be the ideal circumstance in which to execute it.  This is because if a soldier 
were to perform this manoeuvre in pitched battle, they might critically expose themselves to 
nearby enemies.  On the other hand, Caesar describes just such a jumping manoeuvre in a 
pitched battle (Caes. BG 1.52).  Even so, it may have simply been an ad hoc manoeuvre that 
consequentially merited a mention in his commentaries.  On the other hand, however, I would 
argue that it is exponentially more viable in skirmishes.  In such circumstances, the threat of 
nearby soldiers within striking-range or within missile-range is probably significantly 
reduced.  Furthermore, our references to this manoeuvre from Vegetius and Sallust do not 
mention the technique in a pitched battle context.757  In any case, the dynamics of this process 
and the frequency of its use must remain speculative.   
There is a passage in the Caesar’s Civil War that seemingly contests this idea of dynamic 
combat technique, and so it must be evaluated closely. 
At the Battle of Ilerda in 49 BC the situation is described as follows: 
The manner of fighting of Afranius' soldiers was, to come forward briskly against 
an enemy, and boldly take possession of some post, neither taking care to keep 
their ranks, nor holding it necessary to fight in a close compact body.  If they 
found themselves hard pushed, they thought it no dishonour to retire and quit 
their posts ... This affair, moreover, disordered our men, as they were not used to 
this type of fighting.  Seeing several of the enemy come forward, they were 
themselves however, keeping their ranks, withdrawing neither from the standards 
nor without serious cause from their ground which they held, thinking they were 
to be surrounded on their open flank determined a retreat to be required.758 
This passage elucidates several possible key features of the Roman fighting technique, at 
least under Caesar.  First; that line infantry were accustomed to facing the enemy head on, 
and second, that they did not give ground beyond their standards without serious cause (gravi 
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causa).  To understand how this fits in with the previously discussed technique, we must 
assess these features more closely. 
That legionaries normally faced the enemy head-on is made clear by the fact that Caesar’s 
soldiers decided to retreat when the Pompeian soldiers broke rank and individually threatened 
the flanks of Caesar’s legionaries.  This necessity for head-on combat is made quite clear if 
we understand the legionaries’ movements to resemble the back-and-forth movement 
described by Vegetius and Caesar.  Such back-and-forth movement can only be performed if 
the soldiers move in a relatively straight line, face-on towards enemy, rather than 
approaching them in a curving motion.  I would suggest that this passage confirms this.   
This back-and-forth movement does not necessitate giving ground behind the standards, as 
Caesar points out.  This is because the front line of soldiers is both stationed in front of their 
own standards, and a short distance away from their opponents.759  Because of this space 
between the opposing armies, when using the back-and-forth technique, the only ground that 
is given, is that ground which is first taken with the initial advance into this space.  As 
mentioned above, this technique is also made necessary by the position of the standards, 
which determine the pace of general advance and positioning of the entire unit.760  They 
restrict the soldiers from advancing too far beyond them, or retreating behind them.761  Thus, 
the position of the standards necessitates that the antesignani adhere to a generally 
established front line, so this back-and-forth motion could have been necessary to ensure that 
this line was held.  For example, if several soldiers advanced too far beyond their standard, 
they would have to return to hold their line and prevent themselves from being enveloped by 
the enemy or exposing any significant gaps or dangerous ‘kinks’ in their line.  They would 
presumably make this return whilst facing the enemy, thus creating the back-and forth 
movement.   
In the passage regarding Ilerda, the assertion that the soldiers would not give ground should 
be understood to be an emphasis on the fact that soldiers were not used to backing up too far 
from their established front line.  This can be further determined by the fact that the passage 
says that the soldiers would not abandon their standards.  We know that these soldiers are 
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antesignani and so therefore regularly advanced before the standards.  As such, these men 
would not retreat beyond the front line (i.e. back behind the standards) without serious cause 
(sine gravi causa).  They could nonetheless fight in front of the standards with the back-and-
forth technique and comfortably maintain their line. 
Thus, this first engagement at Ilerda highlights the disciplined yet dynamic technique with 
which Roman soldiers may have fought.  They held their line by not retreating beyond their 
standards, but likewise moved back-and-forth in front of the standards when engaging an 
opponent.  Afranius’ men broke both of these normal practices: they did not advance in a 
straight line but outflanked the antesignani and also, they retreated beyond what the 
Caesarians perceived to be their established front line.  As such, their technique merited a 
description in Caesar’s Civil War, which as has been shown, not only implies what 
techniques the Romans were probably used to, but also matches their explicit description 
elsewhere by both Caesar and Vegetius. 
Since Roman soldiers were probably aware of the danger of exposing themselves in an 
attack, Goldsworthy’s assertion that the Roman fighting technique could have been both 
assertive and economical, again, is quite sound.  Indeed, as has been shown, there is ample 
evidence to support this fundamental approach to deadly hand-to-hand combat.  This in turn 
goes some way to explaining the duration of battles.  If the Roman fighting technique was not 
aggressive, but rather assertive and tentative, it is no wonder achieving tactical advances 
could have taken some time.  However, it should be understood that this approach to combat 
was applied once combat was underway, after any initial clash of the battle lines took place 
resulting from the opening charge.  This could be applied to non-pitched battle in precisely 
the same way as it does to pitched battle. 
I hope to have shown that this technique is probably the foundation upon which manoeuvres 
that are more dynamic could have been executed.  Freedom of movement, controlled by the 
standards, would have been necessary to allow soldiers to take full advantage of their 
enemies.   
As regards imperial auxiliaries, because they may have been equipped with a smaller, flat, 
oval shield, we have grounds for suggesting that their fighting techniques may have differed 
from those of the legionary.  Yet, this was not necessarily the case.  Bishop and Coulston 
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have argued that the shape of the auxiliary shield may have been more suited to open-order 
fighting such as skirmishing than the legionaries’ curved rectangular shield.762  As pointed out 
in the section on tactical roles however, there is little evidence to support this argument.  
While the larger legionary shield probably lent itself more efficiently to static, defensive-
stance fighting, the shape of the auxiliary shield itself is the only evidence that lends itself to 
the ‘open-order’ fighting argument.763  In contrast, evidence from Trajan’s column suggests 
that techniques similar to those discussed with the legionary scutum above may have been 
used.  Scene 24 shows auxiliaries with their shields held out almost horizontally, with the 
bottom curve facing the enemy.  This is the same offensive use of the shield mentioned 
above.764  Also, because these shields were smaller than the legionary scutum, it may be 
tempting to equate the technique of the oval shield to that of the parma suggested above: 
auxiliaries might move it about freely as they attacked (as per Bishop and Coulston’s 
argument regarding open-order fighting).  However, the auxiliary shield was certainly much 
heavier than the parma and so was not necessarily used in the same way.765  Rather, because 
both the auxiliary shield and the legionary shield were designed as ‘heavy’ shields, their 
usage techniques were probably quite similar.  Thus, returning to the ‘open-order’ fighting 
argument, because the auxiliary shield was smaller in size and shape, it offered less 
protection, and so may have required a less static mode of fighting than the legionary shield 
allowed for.  This is turn may be understood to mean that the auxiliaries preferred a more 
dynamic and open-order mode of fighting, and thus their shields complimented their fighting 
style.  The reality behind this inference however, must remain speculative. 
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There is a reference in Tacitus to the differing ‘faces of combat’ when enemies faced Roman 
auxilia or legionaries.  At Ann. 12.35 he notes that Britons were felled from behind by the 
swords and pila (gladiis ac pilis) of the legionaries when facing the auxilia, and conversely, 
they were cut down by the swords and spears (spathis et hastis) of the auxiliaries when facing 
the legionaries.  While there is perhaps a strong sense of narrative rhetoric in this passage, it 
is interesting to note that the implied mode of attack from both groups is the same; the only 
difference being the weapons that they used.  Naturally, there is some difference in the way 
gladii and spathae as well as pila and hastae would be used, but Tacitus is not specific with 
the details, and so any deductions would be speculative.  Yet, from this passage, we may also 
infer that when engaging the enemy head-on, Roman troops, whether legionary or auxiliary, 
fought in a defensive manner.  Tacitus explicitly states that the Britons fell to the Roman 
weapons when they were not facing them.  Thus, it may be said that when they were facing 
them, they were less aggressive and/or eager to wound, as discussed above. 
All of the combat techniques discussed above should help inform the following section which 
assesses the ‘face of battle’ between various groups of light infantry. 
The Unit’s Battle 
Because different types of ‘units’ could have engaged in non-pitched battle combat, the 
following section will assess the ‘face of the unit’s battle’ for several different types of units.  
These groups will differ insofar as how they are equipped, and in their combat experience.766 
Lightly armed skirmishers vs. lightly armed skirmishers (velites and the 
like)  
 Pre-pitched-battle skirmishing 
Our sources do not describe the dynamics of this kind of combat.  For skirmishing in Roman 
armies, we must not only draw on what little our sources say in general about these 
engagements, but also on our knowledge of equipment as well as comparative examples from 
related descriptions of combat to suggest a probable ‘face of combat’ here.767 
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As two groups of infantry skirmishers set out against each other, there was probably little 
uniformity of movement.  As a result, there was also probably no real ‘clash’ of battle lines.768  
Without a formal command structure, the velites may have been spurred on from behind by 
the centurions and line infantry of the units they were attached to.  Naturally, the glory-
seekers would lead the ‘cloud’ of velites in their varied pace.  Also, because of this lack of 
uniformity, unlike a pilum volley from a legion, missiles probably did not rain down en 
masse.  Thus, the opportunity to aim at an entire ‘unit’ of light-armed skirmishers was 
probably very slim.  Instead, skirmishing amongst designated skirmishers (such as those 
skirmishes that often took place at the beginning of battles), was probably a very 
individualistic battle, rather than a unit battle.769  Individual skirmishers would probably be 
aiming at other individual skirmishers.  Within this scenario, there are two possible ‘faces’ of 
skirmish; the first probably being the more realistic of the two, as will be indicated below.  
The first might be likened to the initial clash as described in the Illiad, where the masses of 
soldiers are close, perhaps throwing missiles at each other, but only the bravest fight at close 
range, moving in and out of the sparse mass.770  Very much like lightly armed skirmishers, the 
warriors in the Illiad are  
highly mobile, moving back and forth in and out of the fight, which is mostly 
conducted by throwing spears, though occasionally a man moves in close enough 
to deliver a blow with spear or sword.771 
Polybius describes this kind of dynamic at Ilipa, where the light infantry fought in waves, 
such of them as were forced from their ground retired on their own heavy infantry 
and then formed again for attack...772 
In combined forces of light infantry where javelin-throwers and slingers might be grouped 
together, the latter could also provide the area where the former could retire to.  Since 
slingers are not necessarily always armed with a sword, and javelin-throwers such as velites 
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were, it would be the velites who may have occasionally moved forward to engage in hand-
to-hand combat, if the slingers were not equipped to do so.773 
Naturally, there could have been variations on this dynamic in a skirmish.  Daly has 
suggested that ‘Roman skirmishers were divided into small teams, perhaps based upon their 
contubernia.’774  He also suggests that the velites must have been deployed in great depth, 
operating in groups of 150, occupying approximately 5.4 m across.  Daly does not clarify his 
reasoning for such numbers beyond the suggestion that these groups of velites corresponded 
to the maniples to which they were attached.775  I would counter that assigning such specific 
numbers to groups of skirmishers is futile, not least because the dynamic nature of 
skirmishing itself precludes such restrictions.776  This will be discussed in further detail 
below; suffice it to say presently that maintaining such formations whilst engaged in 
skirmish-combat was probably near-impossible and thus seems highly unlikely.   
The possibility exists however, that some skirmishers acted in concert.777  A sudden 
noticeable push forward from such a group could have resulted in a small breakthrough or 
minor retreat of the opposing force from which they might rally to resume a more even 
exchange.778  This fluctuation in battle intensity could have been the result of several causes, 
amongst which could have been the need to help a fellow soldier in danger, or to recover a 
fallen comrade’s body.  Again, this is reminiscent of Homeric warfare.779  Using the Illiad as 
an example, van Wees argues this could have been done in two ways, either contracting 
forces to the required spot or by calling those at the back up to the front.780  This dynamic of 
constant fluctuation within the skirmishing swarm mimics the second possible ‘face of 
skirmish’.  This second possibility differs from the first (mentioned above) insofar as there is 
greater fluidity of movement amongst all the skirmishers involved.  So, with the first 
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possibility, the opposing masses or ‘clouds’ of skirmishers generally does not move as a 
whole, though there is minor movement within the cloud (e.g. to avoid missiles) and minor 
movements in and out (e.g. by the bravest, or by a small group).781  In this way, the respective 
clouds ‘face-off’ against each other.782  The second possibility suggests that all the 
skirmishers on both sides are constantly moving in and around each other with no restrictions 
of space aside from the opposing acies of line infantry, and the dangers of turning one’s back 
to the enemy.783  This is how Thucydides (6.69) describes yiloi\ at Syracuse in 415 BC: 
First there was the fighting between the liqobo/loi, sfendonh=tai and 
toxo/tai of both sides in front of the battle-lines, and, as is usual with yiloi\, 
they chased one another about 
Polybius’ reference to the velites’ wolf’s skin might make more sense in this scenario for the 
following reason.  In the first scenario, the soldiers leading the mass of skirmishers are the 
ones engaging in combat most often.  Given the general lack of grand movements (though 
allowing for minor fluidity within the ‘cloud’), from their position they probably would have 
been hard to see from their own battle-line, where their commanders would have been 
stationed.784  With the second scenario, there is no clear front line between the skirmishing 
masses, with soldiers constantly moving in and out of combat around the battlefield.  As 
such, the most zealous soldiers might have a chance to display their virtus within visual range 
of their commanders.  One objection to this possibility is the sheer amount of energy required 
to sustain such constant and irregular movement for extended periods of time.  As with line 
infantry combat, pre-pitched battle skirmishing may have seen soldiers take breaks, probably 
by retiring away from the action.785  In doing so, they would cause the ‘cloud’ of skirmishers 
to have a more static area of movement, which in turn again imitates the first possibility of 
the ‘face of skirmish’.  Thus, the most likely reality was probably a mix of the two scenarios, 
where part of the skirmishing engagement involved soldiers moving freely about each other, 
but then, as van Wees suggests with Homeric warfare, there would be an area that was more 
static, to which soldiers could retire.  As discussed below in the section on the Psychology of 
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Combat, this arrangement also allows new recruits to participate in battle, without actually 
having to engage enemies in hand-to-hand combat.  They could instead be part of the more 
static area of a skirmish if they were too fearful of advancing to the front.  In this way, pre-
pitched battle skirmishing could also act as a training mechanism for new recruits, where they 
would not necessarily have to be exposed to extreme danger in order to experience battle.786 
Following Du Picq, Daly has recently argued that with Roman velites, having some ‘in 
reserve’ (i.e. in the more static area of the cloud) makes the most sense, especially 
considering their administrative deployment.  He notes that because the velites were assigned 
to the line infantry maniples (as per Polyb. 6.24), they would be deployed in lines, according 
to the manipular assignments.  So, the velites attached to the hastati would advance first, 
followed by those attached to the principes, with those assigned to the triarii bringing up the 
rear.  Daly goes on to say that in this way, some skirmishers would be kept in reserve, thus 
being able to sustain a longer barrage of missiles as a whole; not having it expended all at 
once.787   
While this suggestion is comparable to the dynamic I have suggested, I would argue that 
Daly’s reasoning for this dynamic is somewhat problematic, for two reasons.  First, the 
velites had no standards that we know of, and because there were no commanders guiding 
their movements on the battlefield, I find it unlikely that skirmishers would have been able to, 
or even endeavoured to keep ranks according to their lines of infantry to which they were 
assigned.  Given both the fluidity of combat, and the desire to display their virtus, there 
would probably be little effort to maintain specific ranks.788  Secondly, Daly’s suggestions 
regarding reserving missiles are directly derived from DuPicq.  Yet, while Du Picq’s 
nineteenth-century skirmishers may have entered combat with ammunition preservation in 
mind, we have already noted the reusability of Roman skirmishing javelins, and so the same 
theory is not applicable to our period.789  Instead, as I have already suggested, maintaining a 
group of men in the rear of a skirmish would probably be both a matter of safety and of 
preventing exhaustion, rather than one of sustaining a missile barrage. 
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In regards to this zone of the skirmishing cloud, the area did not necessarily have to be 
completely static, nor did the soldiers in this area have to have their backs turned to their own 
battle lines.  I would suggest that the ‘static’ or perhaps ‘less-active’ part of the cloud had a 
zone of free movement that could have seen this mass of troops standing with either their 
backs to their battle line or sideways (i.e. perpendicular) to their own line infantry.  Barring a 
lot of dust being kicked up, being perpendicular to the line infantry allows skirmishers to be 
within visual range of their commanders as their view of the active part of the cloud would be 
more or less un-obscured.790   
Polybius’ discussion on Roman military decorations also supports this dynamic of a mutually 
active and less-active skirmishing cloud.  At 6.39.4 he discusses the how soldiers were 
rewarded, noting that  
This does not take place in the event of their having wounded or stripped any of 
the enemy in a pitched battle or the storming of a town; but in skirmishes or other 
occasions of that sort, in which, without there being any positive necessity for 
them to expose themselves singly to danger, they have done so voluntarily and 
deliberately. 
The key assertion here is probably the fact that rewards were not given in regular combat 
within pitched battle (e)n parata/xei), but rather in skirmishes (a)krobolismoi=j) or the 
like.  This suggests that skirmishes regularly involved soldiers exposing themselves to 
danger, but not out of necessity.  This in turn supports our scenario where the bravest soldiers 
come out from the cloud to engage in single combat, and likewise where their commanders 
can witness them doing so.791  This aptitude for hand-to-hand combat on behalf of the velites 
clarifies their ability, as light troops, to engage in such combat with heavy infantry and even 
rout them as at the battles of Mount Olympus and Ancyra.792  Indeed, as Lendon has pointed 
out, velites were ‘eager to fight hand to hand’, which was ‘a habit Greek light infantry did not 
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share.’793  This is emphasized by Livy in his description of an engagement between 
Macedonian and Roman forces in 199 BC, 
So the king’s cavalry, unaccustomed to a stationary combat, were no match for 
the Roman horse, and his infantry, trained to skirmish in loose order and 
unprotected by armour, were at the mercy of the velites who with their swords 
and shields were equally prepared for defence and attack.794 
Thus, this readiness for hand-to-hand combat probably made the velites a unique type of 
lightly armed infantry within the Hellenistic era. 
An important aspect of the skirmish which must be noted is that we have moving targets 
shooting single missiles at each other, and so it is debatable whether such combat resulted in 
many casualties.  This in turn explains our ancient sources’ inexplicitness on skirmishes: they 
were simply ‘digna memoratu proelia inferior’, as Tacitus puts it (Hist. 2.24). 
This then raises the question of what the point of such skirmishes may have been.  Naturally, 
there were tactical circumstances external to the actual skirmish that could be directly 
affected, such as the screening of troop deployment (as discussed in Chapter 6).  
Furthermore, that the action within such skirmishes was not uniform is not to say that there 
were not any opportunities for co-operation.  Indeed, we have only to look to Polybius to 
understand the main combative purpose of such skirmishes: they provided the opportunity for 
individual soldiers to show their soldiering qualities,795 and leadership was undoubtedly 
amongst these.  As such, a soldier might choose to lead a small group of comrades against 
one or two opposing skirmishers so that they might concentrate their missile shots and thus 
increase the probability of a hit.796  This would not only result in the increased combat 
effectiveness of a skirmish, but also provide the leading soldier with the opportunity to prove 
his leadership qualities to his officers.797  This in turn would mean that the point of skirmishes 
could have possibly been to provide opportunities for new recruits to prove their fighting or 
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 Cf. Lendon 2005, 188.  The velites’ possible desire to impress their superiors is discussed in more detail 
below, under ‘The Individual’s Battle’. 
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leadership abilities, in order to move up in the ranks.  Alternatively, as briefly mentioned 
above, and discussed in the section below on the Psychology of Combat, skirmishing 
encourages fighting in groups without the necessity of one-on-one, hand-to-hand combat, 
thus possibly providing a type of ‘stress inoculation’ for new recruits.798  Certainly, such 
loose-order skirmishes were not as intense as hand-to-hand fighting, which also meant that 
they were less fatal than pitched battle combat.799  This, in turn, would make skirmishing less 
psychologically difficult than pitched battle combat, and it may be why the youngest recruits 
were chosen to perform these actions (cf. Polyb. 6.21). 
 Small group clashes 
When groups of lightly armed infantry clashed outside of pre-pitched battle skirmishing, 
there is no reason to assume that the dynamics of this combat were vastly different.  The main 
factor that probably had an influence on how the skirmish transpired was the terrain in which 
it took place.  A wide, open area lacking features that would hem in or restrict troop 
movement might allow for very fluid combat, with relatively few casualties.  Alternatively, 
wooded area might restrict missile combat and prevent any effective means of hand-to-hand 
combat.800  Hills would add to the velocity of missiles thrown downhill, and take from the 
impetus of missiles thrown uphill.  Plutarch alludes to nature of a missile’s impetus thrown 
by a skilled soldier in a description of oratory technique saying, 
terse and pithy speakers and those who can pack much sense into a short speech 
are more admired ... Plato, in fact, commends such pithy men, declaring that they 
are like skillful a)kontistai=j, for what they say is crisp, solid, and compact.801 
Hand-to-hand combat on a hillside likewise would have given the advantage to the combatant 
on higher ground.  We can apply any of these factors to the above analysis of skirmishing 
combat to help clarify the face of skirmishes. 
One particular skirmish in 217 BC during the Second Punic War, may also help to clarify the 
face of skirmishing in a clash between small forces.  Velites under Fabius engaged 
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Carthaginian light-armed troops in a narrow gorge of a pass.  Polybius tells us that on this 
occasion, Hannibal devised a tactic that involved lighting faggots tied to the heads of oxen at 
night, and sending them amongst the Roman light-armed.  What is important to note in this 
passage is the fact that Polybius tells us that the oxen fell in amongst the velites (au)toi=j 
e)mpipto/ntwn).  This suggests that the Roman light troops were in a loose enough formation 
for the oxen to run amongst them.  Whether they had advanced in a loose formation or 
whether they opened their ranks from a tight formation to let the oxen through is impossible 
to say.  Lendon suggests that in general, they seem to have fought as an ‘irregular swarm’.802  
And indeed, we do hear of another instance where velites fight in loose order in broken 
terrain.  During the Third Macedonian War, Roman light troops were dispatched against 
Macedonian light troops in a narrow pass.  Livy describes the situation as follows: 
As soon as they met, therefore, they instantly threw their javelins, and many 
wounds were inflicted and received on both sides in a reckless (temerarius) kind 
of conflict; but few of either party were killed … the summit of the mountain was 
wedged into a ridge so narrow, as scarcely to allow space for three ranks of 
infantry in front.  Thus, while but few were fighting, the greater part, especially 
those that were heavily armed, stood mere spectators of the fight. The light troops 
even ran through the hollows of the hill, and attacked the flanks of the light-
armed troops of the enemy; and alike through even and uneven places, were able 
to fight. That day, greater numbers were wounded than killed, and night put a 
stop to the dispute.803 
The terrain in this example necessarily allowed for very loose and broken formations 
amongst the light infantry.  That few soldiers were killed in this engagement (which actually 
lasted two days) highlights the ‘low-intensity’ nature of this combat.  And indeed, because of 
this, it is understandable that the engagement was quite protracted, lasting two days, stopping 
only due to nightfall. 
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Many of our examples of clashes between small groups take place between light infantry and 
cavalry deployed together against similar forces.804  So, this type of combat will be discussed 
in its respective section, below. 
 Siege Warfare 
There is very little discussion in our sources about the use of lightly armed skirmishers in 
sieges.805  We know that lightly armed slingers and archers were key soldiers in siege warfare, 
and we know that the use of missiles and arrows in particular seems to have been common, as 
the proverbial anecdote of the centurion Scaeva’s severely pierced shield reminds us.806  
Arrows were probably fired by contingents of auxiliary archers, who, as we know from the 
vocabulary assessment, were probably not very heavily armed.  Slingers were also used in 
siege warfare, and another example from Caesar describes how the sling bullets could be 
heated to set thatch roofs on fire.807  These soldiers were also lightly armed.  Nevertheless, an 
assessment of missile combat during sieges is perhaps more suitable for a fuller discussion 
dedicated to siege warfare.  Furthermore, since we have no evidence for hand-to-hand clashes 
between lightly armed infantry during sieges, we cannot add to the present discussion. 
Line Infantry versus Line Infantry  
Non-pitched battle combat and skirmishes between corps of line infantry occur in the form of 
small group clashes and ambushes.  Line infantry also face off in this type of combat when 
they are combined with cavalry, but this will be assessed in its own section, below. 
Small group clashes 
As with much of our evidence, we have few descriptions of small group clashes between line 
infantry.  Furthermore, these descriptions do not necessarily describe specific fighting 
technique.  Two descriptions in the sources offer the most useful details for this type of 
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combat; both of them come from Caesar, with some additional evidence from Plutarch.808  
These are our only extended descriptions of non-pitched battle and skirmishing combat 
amongst line infantry that can provide evidence for the present investigation.  Because of this, 
we cannot take them as being exemplary of such combat in general, but rather as case studies 
of particular instances of non-pitched battle and skirmishes between line infantry. 
The Battle of Illerda in 49 BC was actually a series of non-pitched engagements that began 
with the attempt to take a hill by Caesarian antesignani, which then escalated into a 
protracted conflict.809   
The first instance of non-pitched battle combat occurs at the aforementioned prominence.  
There, one legion’s antesignani engaged several Pompeian cohorts for control of the hill 
(Caes. BC 1.43).  The Caesarians were beaten back, partially because they were second to 
reach the hill, but also because of the fighting technique employed by their rivals.  This 
unconventional technique is discussed above, but what is important for the present discussion 
is the implication that the Caesarians had intended to use the standard pitched battle fighting 
technique in this small group within a non-pitched battle conflict.810  This is a marked contrast 
to the nature of light infantry skirmishing, discussed above.  One reason for this contrast 
might include the fact that line infantry expected to face line infantry in standard pitched 
battle fighting technique, even when facing off in smaller numbers.811  So, when Caesarian 
troops were faced with a skirmishing technique from other line infantry, they were 
unprepared to face it. 
The engagement that followed this first reverse for the antesignani resembled a pitched 
battle, though it came about from a failed rout.  Caesar tells us that after his antesignani had 
fallen back, his ninth legion chased the victorious Pompeians all the way back to Ilerda.  In 
doing so, they put themselves in a topographical disadvantage and ended up downhill from 
the Pompeians who had turned about.  We learn that this hill was steep on both sides, but 
wide enough to allow three cohorts to form up next to each other.  This battle continued for 
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five hours with both sides reinforcing their wounded and tired (Caes. BC 1.45).  The 
dynamics of this stage of combat are not described by Caesar, aside from a reference to the 
effectiveness of the enemy’s missiles, being thrown down on his soldiers.812  It is important to 
note that the pilum was the primary missile weapon of legionaries in the Roman army.  Their 
penetrating power was provided by their weighting and their pyramidal bodkin-head, rather 
than velocity, meaning they did not have to be thrown with great force to ensure a deadly 
blow.813  Accurate, and with good penetrating power, a legionary could unleash an accurate, 
penetrating attack without exposing himself to the enemy’s weapon, like he would if he were 
attacking with a gladius.  This is especially true for the javelins that bent on impact: a 
common consequence of their design that rendered them incapable of reuse.814  Other missile 
weapons, such as arrows, were unlikely to penetrate both the shield and armour of heavier 
troops, unless at close range.815  A pilum, on the other hand, even if it hit a shield rather than a 
soldier, its long shafted design was meant to not only penetrate an enemy shield, but also, 
with its own impetus be carried through the piercing and at the body of the bearer of the 
shield.816  Even if the attacked soldier was left unscathed, the narrow shaft would often cause 
it to bend, as mentioned above, making the shield inordinately heavy, awkward, and 
generally useless, causing the unlucky soldier to toss aside an important part of his protective 
armament.817   
Returning to the engagement at Ilerda, given that the soldiers were hemmed in by the steep 
terrain, it is probably unlikely that loose-order or skirmish-like combat took place.  This 
suggestion may be supported by the fact that Caesar does not emphasize the ‘Lusitanian’ 
fighting technique that the Pompeians used earlier for this stage of the battle.  Thus, this 
phase certainly seems to resemble typically practiced line infantry combat as described by 
Vegetius and Caesar in the section on combat techniques, above.  This emphasizes my 
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definition of non-pitched battle combat, given above, where legionaries use pitched battle 
modes of fighting in non-pitched battle.818   
After all the missiles of the enemy were spent, the Caesarians managed to overthrow them 
and chase them back to Ilerda (BC 1.46).  Casualty figures are reported as 200 dead and 600 
wounded.  This seems to be a relatively low number of dead, especially considering the large 
numbers involved.819  I would argue that this confirms the typical, defensive type of combat 
taking place on the irregular terrain before Ilerda.  The defensive stance with a cautious back-
and-forth movement is probably the type of technique that was used. 
We should not assume however, that this was always the mode of fighting between line 
infantry.  Plutarch tells us that skirmishing was frequent between Caesar and Pompey’s 
respective defences at Dyrrhachium (Plut. Pomp. 65).  Caesar’s Bellum Civile gives us some 
insight into the nature of these actions, of which we are told that there were six in total.820  In 
one instance the commanders arranged sallies that outnumbered the garrisons targeted for 
attack.  Volcatius Tullus is said to have sustained the charge of an entire Pompeian legion 
with just three cohorts (BC 3.52).  Conversely, two legions under P. Sulla managed to repulse 
(repellere) some Pompeian soldiers (who had been harassing a Caesarian cohort on garrison 
duty) by their sudden appearance (BC 3.51), but this seems to have taken a long time, the 
chase being protracted until nightfall.  Furthermore, once this chase stopped, Pompey is said 
to have entrenched his forces out of the reach of Caesar’s engines (BC 3.51).  This then, 
suggest that the chase took place within range of the defences near Dyrrhachium (i.e. within a 
set area), thus making it more of a one-sided skirmish, rather than for example, a rout (where 
the chase may have continued far away from the place of initial engagement).  We should 
think of it as a one-sided skirmish because it seems that the troops under Sulla had the 
advantage in the skirmish as Pompey’s are clearly said to have fled from them.  Furthermore, 
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we should not understand this action to have resembled a rout, because as such, there 
probably would have been a different outcome.  Either Pompey’s forces would have been 
forced to return to their extant entrenchments, or they would have been chased away from 
safety and from the battleground, and, as is the case with most routs, many of the soldiers 
would have been killed.821  Thus, the description clearly suggests to me that this action was 
probably more of a very fluid or loose-order skirmish that moved freely, as suggested by 
Plutarch’s reference to skirmishing (Plut. Pomp. 65).  Furthermore, because it was probably a 
skirmish, and because it took place within range of engines and entrenchments, missiles were 
a prominent part of the face of combat at Dyrrhachium.  Indeed, Caesar tell us that all of his 
soldiers within his defences were wounded by missiles, and that around 30,000 arrows were 
shot into the fort (BC 3.53).  The circumstance of this skirmish also made it more deadly than 
skirmishing normally seems to have been.  Because it was done within range of the engines 
and entrenchments, the exposed (as opposed to protected by a tighter order) skirmishing 
soldiers suffered high casualty rates.822  
Ambushes 
Once again, we have few examples where we are given the details of the ‘face of combat’ in 
ambushes.  Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 6, ambushes often involved light infantry as 
well as cavalry.  Because of this, there are few examples of ambushes that involved only line 
infantry on both sides.  Furthermore, as mentioned above, due to the numerous factors that 
affect an ambush, we cannot generalize on the ‘face of combat’.  So, instead, this section will 
evaluate three well-known ambushes, involving large forces of line infantry.  These are the 
Battle of Trasimene, the ambush of Cotta and Sabinus, and the Varian Disaster.  
Polybius tells us that many of the Romans at Trasimene stood no fighting chance against the 
sudden mass attack from the Carthaginians (3.84).  The Romans’ utter confusion and inability 
to see or form up is prevalent in both Polybius’ and Livy’s accounts and this is an important 
factor in this face of ambush.  Not only were the Romans completely surprised and unable to 
move, but not being able to see due to the heavy fog meant that any usual form of combat 
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was unable to take place.823  This face of combat was extremely chaotic and more a one-sided 
slaughter than any kind of combat.  Indeed, if we are to accept Livy’s claim that the battle 
took about three hours, it would seem that dozens of men died on average every minute.824  
However, we are told some of the Romans were able to engage successfully in the fighting.  
There is one phrase in Polybius that we might find particularly relevant to this fact.  In his 
description of the 6,000 soldiers who managed to fight successfully, he notes that they pushed 
through enemy lines up to the crest of the hill.825  The expression used to denote this push is 
o)rego/menoi, which is the present plural participle nominative masculine form of the verb 
o)re/gw.  This verb may be translated as to reach or stretch out, rather than to push.  This is 
important because we should not assume that these 6,000 Romans were literally pushing 
against the Carthaginians in this instance of combat.826  Literally trying to push an enemy 
uphill seems highly unlikely and quite suicidal.  Rather, they probably forced the 
Carthaginians to back away and to the sides, thus creating a gap through which they could 
move forward.  This would have had to have been done with consistent forward movement 
and the disciplined holding of ground gained.  Indeed, this is quite accurately expressed by 
Polybius in the phrase ‘a)ei\ de\ tou pro/sqen o)rego/menoi proh=gon,’ or ‘they carried 
forward always reaching for the space before them’.  I would suggest that such a disciplined 
technique may have been reminiscent of the combat technique described in the relevant 
section above: soldiers would have advanced in a defensive combat position, but with quite 
dynamic movements.   
The face of combat at Trasimene differs quite significantly from our next example.  The 
ambush of Caesar’s legates Sabinus and Cotta is reported to have been a much more 
controlled affair, and while the Romans likewise suffered a defeat, Caesar’s description does 
not reflect the wanton slaughter at Trasimene (BG 5.33-35).  In contrast, Caesar’s description 
of the fighting reflects the back-and-forth movement discussed above.  He describes the 
Romans advancing against the Gauls and then being pursued by them when returning to their 
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 Cf. esp. Livy 22.5.7. 
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 Livy purports that 15,000 Romans were killed in the battle (citing Fabius Pictor), which would mean 
approximately 5,000 deaths per hour on average, or about one century (80 men) per minute. 
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e)/laqon e)kpeso/ntej pro\stou\j uperdeci/ouj topouj. geno/menoi d )e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn...  
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 This may be considered an instance of the standard set of metaphors used to describe battle, v. nn. 33, 34, 
above.  
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standards.827  Despite this disciplined technique, it seems that being surrounded in this 
ambush had exposed a deadly flaw in this method of combat.  This is because when the 
Romans advanced, they were susceptible to missile fire on their flanks (BG 5.35).  Indeed, 
Caesar claims that his men were quite successful in killing the Gauls when they could engage 
them, and this in turn might point to the defensive aspect of the combat technique described 
above.  What this ambush had in common with Trasimene, was the envelopment which led to 
defeat. 
Envelopment was also a deciding factor in our final example at the Teutoburger Wald (Dio 
56.19-21).  When Dio explicitly discusses the nature of the combat experienced during the 
four-day massacre, he claims that there were several factors that put the Romans at a 
disadvantage.  As mentioned in the section on combat techniques, one of these factors was 
the lack of space required to move as freely as they would have liked.  Another factor was 
their inability to use their weapons properly, due in part to the poor weather.  Their shields 
are specifically mentioned amongst javelins and bows (56.21.3-4).  All of the instances of 
line infantry combat above have alluded to the importance of being able to employ a 
defensive stance when engaging in combat.  If the Roman shields were as ineffective as Dio 
claims, it is no wonder that the Romans were wiped out.  Encirclement was of course still a 
key factor leading to the defeat, especially as the number of Germans able to envelope the 
Romans had increased by the fourth day (56.21.4).  Also, the topography promoted this 
encirclement and it should be counted alongside the weather as being key factors in the 
defeat. 
So while we cannot generalize about the face of ambush, we might surmise that envelopment 
in an ambush can prevent line infantry from successfully employing the combat technique 
discussed above.  Furthermore, I would argue that the above evidence suggests that if 
Romans lost the initiative in a battle, they would be exponentially more vulnerable.  This is 
primarily due to form of combat I have argued for above.  If they lost the initiative and were 
consequentially unable to establish a ‘front line’ with their standards, they would probably 
have found it much more difficult to engage in the defensive back-and-forth technique, since 
there was no front line that could guide and control this motion.  Without an established 
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 BG 5.34.3-4 quam in  partem Romani impetumfecerint, cedant (levitate armorum et cotidiana exercitatione 
nihil eis noceri posse), rursus se adsigna recipientes insequantur. 
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‘front line’ from which to advance and retreat, they could either find themselves bunching in 
their units, or exposing themselves to encirclement, as we have seen above. 
Siege Warfare 
Sallies during sieges can fall under the definition of non-pitched battle or skirmishing, given 
above.  However, our sources often do not describe the details of their dynamics.  Josephus’ 
description of the siege of Jotapata includes a reference to non-pitched battle combat where 
desperate Jews attacked the Romans attempting to take the city walls (Jos. BJ 3.151).  The 
dynamics of this combat may be partially clarified through the description of their casualties.  
Josephus tells us that while this action lasted most of the day and stopped only at dusk, only 
thirteen Romans died, while seventeen perished on the Jewish side.  Yet, Josephus adds that 
six hundred Jews were wounded.  Thus, it seems to me that this action probably involved 
cautious movements.  It may have included formations that resembled battle-lines and 
techniques that were more tentative than loose-order combat (i.e. it was non-pitched battle 
combat, rather than a skirmish).  We might corroborate this claim with the evidence of 
casualty rates from the skirmish before Dyrrhachium, discussed above.  We are told that 2000 
Pompeians were killed compared to 20 Caesarians (Caes. BC 3.53).  Although the casualty 
figures are probably inaccurate, we should accept that Pompey’s losses were much greater 
than Caesar’s.  Thus in comparing these casualty rates to those from the engagement before 
Jotapata, a reasonable conclusion would be that the forces at Jotapata were in much better 
defensive positions than they were at Dyrrhachium.  I do not wish to suggest, however, that 
skirmishing was always more deadly than non-pitched battle combat (or line infantry 
combat).  Rather, I wish to emphasize that the skirmish before Dyrrhachium saw more 
fatalities than the non-pitched battle combat before Jotapata precisely because it was a 
skirmish that took place within range of siege engines and the entrenchments (as suggested 
above).  So, because skirmishing in general left the combatant more exposed than non-
pitched battle combat, skirmishing before the walls of camps where more missiles would 
have been exchanged than in most other skirmishes (with extra missiles being shot from men 
on the walls and engines in the camps), meant that this example of skirmishing was more 
deadly than skirmishing in other circumstances.  Thus, because the engagement before 
Jotapata also took place before the walls, the conclusion, based on the casualty rates, should 
be that it was probably a non-pitched battle engagement, where the combatants would be in 
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more defensive positions than they would be in a skirmish.  Furthermore, because neither side 
was routed at Jotapata, but rather combat was stopped due to nightfall, there was little 
opportunity for widespread slaughter; the high number of wounded were probably victims of 
superficial cuts from slashing blows, rather than deadly sword-thrusts.828  
Once in a city, it would have been very difficult for Roman legionaries to form up in regular 
battle lines, and given the infrastructural destruction inherent in most sieges, the ground 
probably would not have allowed for any kind of formations.829  Likewise, because of the 
dissimilar circumstances within each siege, the face of such non-pitched battle probably 
varied greatly.  Both Appian and Josephus describe groups of Romans advancing through the 
streets of Carthage and Jerusalem respectively, but the specifics of how the killing occurred 
do not go beyond references to stabbing.830  Yet, Appian’s description of the fall of Carthage 
mentions centurions leading their cohorts amongst blasts of the trumpets (App. Pun. 129).  
Indeed, as Ziolkowski has pointed out, there was a diversity of practices once Romans 
breached city walls, which was based on several varying factors such as the soldiers’ mood 
and the size of the city.831   
Overall then, one important conclusion we may come to regarding line infantry in various 
types of non-pitched battle combat is that it seems that they may have had a tendency to fight 
with similar formation, techniques and command to the ones used in pitched battle, if the 
relative factors allowed them to do so. 
Lightly Armed infantry versus Line Infantry  
Instances of lightly armed infantry (such as velites) facing more heavily equipped infantry 
such as line infantry, are relatively rare in our sources.  Nevertheless, we have a few cases 
where this scenario occurs in our sources.  Due to the scarcity of these cases, we should not 
necessarily take them to be exemplary of this kind of combat, and furthermore, we cannot 
assume that such combat was at all common. 
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 This tendency to slashing blows in combat is discussed further below under the Psychology of Combat.   
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 Ziolkowski has pointed out that storming and plundering were the common actions following a breach into 
the city, Ziolkowski 1993, 74 ff.  As pointed out in n. 689 under the definition for siege warfare earlier in this 
chapter, the ‘face of urban warfare’ is too large a topic to be considered sensibly in this thesis. 
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 Cf. e.g. App. Pun. 128 and Jos. BJ 6.401ff. 
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 Ziolkowski 1993, 89-90; cf. Goldsworthy 1996, 259 who argues that there was little control over men 
storming a city. 
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During the Roman siege of Capua, Polybius recounts how Hannibal attacked the camp of 
Appius Claudius (9.3).  Here, he notes that the line infantry (tw=n de\ pezw=n kata\ 
spei/raj) attacked the palisades of the camp.  The Romans responded by sending out the 
light infantry (eu)zw/noij) to harass them with missiles (belw=n).  These in turn, were not 
very effective against the heavy Carthaginian shields.  The Roman attack however, certainly 
prevented any further advance from the line infantry. 
The high number of missiles that a corps of velites were able to launch (discussed above in 
Chapter 6), would have naturally made advance quite difficult for line infantry.  Indeed, a 
formation like the testudo would be necessary to advance against such an assault of 
missiles.832  Even so, advancing in a safe formation such as that would be very slow, and in 
open terrain, it would be vulnerable to out-flanking or attack from the rear by cavalry.  
Outflanking slow or fixed line infantry and harassing them with missiles is exactly how 
Scipio employed his velites at the Battle of Ilipa.833  Livy tells us that while the Carthaginian 
flanks were being held by the Roman line infantry, Hasdrubal’s men were harassed by 
wheeling cavalry and skirmishers (Livy 28.14.20). 
This missile storm was seen to be particularly effective at the successive battles of Mount 
Olympus and Ancyra.834  There, the javelins of the velites, aided by the missiles of auxiliary 
archers and slingers wore down the entire army of Galatian Gauls, to the point where, when 
they rushed the velites in an attempt to avoid the missiles, they were easily cut down.835  In 
the first battle, Livy specifically notes that the velites fought with their gladii, adding quodsi 
pede collato pugnandum est, translatis in laevam hastis stringit gladium (38.21.13).  This 
hand-to-hand contest was probably a loose-order fight, as the velites would not have been 
formed up in a tight formation to begin with.  Thus, the combat was probably more dynamic 
and fluid than a line infantry contest. 
Because the Roman velites retired into the ranks of the line infantry, they may have also 
somehow been involved in a line infantry clash within a pitched battle, if only as missile-
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 E.g. see Livy 31.39.14-15. 
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 This tactic is also encouraged by Onasander, 19.2. 
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 Livy 38.21 and 38.25-26 respectively. 
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 NB. Briscoe claims that Livy exaggerates the casualties in this battle, v. Briscoe 2009, 473. 
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throwers.  A fragment from Tyrtaeus (frag. 11.35-8) provides us with an example of how 
such light infantry would have engaged the enemy within a line infantry formation: 
You light armed, squatting under a shield here and there, must throw great rocks 
and hurl smooth javelins while you stand close by the heavy-armed. 
This dynamic is also depicted in Homeric and Archaic art, and so like their line infantry 
counterparts, it may be that the velites would sometimes have engaged in combat 
cautiously.836  Of course, they would have done so with missiles, while their more heavily 
armed companions would do so in hand-to-hand combat.  
Dio gives us a glimpse of the face of line infantry versus light infantry combat in the post-
velites era.  During the Sicilian revolt of the first century BC, he tells of Sextus Pompeius’ 
light infantry attacking the line infantry under Octavian’s general Cornificius during the 
latter’s retreat to Mylae, 
Both cavalry and yiloi\ attacked him [Cornificius] from a distance, not daring to 
come to close quarters, and proved exceedingly troublesome to him; for they 
would not only attack whenever opportunity offered but would also quickly 
retreat again, whereas his men, being heavy-armed, could not pursue them in any 
case owing to the weight of their armour, and moreover were endeavouring to 
protect the unarmed men who had been saved from the fleet. Consequently, they 
were suffering many injuries and could inflict none in return; for, in case they 
made a rush upon any of them, they would put them to flight, to be sure, but 
being unable to carry their pursuit to the end, they would find themselves in a 
worse plight during their retreat, since by their sortie they would become 
isolated.837 
This reinforces the other suggestions put forth by our sources that light infantry could secure 
an advantage over more heavily armed line infantry by attacking from afar.  Also, there may 
have been some additional advantage for the yiloi\ here because of the strategic 
circumstances affecting the line infantry.  The Caesarians were retreating, and therefore may 
have been less organized and/or disciplined in such circumstances.  This, in turn, may have 
caused them to expose themselves unnecessarily to the skirmishing attacks of the yiloi\, 
which is something they may not have done had they been formed up in their usual ranks.  As 
in the section on ambushes for line infantry, above, the lack of a controlled front line, 
determined by the standards, led to a lack of cohesion or discipline in the ranks. 
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 Dio 49.6 translation: Cary, Loeb 1927. 
220 
 
Dio (49.7) goes on to describe the type of wounds that would have been suffered by the line 
infantry in this situation saying 
Indeed the wounded were far more numerous than those who died; for since they 
were being hit by stones (li/qoij) and javelins (a)konti/oij) thrown from a 
distance and sustained no blows dealt in hand-to-hand fighting, they received 
their wounds in many parts of their bodies, and not always in a vital spot.838 
This kind of sustained missile attack from light infantry on line infantry could allow the 
former to have the advantage in hand-to-hand combat, such as at the battles of Mount 
Olympus and Ancyra. 
Caesar’s night ambush against the Belgae before the ensuing pitched battle against them has 
been already been mentioned in preceding chapters.839  The fact that slingers and archers were 
deployed against the infantry of the Belgae at night presents the practical dilemma of how 
missiles were successfully used in poor visual conditions.  While the possibilities are purely 
speculative, they may aid in revealing various potentialities of such combat.  Given that the 
ambush was on a bridge, the possibility exists that it was in a clearing and subject to 
moonlight.840  With this light and possibly its reflection off the water, the silhouettes of the 
Belgic infantry could have been visible.  Furthermore, if they were bunched together, being 
on or near the bridge, the Roman missile troops would have had a large, possibly silhouetted 
target area at which to aim, thus eliminating the need to see very much of the target at all.  
This would have been a devastating attack for the Belgae, as they would not have been able 
to see the arrows in mid-flight, causing confusion or even panic.841  Because of this, in turn, 
the light infantry could have used the cover of darkness to camouflage their location (if only 
partially due to the moonlight), possibly making it difficult to know where the missiles were 
coming from.  Overall, the situation must have been quite chaotic for the Belgic infantry, and 
so it is no wonder that Dio tells us that the Roman troops killed many of them, taking them by 
surprise.  If we are to accept such a speculative suggestion as a good possibility in this kind 
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 It is impossible to say whether the stones (li/qoij) were being thrown by slingers or whether they were being 
thrown by hand (cf. liqobo/loi in Chapter 3, above, where this term is almost never used for slingers).  If these 
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positions away. As we shall see, the element of surprise here was vital to this ambush, especially given the 
disproportionate strengths of missile troops versus line infantry. 
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of tactical circumstance, we may conclude that missile troops were ideal for laying night-time 
ambushes against line infantry, especially against an enemy in a concentrated formation. 
While we do not have specific casualty figures for Roman light infantry, it is interesting to 
note that in Greek warfare, combat for the light-armed troops was more dangerous than it was 
for hoplites.  The lethality of combat for peltasts is demonstrated in Xenophon’s Anabasis 
where 50 per cent of the light troops died on the campaign as opposed to only 25 per cent of 
the hoplites.842  Best also notes that this was probably because of the type of combat which 
the peltasts were involved in, since in their role as shock troops they ‘had to bear the brunt of 
the fighting.’843  While this was not a common feature of combat for Roman light infantry, we 
cannot speculate because we do not have evidence of general casualty figures for light 
infantry in Roman warfare. 
Infantry and Cavalry versus Infantry and Cavalry  
As we know from the previous chapter on tactical roles, the combining of cavalry and 
infantry was a common deployment during the Republic.  This deployment would be used for 
skirmishing and non-pitched battle tactical scenarios.  Livy gives us a thorough description of 
the nature of such combat between the forces of Philip and Rome near Athacus in 199 BC.   
The king's forces assumed that the type of fighting would be that to which they 
were accustomed, that the cavalry, alternately advancing and retreating, would 
now discharge their weapons and now retire, that the swift movements of the 
Illyrians would be useful for sallies and sudden charges, and that the Cretans 
would shower arrows upon the enemy advancing in disorder. The Roman attack, 
no more vigorous than stubborn, prevented the carrying out of this plan; for just 
as if they were in regular line of battle, both the velites after hurling their spears, 
came to a hand-to-hand combat with their swords, and the cavalry, as soon as 
they had charged the enemy, stopping their horses either fought from horseback 
or leaped from their saddles and fought mingled with the footmen.  So neither the 
king's cavalry, unused to a stationary battle, could stand against the Romans, nor 
his infantry, running to and fro and almost unprotected by armour, against the 
light-armed Romans, equipped with shield and sword and prepared alike for 
defence or offence.  So they did not sustain the struggle, but relying on nothing 
else than their swiftness of foot they fled to the camp.844 
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The description here confirms the proposed ‘face of skirmish’ above, insofar as Livy 
describes a formation ‘just as if the whole battle-line was fighting’.845  Thus, this ‘face of 
skirmish’ saw the front line of the cloud of the velites moving back-and-forth while the less-
active area behind them held ground.846  This also supports the previously discussed ability of 
the velites to engage in hand-to-hand combat; while it is true that they seem to be fighting 
unprepared opponents in this instance, the fact that they were ‘armed for both offense and 
defence,’ is evident here.847  This instance of skirmishing might indicate that the Macedonians 
had not encountered this type of combat before, or that they were just taken by surprise on 
this occasion.  If the former is true, then we might speculate that the Romans were engaging 
in typical infantry-cavalry tactics, and that the Macedonians were simply incapable of 
fighting in this manner.  In any case, it is impossible to ascertain the truth in this regard. 
It is also interesting to note that the cavalry dismounted to fight on foot.  It certainly seems 
strange that the Roman cavalry would do so, instead of pursuing the Macedonian cavalry to 
ensure the safety of their infantry.  This notion of dismounted cavalry here also echoes Livy’s 
description of the institution of the velites (26.4), discussed in Chapter 2.  This suggests that 
there may have been some Roman military tradition associated with the cavalry that involved 
dismounting and fighting on foot.848   
Though dismounting is also described at the battle of Callinicus, it was a battle between 
Rome and Perseus in 171 BC that involved large deployments of cavalry and infantry on both 
sides (Livy 42.58).  Indeed, this is our only reference to velites having a designated 
commander (who in this instance is the consul’s brother Caius Crassus), and this is namely 
because they are deployed with the Italian cavalry for the battle (Livy 42.58.12).  Once the 
battle commences, Perseus’ allied Thracian cavalry and light infantry attack the combined 
force of Italian cavalry and velites and the resulting combat is graphically described by Livy.  
He tells us  
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7, thus omitting  the description of the Roman fighting technique entirely.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
this passage could possibly serve as an example of Livy’s tendency to Roman bias. 
846
 Cf. ‘Pre-pitched battle skirmishing’ under ‘Lightly armed skirmishers versus lightly armed skirmishers’, 
above. 
847
 Livy 31.35.6 ‘armorum veliti Romano parmam gladiumque habenti pariterque et ad se tuendum et ad hostem 
petendum armato.’ 
848
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The infantry on both sides attacked the spears of the cavalry with their swords, 
cut at the legs of the horses and stabbed them in the flanks.849 
If this were the usual form of attack when the velites were combined with cavalry, we might 
see this as a reason for cavalrymen to dismount and fight on foot.  This is because by 
dismounting they might have a better chance of defending their horses (and themselves) from 
a fate similar to that which they suffered at Callinicus.  The possibility of such a necessity 
may be the reason behind Livy’s confused statement about the establishment of the velites 
(discussed in Chapter 2).  Indeed, as McCall points out  
In a melee against mounted cavalry, the light infantryman enjoyed the greater 
advantages of agility and speed over the cavalryman.  He had all the benefits of 
dismounted Roman cavalry and one further benefit: he was completely 
unhampered by horse.850   
He goes on to say that, Roman cavalry preferred a relatively stationary type of hand-to-hand 
combat over more fluid combat.  Thus, combining them with light infantry such as velites 
would have been duly effective, as Livy indicates above.  Alternatively, McCall also 
proposes that light infantry could have served as a defensive base from which cavalry could 
strike and regroup.851  Indeed, it may have been difficult for light infantry to engage enemy 
cavalry successfully unless the cavalry were relatively immobile.  Certainly, holding a line 
towards the rear of any skirmishing action may have been something the velites were capable 
of, as suggested above in the section combat techniques. 
While Polybius’ description of another infantry-cavalry skirmish in the Second Macedonian 
War does not mention dismounting cavalry, he does note that both sides fought in close 
combat quite spiritedly.852  We might compare this skirmish to Polybius’ description of 
another infantry-cavalry skirmish that occurred not too long after the first, which in turn was 
the catalyst for the battle of Cynoscephalae (18.21).  Here, Polybius notes that the cavalry and 
infantry on both sides engaged each other in irregular attacks.853  So, if we are to compare 
these two descriptions, we might deduce that the face of this type of combat involved fluidity 
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of movement, as well as the odd single combat amongst the infantry, as a result of both the 
irregularity (o)li/gon h)/rcanto) and bravery (e)kqu/mwj) of the men involved.  Furthermore, 
since Polybius tells us that the ratio of cavalry to eu)zw/noi on the Roman side at 
Cynoscephalae was 10 to 1, we might speculate that the lightly armed infantry could have 
their flanks (as individuals or groups) fairly well covered by the cavalry.   
When Caesar sent his expeditos antesignanos against Pompeian cavalry (Caes. BC 3.75), he 
notes that  
so great was the success, having engaged in combat with their cavalry, they put 
them all to rout, and leave a considerable number dead upon the field, and return 
without loss to the marching column.854 
Although the specific dynamic of fighting here is not made clear, we may assume that it 
differed from instances where the velites were deployed with cavalry insofar as there may 
have been significantly less missile combat on behalf of the infantry.  Thus, the antesignani 
here probably engaged the Pompeian horse at very close range.  Furthermore, since Caesar 
emphasizes the fact that the antesignani and cavalry fought together (ut equestri proelio 
commisso), the fighting between the cavalry may have been relatively static, rather than 
having the antesignani constantly on the run with the cavalry.855  In this way, the infantry 
would be able to reach and engage the cavalry, just as the light infantry did in Livy’s 
description of the Battle of Callinicus.856  If the cavalry was not static, they probably would 
have been able both to out-manoeuvre and out-reach the infantry.  Thus, the effectiveness of 
the Caesarian attack must have been in the simultaneous assault from both the cavalry and 
infantry. 
In a different kind of encounter, but perhaps relevant to this section, Polybius describes the 
velites engaging elephants at Panormus (1.40).857  While this description does not involve 
cavalry, it is an instance of light infantry engaging mounted troops, the mount however being 
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elephants rather than horses.  Here, using a moat for cover, the velites skirmished with the 
elephants, throwing missiles at them in their approach, and then, being routed by the charging 
elephants, retreated to the safety of the moat.  The elephants were then faced with the missiles 
of men stationed beyond the moat and on the walls of Panormus, and in this way, they were 
defeated.  Having velites attack elephants with missiles and then retreat is also a tactic that 
Scipio Africanus famously employed at Zama.858  In both cases, the velites had some sort of 
cover to retreat to, whether it was the moat at Panormus, or the gaps of the maniples at Zama.  
Thus, I would propose that in combat scenarios that involved velites and cavalry versus 
cavalry, the same sort of dynamic could have been used where the velites threw javelins at 
the enemy horses and then retreated behind the cover of their cavalry escort.859 
Naturally, the most probable reality of the face of combat involving infantry and cavalry is 
one that was dictated by many factors.  These may have included the terrain on which the 
skirmish was fought, the number of men, the experience and skill of the men, the ratio of 
cavalry to infantry and the weather.  Unfortunately, we are rarely given any of these details.  
However, in most of these scenarios, it seems that combat between cavalry had to be static 
for any accompanying infantry to be most effective. 
The Individual’s Battle 
Virtus and Leadership 
The previous sections under ‘The Unit’s Battle’ determined that the face of skirmish was 
often a very fluid one, perhaps unsurprisingly.  Some skirmishes however, especially those 
that occurred before pitched battle, could have had the tendency to resemble a loose-order 
battle line, and while there was probably still fluidity of movement at the front of this cloud, 
the duration of the skirmish necessitated lulls, and thus less dynamic areas of activity.  As 
with line infantry, self-motivated individuals as well as those with leadership tendencies 
would have been required both to re-ignite action and spur men forward from these lulls and 
less-active parts of the cloud.  Furthermore, it is probable that in any skirmish, those 
infantrymen who stepped up to this challenge that were rewarded appropriately.  Our 
strongest piece of evidence for this dynamic within a skirmish involving lightly equipped 
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infantry is the aforementioned wolf’s skin of the velites.  This is a good indication of the fact 
that commanders paid close attention to individual action.  This dynamic is in accord with the 
Roman ideals of virtus, as Lendon has already discussed.  As he aptly puts it, 
There were no officers or centurions among the velites to compel them, no 
standards to urge them: the velites fought in a realm of artificial equality and self-
motivation.  But the lack of compulsion allowed them to make the heroic choice 
to seek out single combat, decorations lured them, and their headgear allowed 
them to be recognized when they did so.860 
We cannot expect all of the velites to have had this sort of motivation, or at least, what is 
more likely is that some of them had greater motivation than others, as is typical in most 
groups.  This is further demonstrated in the role of the Caesarian antesignani.  These men 
stepped forward before the rest of the battle-line to be the first to engage in combat.  This is 
perhaps not surprising considering the fact that the antesignani seemed to have taken over 
many of the velites’ tactical roles. 
Regarding the notion of single combats, Oakley points out that during our period, it is 
conceivable that single combats occurred several times each year.  Furthermore, he states that 
single combat could decide battles without a full engagement of all the forces deployed.  This 
point is vital considering that most examples of monomachy are found to have occurred prior 
to the main clash, i.e. during initial skirmishing.861  It must be noted however that these 
instances of monomachy on the battlefield are not the same as instances of ritual single 
combat where entire armies would observe the fight.862  Rather, these regular instances of 
hand-to-hand, one-on-one combat occurred in a broader engagement.  Daly emphasizes this 
stage as an exhibition of bravado that served as a morale-boost for the side that performed 
well.863  Although there is no definitive statement in our sources linking the velites and the 
initial skirmishing to specific instances of single combat, Lendon suggests that this was 
indeed one of the roles of the velites, noting that young soldiers could distinguish themselves 
in the ancestral fashion in this way.  He goes on to argue that the manipular array ‘reflected 
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the need for young Roman men to display their virtus,’ and that not only the richest but the 
poorest Roman men could endeavour to meet this societal inclination to demonstrate virtus.864 
This desire for recognition and glory that Lendon refers to would certainly have inspired 
aggression and heroic action from these young and/or poor soldiers trying to establish 
themselves in a society where valorous deeds on the battlefield brought fame and fortune not 
only to the individual himself, but to his family as well.  Veterans carried the reputation of 
their deeds throughout their lives; their spoils and decorations kept in the eyes and minds of 
their friends, family and the public.865  This gave Roman competitiveness a sense of structure 
that was in accord with their value of disciplina – a discipline that meant that even a wild 
attack by aggressive young soldiers at the beginning of a battle was a controlled tactic; a 
tactic that could possibly have even sought a rout through the intimidating quality of a 
victorious single combat.866  Of course, the potential for heroic action does not mean that 
activities such as single combats occurred with every opening skirmish of a pitched battle, 
much less a rout resulting from one.  However, even if no single combat came out of this 
aggressive foray, there were probably still many opportunities to prove one’s virtus and 
leadership abilities.   
With the phasing out of the velites, this desire for recognition and glory through 
competitiveness probably transferred to the antesignani, as did some of the velites’ tactical 
roles.867  The men at the front of the acies – the first ones to engage in combat – would have 
had the same opportunity that the velites’ had; they were the first troops to display their virtus 
in front of the rest of the army.  This highlights the enduring nature of this Roman value, and 
it likewise points to an enduring association with troops that are labelled ‘light’ by our 
sources.  The same can be said for the imperial army, where soldiers of the auxilia – often 
labelled as ‘light’ by our sources – are said to have this characteristic.868  This is particularly 
true for the Batavian auxiliaries for example, which Tacitus notes for their virtus on several 
occasions.869 
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Yet, the Roman cultural characteristic of virtus is only one aspect of a greater force that had a 
much larger role to play in a soldier’s actions, and that is the psychology of the soldier in 
combat. 
The Psychology of Combat 
Man in battle ... is a being in whom the instinct of self-preservation dominates, at 
certain moments, all other sentiments.  Discipline has for its aim the domination 
of that instinct by a greater terror.  But it cannot dominate it completely.  I do not 
deny the glorious examples where discipline and devotion have elevated man 
about himself.  But if these examples are glorious, it is because they are rare; if 
they are admired, it is because they are considered exceptions, and the exception 
proves the rule.870 
Assessing the psychology of the Roman soldier may seem a difficult investigation, as we do 
not have Romans on which to evaluate their psychological state of mind.  Yet, as Du Picq 
points out in the above quotation, there is an instinctual level of psychology that is not 
learned or culturally influenced, but inherent to most animals, and that is the psychology of 
self-preservation.871  We can assume that this aspect of human psychology is prevalent in 
battles.  While Butterfield has suggested that all battles have something in common, Keegan 
offers the following response to this suggestion:  
What battles have in common is human: the behaviour of men struggling to 
reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the 
achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them.  The study 
of battle is therefore always a study of fear and usually of courage...872 
Like all combat, fear and courage were a major part of Roman combat, as can be observed in 
the aforementioned Roman cultural feature of virtus and the emphasis Romans placed on 
having it, and thus hiding fear.  These psychological reactions are influenced by a number of 
external factors that may be reflected in modern studies in psychology.873  These include 
cultural and familial upbringing, training, discipline, group dynamics, leadership and unit 
cohesion, rewards, and morale.874  The first two factors are impossible to measure on dead 
men, which makes it difficult to evaluate how the individual Roman soldier may have really 
experienced battle.  Aside from the first two factors, the rest can, to some extent, be assessed 
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in Roman warfare as Lee and Goldsworthy have already done.875  Indeed, as Goldsworthy has 
pointed out, it seems the Roman system was designed to manage the effect of all of these 
psychological factors of battle.876  Yet, as alluded to above, I would argue that there is further 
psychological evaluation that can be applied to Roman soldiers, and that is their reaction to 
mortal danger and the resulting instinct of self-preservation.   
Self-preservation in attack 
A major innate feature of the human psyche is the self-preservation instinct, and it is very 
likely that this instinct was prevalent in Roman soldiers.  As seen in the earlier discussions of 
fighting techniques and the unit’s battle, I proposed that combat could have been a cautious 
affair on the Roman side.  That is not to say however, that Romans were never aggressive in 
combat.  As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the shield could have been used in an 
aggressive manner in offensive combat movements, and certainly charging into battle would 
fall under aggressive combat as well.  Even so, the instinct of self-preservation may be 
observed in such aggressive attacks.  Using the scutum as a primary weapon of both defence 
and of ensuring distance between the legionary and enemy suggests to me an emphasis on 
safety, rather than aggression.  This highlights a discrepancy between the traditional 
aggressive Roman attitude towards combat and warfare and the actual face of combat.877  
Lendon’s arguments, regarding how the Roman value of disciplina forms an opposed pair 
with virtus, highlight this apparent balance between traditional Roman aggression, and safety 
or sensibility in combat.878 
Although disciplina certainly seems to have been an integral part of the Roman military 
ethos, whether Roman weaponry, armour and combat techniques were manufactured or 
developed with safety as a primary concern, is impossible to prove.  Furthermore, the precise 
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origins of disciplina and how closely related they may have been to a self-preservation 
instinct cannot be ascertained.879  Still, that some sort of self-preservation instinct existed 
amongst Romans is probably true.  Thus, a tentative link may be revealed between the need 
to deal with the psychological issues inherent in battle (such as fear or the self-preservation 
instinct) and the way that Romans attacked in combat. 
We know that slashing with the gladius was not uncommon; we know this from Vegetius’ 
suggestion at 1.12, and from other sources such as the depiction of such techniques on 
Trajan’s column, the Adamklissi monument, as well as the allusion to them in the literature.880  
Given this, it is interesting to note that psychologically, there may have been an inherent 
aversion to a thrusting technique.  Lt. Col. Grossman, who has written extensively on the 
psychology of combat, suggests that stabbing another person is somehow intimately 
sickening, saying, 
[For] a sword-armed soldier his weapon becomes a natural extension of his body 
– an appendage.  And the piercing of the enemy’s body with this appendage is an 
act with some ... sexual connotations ... To reach out and penetrate the enemy’s 
flesh and thrust a portion of ourselves into his vitals is deeply akin to the sexual 
act, yet deadly, and is therefore strongly repulsive to us.881 
Grossman further suggests that the one aspect of Roman warfare that could have helped their 
soldiers to overcome this instinctive repulsion to stabbing was the design of the gladius.  He 
proposes that the relatively long and sharp point of the Roman sword allowed soldiers to 
execute a killing blow with little penetration.882  Indeed, as Vegetius (1.12) states, ‘a stab, 
though it penetrates but two inches, is generally fatal.’883   
Yet, while Grossman occasionally references ancient armies in his work, much of his 
psychological analysis applies to present-day society.  Thus, the application of his analysis on 
the Roman soldier’s psyche is quite speculative, but there may be some further common 
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ground on which we can advance the present analysis.  This lies in a possible link with an 
unconscious resistance to killing in all sane humans.884 
Resisting the Kill: Self-preservation of the species and primal instinct 
Grossman suggests that modern soldiers resist killing because of many factors, but one that 
might be relevant to our period is that of instinctive intra-species resistance to killing.885  That 
is, creatures of the same species, no matter how aggressively predatory they may be, almost 
never attack to kill each other.  While they may occasionally or even often engage in 
aggressive behaviour towards one another, they do not usually inflict killing blows.  This 
seems to be an instinctive response, as it is visible across many various species, from 
piranhas to rattlesnakes to baboons.886  The reasons behind this seem to be a primal necessity 
to ensure the survival of the species, and it may be likened to other primal needs such as 
procreation.887  Indeed, Goldsworthy has argued that for Romans in combat ‘it was not the 
actual fighting and killing that was important, but the courage that they displayed in the face 
of danger.’888  He goes on to cite Marshall’s Second World War study which concluded that 
the most important factor in keeping a soldier actively fighting against the enemy was the 
close proximity of his comrades.889  How closely such modern psychological studies may be 
applied to Roman soldiers is debatable, but probably not feasible due to massive differences 
in cultural values and ethics. 
So, whether this unconscious resistance to killing fellow members of the same species was 
present in Roman soldiers is impossible to say.  Naturally, the Romans were far more used to 
killing and death than any present-day society, and that in itself may be an indication of the 
lack of such self-preservation-of-the-species instincts.  Yet, to say that the Romans lacked 
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standard primal instincts (including the survival of the species) also seems flawed.  Indeed, 
Marcus Aurelius implied some philosophical awareness of this instinct noting,  
To break off any particle, no matter how small, from the continuous 
concatenation--whether of causes or of any other elements--is to injure the 
whole.890 
So, while it may be suggested that such an instinct could have been a cause for preference of 
slashing to thrusting techniques, unfortunately, this cannot be proven.  There is, however, 
another trend in Roman battle (and most ancient battles) that may indicate the prevalence of 
instinctive resistance to killing, and that is mortality rates in relation to routs. 
As Gabriel and Metz have pointed out in their assessment of ancient battles from the 
Sumerians to Rome, significant killing did not occur whilst men were in formation.891  Rather, 
most of the killing occurred once an enemy was routed.892  This trend has continued into the 
modern period as well.893  Grossman suggests that this phenomenon may be explained by two 
theories.  The first is what he terms a ‘chase instinct’, where just as most animals will 
instinctively chase anything that shows fear and suddenly runs from them, soldiers somehow 
instinctively know to do the same to a fleeing enemy with the intent of killing them.894  Kagan 
points out how battlefield casualties psychologically affected troops, saying 
Sudden loss of life, even if the numbers of deaths are few, may be more 
frightening than slow but sustained casualties far greater in number.895 
In other words, once soldiers began to run and sustain high casualties at a rapid rate, the 
running perpetuated more killing as it encouraged more soldiers to run and likewise 
encouraged the opposition to continue the killing.  
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The second theory that enables killing from behind, Grossman explains, is 
...a process in which close proximity on the physical distance spectrum can be 
negated when the face cannot be seen.  The essence of the whole physical 
distance spectrum may simply revolve around the degree to which the killer can 
see the face of the victim ... if one does not have to look into the eyes when 
killing, it is much easier to deny the humanity of the victim.896 
This certainly helps to explain the lack of fatalities prior to a rout.  In skirmishes, such 
opportunities (i.e. victims’ backs turned to the pursuer) may have been more frequent, due to 
the lack of formal battle lines.  This, in turn, may have taken the intensity or 
moral/psychological stress out of combat.  For those skirmishers with little experience, such 
as the velites, this may have helped them endure the stress associated with killing and fear of 
death.  In this way, skirmishing may have been a type of ‘stress inoculation’ for new recruits, 
and this will be discussed in further detail below.  Regarding exactly how much influence the 
particular instinct of resistance to killing had on Roman warfare, this remains indeterminable. 
There is one final instinct related to self-preservation that may be applied to Roman warfare, 
and that is a human’s physiological response to fear. 
The Physiological Response to Fear 
Keegan summarizes Marshall’s assessment of soldiers’ behaviour in modern warfare by 
saying that  
all men are afraid on the battlefield, yet most, despite their fear, remain products 
of their culture and its value-system897 
We know that the Roman value-system and its culture was much more accepting of violence 
than modern society.  As such, modern studies of how soldiers react to violence cannot be 
realistically applied to the Romans.898  However, fear was still a very present force on the 
battlefield; for evidence of this we have only to look as far as the tendency for defeated 
armies to rout.899  Furthermore, as an innate instinct, the study of fear is often more 
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physiological than psychological, and so modern understanding of the subject may be 
retroactively applied to Roman soldiers.   
Fear causes vasoconstriction, which raises the heart rate, and we slowly lose fine-motor 
control.  As the fear increases, the sympathetic nervous system prepares the body for fight-or-
flight response by inhibiting digestion, increasing secretion of epinephrine and 
norepinephrine, dilating the bronchial tubes in the lungs, dilating the heart vessels and tensing 
muscles.900  As vasoconstriction increases with increased fear, less blood gets to the muscles, 
and so they receive less oxygen making motor control deteriorate significantly.  It may be at 
this point that soldiers unconsciously know to run.  If soldiers are not fleeing from fear at this 
point, increased stress also causes the loss of peripheral vision, or ‘tunnel vision’ as it is 
commonly referred to.  Because of this, there is also a loss in depth perception meaning 
threats seem closer than they are.  There is also increased presbyopia (far-sightedness), which 
makes it difficult to see relatively close things.901  In such circumstances during battle, the 
frightened individual would naturally back away, which in turn could lead to a rout. 
Another consequence of vasoconstriction is the lightening of the skin, hence the term ‘white 
with fear’.  Also because of this, the outer layer of skin can take conspicuous damage without 
the loss of much blood.  This is probably an innate survival mechanism meant to limit blood 
loss in combat.902  It is possible that such effects were present or even visible in some cases in 
Roman combat. 
So, primal instincts of self-preservation could have possibly affected combat in some way.  
Indeed, fighting techniques, small-unit tactics, and armour may have consciously or 
unconsciously been affected by such instincts, but unfortunately, the extent to which this is 
true is impossible to ascertain.   
Beyond primal instincts however, many other factors affect the psychology of a soldier in 
combat.  Like Goldsworthy, Grossman has suggested that the Romans were aware of some of 
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these factors to some extent, and so manipulated them to make their army less susceptible to 
the aforementioned instincts and more effective at killing.  This will be assessed presently. 
How the killing occurred in skirmishing and non-pitched battle 
Both du Picq and Grossman have demonstrated that authority and leadership on the 
battlefield were decisive factors in prompting soldiers to kill.903  Regarding battlefield leaders, 
Grossman further points out that the centurion was a leader with a particular advantage in 
attaining obedience in men because he had the legitimacy of having come up through the 
ranks, proven his combat ability, shared and continued to share the face of combat with the 
men he was directing.904  Indeed, such leadership where the man directing a tactical sub-unit 
joins the fray is seen to have been doubly effective not only with the centurionate, but also 
whenever Republican generals did this.905 
Thus, in non-pitched battle, any man directing soldiers to kill, probably had significant 
influence in actually making them do so.  In pre-pitched battle skirmish situations where 
there were no pre-designated leaders (especially with the velites for example), the demands of 
authority could have come from the soldiers or centurions standing in formation observing 
the skirmish, or perhaps from tribunes riding amongst the skirmishers.906  Alternatively, 
individual soldiers may have encouraged their comrades in displays of leadership. 
Regarding such personalized encouragements, Marshall noted that  
it is the touch of human nature which gives men courage and enables them to 
make proper use of their weapons.907   
This is also related to Goldsworthy’s assertions on the importance of morale in the Roman 
army.908  In non-pitched battle, such encouragement was likely to come from unit leaders, and 
amongst units such as the velites, there was room for this ‘touch of human nature’ to manifest 
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in any one of the soldiers – soldiers who might later become the centurions continuing to 
encourage their men. 
Vegetius points out that a soldier’s training works to turn fear of battle into enthusiasm for it 
(2.23)  Josephus likewise comments on the efficiency of the Roman soldier in battle as a 
result of their training (BJ 3.70).909  Grossman terms such training ‘stress inoculation’, noting 
that realistic and repetitive training takes the surprise out of combat, and furthermore turns 
combat actions into muscle memory, so that they become a sort of habit.910  We have seen 
above that post exercises were probably a regular part of Roman military training.  As regards 
to something more akin to ‘stress inoculation’, we have evidence for such training given to 
Roman soldiers through the medium of regular and ‘safe’ skirmishing under Fabius during 
the Second Punic War.  Livy (22.12.10) tells us that  
[Fabius] refused to stake all on a general engagement, and yet by means of little 
skirmishes, undertaken from a safe position and with a place of refuge close at 
hand, he at length accustomed his soldiers, disheartened by their former defeats, 
to be less diffident of their own courage and good fortune. 
This passage is particularly interesting for the suggestion that controlled skirmishing may 
have had such an effect on soldiers.  This is especially true since we know that pre-pitched 
battle skirmishing was, in effect, a controlled type of skirmish; furthermore, just as with 
Fabius’ method, velites in a pre-pitched battle skirmish had a refuge to retire to within the 
ranks of the heavy infantry.  What we may draw from this then is the notion that pre-pitched 
battle skirmishing may have been a type of psychological and physiological combat training 
for young soldiers, a type of ‘stress inoculation’.  In an abstract sense we might see this as a 
highly developed training ritual that not only allowed for ‘failure’ within this ‘training’ (i.e. 
voluntary retreating to the rear of the skirmishing cloud) but also the opportunity to overcome 
such ‘failure’ and thereby ‘pass’ the training (i.e. by actively engaging the enemy and 
performing bravely).  This then might mentally prepare such young troops for the transition 
to line infantry in a later campaign.  Indeed Sabin and Zhmodikov’s suggestions that very 
little hand-to-hand combat took place between line infantry during pitched battles might be a 
reflection of this earlier ‘training’ in the following way.911  If fresh recruits adopted a style of 
fighting where they were only rarely engaged in hand-to-hand combat, then as line infantry 
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 Cf. Marius’ ‘light’ engagements with his fresh troops as a way of instilling courage: Sall. Iug. 87. 
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 Grossman 2008, 34-36.  For an example of ancient awareness of the value of habit, v. Arr. Epict. diss. 2.18. 
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 Sabin 2000; Zhmodikov 2000. 
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they may have held on to these old habits and only engaged in intense fighting in sporadic 
flurries, as Sabin and Zhmodikov suggest.912   
There were certainly many other factors in instigating soldiers to kill, and Grossman’s model 
of all factors involved in making a personal kill reflects this.913  We can potentially apply this 
model to Roman warfare, but to do so would be beyond the scope of this thesis.  A visual 
depiction of the model itself should suffice for the present discussion (see Figure 6).914 
In conclusion, while no amount of evidence can truly elucidate the face of non-pitched battle 
for us, I hope to have shown that there are some common factors in this type of Roman 
combat.  These include: a cautious fighting technique, effective group dynamics through 
battle-line formations - whether in loose order or controlled more stringently by the 
standards, an innate instinct of self-preservation, and the conventions and traditions that 
helped overcome those psychological factors to make Romans excellent skirmishers and non-
pitched battle combatants. 
 
                                                 
912
 Alternatively, a lack of hand-to-hand combat could also be explained by innate instincts, such as self-
preservation, as proposed above. 
913
 See Figure 6. 
914
 Some of the points depicted in the figure may also be found in Goldsworthy’s discussion on ‘Motivating the 
Roman Soldier’, op. cit. 1996, 250-264. 
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Figure 6: Factors involved in making a personal kill (after Grossman). 
 
  
239 
 
8  General Conclusions 
Throughout its history, the Roman army was a mixed force.  Like most successful armies, the 
Roman army found itself victorious because it had various specializations within its 
organization that allowed it to handle almost any kind of military exigency.  Light infantry 
was a major part of this mixed force and, as shown in Chapter 6, the light infantry of the 
Roman army were assigned the widest variety of tactical deployments, including some of the 
most dangerous. 
Goldsworthy’s assertions that the Roman army’s success lay partly in the hands of a few 
exceptionally brave men is directly reflected in the role of light infantry.915  Examples include 
the velites, who were not only assigned the widest variety of tactical roles, but aimed to stand 
out for bravery in battle.  Also, the antesignani were the first to engage in pitched battle and 
thus the first to be called upon for challenging ad hoc tactical exigencies.  The imperial 
auxilia carried on the role of foremost fighters and tactically versatile soldiers.   
All of this begs the question as to why a full-length study of Roman light infantry had not yet 
been undertaken.  As we have seen throughout Chapters 2 to 5, the answer probably lies in 
the way our sources treated such troops.  As Chapters 2 and 3 indicated, there are few terms 
related to light infantry that give us a clear understanding of the types of troops that these 
terms refer to.  Instead, most light infantry terminology is quite general.  It is only when our 
sources use specific terms such as accensi, antesignani, and velites that we can begin to 
determine what kind of soldiers these may have been.  Indeed, as suggested in Chapter 4 (p. 
116), the Latin terminology sometimes has a tendency be more specific than Greek in naming 
these troops, nevertheless, the most often used terms are quite general in meaning, such as 
expeditae, leves, eu)/zwnoj, and yiloi\.  Furthermore, the broad or general definitions of 
these terms seem to have encouraged the non-technical usage of the terminology.916  This 
usage of light infantry terminology was probably also a result of our sources’ general views 
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 Goldsworthy 1996, 285, cf. Ch. 6. 
916
 Non-technical usage: e.g. using any kind of term to refer to light infantry, rather than specific terms to refer 
to specific kinds of light troops. 
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on the light infantry and their role(s).  Though light infantry may have been used for the 
widest variety of tactical exigencies, these manoeuvres rarely resulted in an outcome 
affecting the overall campaign.  As result, our sources saw them as ‘digna memoratu inferior’ 
as Tacitus so unequivocally put it.  This has been directly reflected in modern historiography.   
Thus, this thesis has attempted to look beyond the limitations of the ancient historiography 
and clarify our understanding of how the Roman army worked as a fighting force.  I would 
suggest that one of the most significant conclusions reached as a result, is that the general 
terminology for light infantry in both Latin and Greek primarily describes the category of 
tactics being undertaken by the group, and not the equipment of the named unit. 
Perhaps one of the important outcomes of Chapter 7 and the assessment of the psychology of 
combat is the new suggestion that serving as velites could prepare soldiers psychologically 
for serving in the acies by allowing them to kill in a more controlled environment.  The 
dynamics of skirmishing that I have suggested result in a ‘cloud’ of skirmishers where 
soldiers are only exposed to combat if they so choose, culminating in a ‘controlled’ combat 
environment for the soldiers involved.  This, in turn, meant that a soldier was not given a 
combative ‘baptism of fire’ as it were, but rather, was introduced to the psychological rigors 
of combat at his own pace.  If he survived this training, he might move up into the acies, 
having presumably been psychologically prepared for the more restrained and disciplined 
methods of combat he would engage in as a line infantryman.  We might look to this 
suggestion as a possible explanation behind the Roman army’s proverbial discipline, i.e. this 
may have been one of the methods by which discipline was achieved.  We should not forget 
however, that a cautious fighting technique and rigorous group dynamics also contributed to 
this ostensible discipline.  Furthermore, it seems that if this potential training cursus were in 
any way officially recognized, it then becomes difficult to explain why the velites were 
eventually replaced by both line infantry and foreign light infantry.917  Thus, we must keep in 
mind that while serving as velites could possibly prepare soldiers psychologically for serving 
in the acies, we have no direct evidence to suggest that this was a recognized method of 
training on the Roman army’s behalf, nor indeed could it have been the only or main way in 
which to instil discipline in soldiers.   
                                                 
917
 I.e. if serving in the velites psychologically prepared soldiers for combat, then the question remains how they 
would by psychologically prepared once the velites disappeared as a fighting force from the army. 
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The general approach of this thesis has been to collect and analyze terms related to light 
infantry, and to determine how our sources use them and from this, attempt to clarify possible 
modes of combat for Roman light infantry.  As has been shown, such combat could be quite 
sundry, since variously equipped soldiers, from slingers to heavily armed legionaries could 
participate in skirmishing and non-pitched battle combat.   
Though the present work has attempted to elucidate the ancient understanding and definitions 
of Roman light infantry there is much more work that needs to be done.  A fuller discussion 
of missiles and missile warfare might be included, which may also require new 
archaeological discoveries.  With the extant archaeological evidence, more in-depth analysis 
of sling bullets and arrows heads might improve our understanding of the ‘face of missile 
warfare’. 
A more thorough investigation into the dynamics of command and control might also help 
elucidate the face of non-pitched battle, by clarifying the precise methods of transmitting 
commands from the highest levels of command through to the smallest units.  Until then, I 
hope to have contributed to our understanding of the Roman ‘face of battle’ by demonstrating 
that Roman light infantry was not only a subsidiary unit within the legions, but that almost 
any soldier could be regarded as light infantry.  Functioning in this capacity, most Roman 
soldiers would have seen combat most frequently as light infantry. 
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